Mono, Ethnic Solutions:The Taliban's Cheque Book Campaign, Autumn 1998 - Part 1
G.D. Bakshi
In military parlance, a campaign that is so flawlessly executed as to become a professional role model, is called a "text book campaign." The Pakistani sponsored Taliban, however, has given us a new genre of military campaigns. Tim McGirek of Time magazine has most aptly described this as a "cheque book campaign." Its core tactic relies upon simply buying off your opposition with huge doles of cash/bribes. This has been the leitmotif of Taliban operations in Afghanistan for the last four years and more. This "cheque book imprimatur" is most clearly visible in the Taliban's recent victory in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998.
Most analysis would have thought that with Pakistan in dire economic straits after the economic sanctions, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) may not be able to bankroll more "cheque book campaigns" by the Taliban. The financial inputs for most of these purchased victories, however (it is now crystal clear), have come from Saudi Arabia and the consortium of oil firms led by UNOCOL which have been hell bent on laying a twin oil-cum-gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to the Makran coast. Pakistan raised, armed and trained the Taliban to deliver the new "Silk Route" to Central Asia. The Taliban was its instrumentality to effect a proxy conquest of Afghanistan and establish a client regime there. The aim was to gain strategic depth against arch rival India, corner the entire Central Asian trade and oil outflow, establish a bridgehead for the destabilisation of Central Asia, and outflank and marginalise Iran altogether from the Central Asian sweepstakes. This blueprint could exploit the low intensity warfare skills of the Taliban to raise the ante in Kashmir and possibly in Xinjiang. In short, Pakistan was in quest of a zero-sum-game option in which it would win all at the cost of each and every one of its neighbouring states--India, Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics and even its ally China. The stark tragedy is that a joint Iran-Pakistan initiative to get peace talks going in Afghanistan was well underway just prior to this Taliban offensive. The avowed objective of putting in place a multi-ethnic arrangement that would accommodate the aspirations of all ethnic groups in Afghanistan, was a very sensible denouement that could have ensured long-term peace and stability in the region. After the earlier UN mediation efforts had failed due to the intransigence of the Taliban, another initiative was launched by Iran in concert with Pakistan. The Pakistan Times in its editorial of August 8, 1998, said that Ayaz Wazir, Director Afghanistan in the Pakistan Foreign Office and Mohiuddin Wajafi, former Iranian Ambassador, were scheduled to pay a joint visit to Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif to broker peace talks between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. It now appears that Pakistan's participation in these peace talks was a smoke screen for its plans for a "final military solution" of the Afghan ethnic problem.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UNOCOL had been eyeing the dissensions in the Jowzjani militia of the Uzbek warlord--Abdul Rashid Dostam--with great interest. The Jowzjani militia was once one of the KGB's proudest creations during the Afghan War. It was a highly professional force. The Uzbeks are amenable to barrack room discipline and had proved a disciplined and potent fighting force in the Afghan War. The Jowzjani militia, however, was sensitive to defaults on payment. Thus, once the Soviets cut off all arms and economic aid to the Najibullah regime, he defaulted on payments. The Jowzjani militia was the first to mutiny. It also suspected Najibullah of selling out the interests of the Afghan ethnic minorities to the Pashtuns. That is how Dostam helped to overthrow Najibullah and became a warlord.
The serious cracks in the Jowzjani militia came to the surface in 1997 in the bitter feud between Dostam and his "Pehelwan" quarter of Generals. General Abdul Malik Pehelwan suspected Dostam of having had his brother assassinated. He was given a hefty bribe (reputedly over a million dollars) by the Taliban and had changed sides in May 1997. The Taliban marched in triumph to Mazar-e-Sharif and began what it does best--high decibel theatricals that involve shooting up posters and beating hapless women. Malik was expecting the Taliban to give him a high position but they were cold. Abdul Malik was outraged by the double-cross. There was a spontaneous rebellion again the Taliban and over 2,000 of them were slaughtered. The Mazar-e-Sharif operation of May 1997 proved to be a dismal fiasco. Dostam had initially fled to Turkey. After the Taliban rout, he came back to resume charge. The bitter feud between him and Abdul Malik Pehelwan, however, simmered on and again burst into the open around March 1998. There were fierce internecine clashes between these Uzbek groups. Anthony Davis writing in Asia Week (August 28, 1998 issue) says that ever since his return from his four months exile in Turkey, Dostam was more busy trying to regain control over the Uzbeks and clashing with the Shias and Mahsood's forces. In March 1998, clashes had erupted between his troops and the Shias and in June with the Tajiks of Mahsood. He paid no attention to the joint offensive of the Northern Alliance against Kunduz. Even in Mazar-e-Sharif itself, lawlessness, rampant corruption and extortion and rape--typical characteristics of Mujahideen rule—had resurfaced under the Hezb-e-Wahdat. The locals were fed up with the incessant infighting and group rivalries. Pakistan's ISI felt that it was an opportune time to strike and take advantage of the serious disarray in the ranks of the Jowzjani militia. The oil pipeline dream once more seemed within reach and the long-term objectives of ethnic reconciliation and durable peace in Afghanistan were dumped unceremoniously for quick short-term gains.
The Saudi Connection
Tim McGirek (writing in the August 31, 1998, issue of Time magazine) states that in July 1998, the Saudi Intelligence Chief, Prince Turki El Faisal had flown into Kandahar for a meeting with the Taliban leaders (and their ISI handlers) and vast sums of money were handed over to the Taliban to purchase/bribe the feuding Uzbek commanders. Logistics had been the Achilles heel of the Taliban May 1997 fiasco in Mazar-e-Sharif. This time the Saudis had 400 brand new pick-up trucks flown into Kandahar. McGirek writes that these still had their Middle Eastern licence plates on when the Taliban pressed them into service for its Autumn 1998 campaign.
Herat was made the mounting base for this operation. The Taliban's combat performance had been fairly dismal in 1997. This time around the ISI was not taking any chances. Anthony Davis writes in the Jane's Defence Weekly (August 1990 issue) that over 1,700 Pakistani Pushtun and Urdu speaking troops in Mufti were airlifted to Herat to spearhead and control the operations. Some media reports indicate that Pakistan's 48 Infantry Brigade located at Quetta was directly involved besides the Mufti-clad personnel of the ISI's Afghan Bureau. The tragic lessons of the Taliban's two failed attempts to capture Mazar-e-Sharif (May and September 1997) were carefully studied by the ISI and detailed precautions were taken. Airlift of reinforcements was meticulously planned. The Taliban offensive commenced on July 10, 1998, with 400 supply trucks/food vehicles and petrol trucks following the advance on the Northern Highway from Herat to Mazar-e-Sharif. The Taliban's cheque book tactics paid handsome dividends. Two Opposition commanders at Maimana were purchased and changed sides. Thus, Maimana (the capital of Faryab province) fell without much fighting. Dostam and Mahsood launched a quick counter-attack. They succeeded in retaking the Maimana airstrip by end July 1998 and were soon fighting in the city itself. The Taliban offensive was stalled for two weeks. It was at this stage that the Pashtuns of the infamous Gulbuddin Hekmetyar (who had returned from exile and was now a junior partner in the Northern Alliance) turned sides treacherously. This purchase gave the Taliban a significant breakthrough on August 2, 1998. Western aid workers at Maimana reported that almost 25 to 50 per cent of the Taliban were Urdu speaking Pakistanis. From Maimana on the northern highway, the Taliban launched a pincer aimed at Dostam's home town of Sherberghan (via Andhkhovi). Internecine fighting had taken a heavy toll of Uzbek morale. By August 5, 1998, the Taliban's western thrust (led by its Interior Minister Mulla Karimulla Khair Khera) had succeeded in capturing Sherberghan (after a brief but reportedly intense fight). The Taliban took two days to consolidate. Simultaneously, it moved to the south to secure Sare-Pole to threaten Mazar-e-Sharif from the south and isolate it from reinforcements by the Shia Hezb-e-Wahdat. The Taliban's eastern pincer towards Mazar-e-Sharif was led by its 28-year-old Culture Minister Mulla Amir Khan Muttaquui. Saudi cash was put to good use to purchase the loyalties of opposing commanders with huge bribes. There were large scale desertions/switch around of Uzbek militia loyalties in the Baghlan province which weakened the eastern defences of Mazar-e-Sharif. Alarmed by the infighting in the Jowzjani militia, the Northern Alliance's Defence Minister sent reinforcements to Mazar-e-Sharif. On August 6, 1998, a 400-strong force of Mahsood's troops launched a counter-attack at Burqua in northern Baghlan province. Tajik and Shia reinforcements were sent to Mazar-e-Sharif to tackle turncoat Uzbek commanders. However, the Taliban had put the Saudi largesse to good use. On August 8, it broke through the defences of Mazar-e-Sharif even as two Uzbek factions (presumably Dostam's and Malik's troops) were fighting it out amongst themselves. The rift between Dostam and Abdul Malik proved fatal to the Northern Alliance. Mazar-e-Sharif was captured in this confusion and the Uzbek forces fell back in disarray. The Taliban pushed on to the Uzbek border and captured Hairatan.
On August 9, 1998, Mahsood launched a hasty counter-attack and for a time succeeded in re-entering Mazar-e-Sharif and temporarily pushing back the Taliban. Despite the turnaround of the squabbling Uzbek factions, the Tajiks and Shia Hazaras put up fierce resistance. Ultimately, Pakistani manned tanks and artillery turned the tide in this battle. Mahsood's counter-attack was poorly coordinated between the Tajiks and the Hazaras. Logistics failed to keep pace and Mahsood had to retreat as he was short of ammunition. The Taliban stormed back into Mazar-e-Sharif.
The operational significance of Mazar-e-Sharif lay in its excellent airport which Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan were using to re-supply the Northern Alliance with arms and ammunition. The Pakistanis now flew in a large number of sorties of heavy transport aircraft to fly in reinforcements and logistic support.
Ironically even as the UNOCOL was partly financing the August 7-8 victory of the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan based Osama Bin Laden's cohorts struck US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania with massive truck bombing attacks. This highlights the perils and pitfalls of American policies in this region that were apparently premised on very tactical, short-term agendas (the laying of oil pipelines). These short- term agendas have totally ignored the long-term consequences of placing in power in Afghanistan such a rabidly fundamentalist group as the Taliban.
The Taliban pushed ahead on August 11, 1998, to capture Taloquan, Pul-e-Khurmi and Nahrain in the Baghlan province, south-east of Mazar-e-Sharif. Ahmad Shah Mahsood fell back to preserve his forces in the face of betrayal by a number of turncoat Uzbek commanders. The Taliban also mounted attacks in the Badakshan province (home base of Rabbani at Faizabad) and captured Aibak. Subsequent media reports have spoken of gruesome massacres by the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif. The Shia Hazaras have been specifically targetted for ethnic cleansing of a most barbaric kind. CNN reports indicated that over 70 Hazaras were nailed to the walls and killed in horrific fashion. Ahmad Rashid, writing the Far Eastern Economic Review (September 11, 1998 issue) reports that on September 9, 1998, over 2,000 Hazaras were massacred in Mazar-e-Sharif by the Taliban. In the long-term, this will make any ethnic reconciliation in Afghanistan well nigh impossible.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the loss of Mazar-e-Sharif has been a serious blow to the Northern Alliance. It has lost a major city and prestigious political objective and more significantly a land and air communications link with its backers (Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, etc). The two air bases left for resupply were the Bamiyan airbase of the Shia Hezb-e-Wahdat and the small air base of Khawjaghar town in north Takhar province which is now the sole air base for the resupply of Mahsood's Tajik forces in the Panjshir.
The Taliban may have exploited the disarray in the ranks of the Uzbek Jowzjani militia to capture Mazar-e-Sharif but its long-term consequences for ethnic reconciliation in Afghanistan could prove to be fatal. Ahmad Shah Mahsood has said that his forces will switch back to the guerilla phase of warfare. Afghanistan has been conquered many times before. The Soviet Army did it in just five days. What was critical, however, was maintaining control over time. It is here that the combat performance of the Taliban will have to be carefully monitored. It may well be premature to write off the Northern Alliance. Heavy bribes paid to Uzbek faction leaders will have to be renewed annually. Problems could occur when the Taliban attempts to disarm these factions in the areas under its control. Similar attempts to disarm the Shia forces had led to massacres last year. Bribes to Opposition commanders have been standard tactics in Afghanistan. Recently declassified records of the Soviet 40th Army based at Termez (which directed the Afghan operation) indicate that once initial Soviet Army operations had failed against Ahmad Shah Mahsood, a significant intelligence operation was launched to buy him off. Soviet Col Zakin Kadyrov reportedly paid a bribe of $350,000 to Mahsood to buy peace. The Tajik military hero was under intense military pressure and accepted the deal. Two years later, he struck viciously at Soviet convoys crossing the Salang Pass. This necessitated the most major operations of the Soviet Afghan campaign to subdue him. Mahsood survived operations Panjshir VII and VIII launched by the cream of Soviet airborne forces. It remains to be seen if the ragtag Taliban outfit can do better in counter-guerilla operations even with massive Pakistani support. Enforcing a quick conquest of major population centres in Afghanistan through classic "cheque book campaigns" has been relatively easier. Enforcing that control over time will be the critical factor. The combat performance of the Taliban (both in 1997 and 1998) does not inspire much confidence in its ability to control the non-Pashtun areas over time. We could still witness many changes in the ground situation. With typical arrogance, the ISI has chosen ethnic confrontation and cleansing over ethnic reconciliation in Afghanistan. One is reminded of Bangladesh in 1971. This could have tragic consequences not just for that hapless country but also the whole region.
Iran's Reaction
As the Taliban swept into Mazar-e-Sharif, it overran the Iranian Embassy and captured 11 Iranian diplomats/intelligence personnel. The Iranians (already incensed by Pakistani's brazen attempt at torpedoing the peace process in Afghanistan) were livid. Pakistan's outright zero- sum-game mentality was transparent. It was attempting to secure victories at the prime cost of Iran and all other regional players. Iran's response was the massing of over 70,000 troops on the Iran-Afghanistan border under the guise of military manoeuvres codenamed Ashura III. There was a massive unprecedented military exercise by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Torbat-e-Jam area. The manoeuvres were conducted over a 600 sq km stretch near the Afghan border. The Revolutionary Guards Commander, Maj Gen Yahaya Rahim Safavi announced that the Iranian troops would continue to remain in the area even after the exercises were over. The Iranian military exercises posed a very potent threat to Herat, the launch pad and logistics base of the Taliban's Autumn 1998 offensive. This forced the Taliban to recoil and rush back reinforcements for the defence of Herat. So great was the initial panic in the Taliban (and Islamabad) that weapons were issued by the Taliban to the civilians in the border areas with Iran. The Iranian manoeuvres by the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) were given a suitable media build up in the Iranian TV and Press. For a time, this gambit totally succeeded in taking the pressure off the beleaguered Tajik and Hazara forces of the Northern Alliance. Iranian political leaders, however, made reconciliatory statements to the effect that Iran would not invade Afghanistan. This served to dilute the Iranian military threat. Emboldened, the Taliban (with strong Pakistani backing) now swiftly turned its attention on the Shia bastion of the Hazarjat. In case of an Iranian offensive, the Taliban was apparently very apprehensive about a Shia military presence in its rear. The Taliban mounted a concerted attack on Bamiyan, the last major city under the Northern Alliance's control and the only significant airport left for the resupply of the Shias. As the defences of Bamiyan crumbled, the Iranians panicked and sent in military supplies in their Air Force aircraft and helicopters even as the Taliban came within artillery range of the Bamiyan airfield. This was too little, too late, and Bamiyan fell. The Taliban essayed into another orgy of ethnic cleansing. This infuriated the Iranian leadership. It now upped the ante by ordering 200,000 troops of the regular Army (some nine divisions) to commence unprecedented war games in the Torbat-e-Jam area (codenamed "Zolfikar"). This brings the Iranian force concentrations against Herat to almost 270,000 troops (including the Revolutionary Guards). A worried Taliban now sent back the dead bodies of nine Iranian diplomats. This further inflamed passions in Tehran as the bodies were received with full military honours, creating a popular groundswell of public opinion demanding Iranian retaliation. Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamanei, the supreme religious leader of Iran, ordered the country's top civil and military officials to go on full alert and complete all preparations for exercising the military option. On September 15, 1998, the armed forces reported full readiness. Ayatollah Khamenei said that he had so far prevented the lighting of a fire which would be hard to extinguish but that all should know that a very wide and great danger is quite near. This danger, he said, could only be prevented by forcing the Pakistani Army to stop intervening in Afghanistan.
(a) Military Option: Teach a Lesson Style Operation. Rather than attempting a permanent military conquest, a more viable option would be for Iran to launch a massive military thrust aimed at Herat to inflict heavy casualties on the Taliban and its Pakistani contingents and later reintroduce Gen Ismail's pro-Iranian Mujahideen in this area and withdraw. It could also serve to take off the military pressure from Mazar-e-Sharif and the Tajiks.
(b) Proxy Option. The other option would be to fight a proxy war with the Taliban using the 2,000 or so Herati troops of Gen Ismail who was earlier ousted from this region. This may not prove a very successful option militarily. Hence, it is far more likely that the stage for the reintroduction of the Iranian backed Afghan factions could be set by a regular military offensive by Iran to give a body blow to the Taliban. The prime objective of the Iranians would be the capture of Herat and the opening of a corridor to Bamiyan via the Harirud River Valley in the Shia majority Hazarajat area. It is, therefore, obvious that the ill advised Afghan venture may become a serious quagmire for the Pakistanis if they fail to learn the lessons of Afghan history. The reverse contagion of rabid fundamentalism may already be coming home to roost. Recently, Premier Nawaz Sharif announced his plan for the full Islamisation (Talibanisation?) of Pakistan. The US missile strikes have caused a fundamentalist backlash in Pakistan. Pakistan is setting itself up as the fountainhead of a new transnational jihad ideology that has scant respect for international borders and national sovereignty. It has succeeded in destroying the nation state of Afghanistan and sending it back to the Middle Ages. This new internationalist mindset is dangerous and could have grave security implications for Central as well as South Asia. The ripple effects of the Afghan vortex are bound to reach across to the Central Asian heartland and to the Indian subcontinent. |
