Right. Another irony here is that Rumsfeld was always presented as nothing if not into details, carefully whittling down what the military wanted to go into Iraq with. When Shinseki pointed out the problem with this, the administration response was the usual, attack the messenger. Now, of course, Rumsfeld knows nothing.
Was that a zig or a zag, Win? A waffle or a wiffle? A flip or a flop? Maybe a slither, though it also had the markings of a dodge.
Whatever it was, it had nothing to do with Rumsfeld's personal culpability for the AG stuff, which I thought we were discussing. And which, incidentally, no one and I mean no one has pointed out facts to support. Even the icon to which you pray, S. Hersh. Sure, lots of "seemingly" and lots of "if this, then surely that." Facts? I'm still waiting, with an open mind, I might add.
But since you have gone off on a tangent, I'll indulge you.
Rumsfeld has not to my knowledge disclaimed his role in setting the troop levels to go into Iraq. As far as criticisms concerning the levels goes, they don't hold any water whatsoever, zip, zero, nil, nada, with respect to their effectiveness to wage what turned out to be a phenomenally efficient and successful campaign. Or do you disagree?
The troop levels the generals wanted would have cost a ton of money, apparently did not take into full account the increased lethality of our weaponry, and did not appear to accurately appraise the degraded effectiveness of Saddam's own troops. Rummie was 150% correct in his views. In retrospect, considering the oppositon and our assets, we in fact went into Iraq with overwhelming force. Just as the Powell Doctrine suggests.
The troops, at Rumsfeld's levels, were at Baghdad's back door at just about the time when people like you were starting to whine about "quagmires."
Or do you remember? I sure do.
I'll grant you troop levels were not the best for post-war. It's an appropriate bone to pick.
As far as the rest of your message, it's just more of the same tired biased stuff. |
