If you gave a perspective that made sense, I might agree with you that it was not appropriate then. But nothing you have said supports your argument.
Well, it is a perspective that made sense to each and every country that was a member of the multinational coalition; it was a position that made sense to Bush 41, Powell, Schwartzkopf, Scocroft, the United States Congress, and damned near everyone else who was involved -- ALL much better informed individuals than you (or even ME!).
Nothing has changed except the American players and yet we may go to war.
EVERYTHING has changed! How ridiculous to suggest that "nothing" has changed. Most importantly, we no longer have weapons inspectors in place, but also, the absence of any foreign policy for eight long years had devastating consequences.
CHECK THIS 1996 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HAASS
"On balance, Saddam gained more than he lost. Indeed, September 1996 was Saddam's best month since March of 1991 when he was able to put down the Shia and Kurdish uprisings and deflect opposition stemming from his catastrophic handling of the Gulf War. To some extent, these gains were the inevitable consequence of Kurdish infighting and the opportunity it created. But U.S. foreign policy also contributed.
Several things could and should have been done differently. The first was coalition maintenance. The anti-Saddam consensus had been allowed to weaken. In diplomacy, neglect is almost never benign. The United States did precious little during the past few years to keep the coalition intact and robust. The policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran gave us a slogan when what we needed was a strategy and sustained efforts to implement it. This applies to Turkey, the Arab governments, the Europeans, and Russia. Furthermore, the lack of U.S. reaction to Turkish and Iranian incursions into northern Iraq only increased Saddam's incentive to act at the same time it increased the odds that a move on his part would be accepted by his Arab neighbors.
The second principal error involved the use of force. The U.S. action--using cruise missiles to destroy a number of Iraqi air defense sites--was too small and too remote. To be sure, there was coalition resistance to using military force against Saddam at this time, a view that reflected a lack of sympathy for the Kurds and concern over Iranian behavior. But the United States will only have a limited number of occasions to use force against Iraq and it must make the most of them--even if it means placing U.S. pilots at some risk or causing some collateral, that is, unintended, damage to people and sites in Iraq. Despite these setbacks, it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. position is irretrievably damaged. The weakness of the coalition in responding to Saddam's actions inside his country should not be interpreted as its demise. A good deal of consensus continues to exist, enough so that keeping the sanctions in place and preventing Iraq from again becoming a strategic threat to its neighbors should be possible. "
These are brief, but telling examples of "what is different".
Bush Sr.'s popularity at the time was running high.....not as high as Bush Jr. but high.
Actually, Bush 41's popularity was far higher than that of Bush 43. |
