Don't Fear Stock Buybacks, Celebrate Them  Tim Worstall,
  Given  that it’s election season there’s much economic illiteracy upon the  prowl. Some part of which is this worrying over the way that publicly  traded corporations spend a lot of their profits on stock buybacks and  dividends. Apparently this means that they don’t invest and by golly  gosh, we’ve got to do something about this. The problem for this is that  returning money to shareholders is what a publicly traded corporation  is for. Complaining that they’re doing what they’re designed to do seem a  little odd really.
   But there’s another level to this argument as well. I’m broadly in agreement with  Matt Levine here:     My naive optimistic model of buybacks is that big public companies  did their innovating in the past, and that public capital markets are  largely about returning money to shareholders, but that those  shareholders can then take that money and reallocate it to smaller  private companies whose innovation is in the future, or at least the  present.     I would add something more to it though. The general movement away  from conglomerates to single purpose companies has been driven by the  increasing efficiency of the finance sector. Efficiency in the financial  sense, in that it’s just cheaper to raise money now than it used to be,  not the economic sense. For 50 years ago, if you made a profit then it  was generally assumed to be a good idea to keep it in that company. So  that you could plan a move into a new business area perhaps. These days  we’re not so keen on that happening. If there’s a new business  opportunity then a new business which raises money on its own is the  preferred solution. Simply because it’s now a great deal cheaper to  raise money for such a new business in a new opportunity.
   Levine then leads into JW Mason who  says this:     Anyway, it seems unlikely that the behavior of privately held  corporations is radically different from publicly traded one; I have a  hard time imagining a set of institutions that reliably channel funds to  smaller, newer firms but stop working entirely as soon as they are  listed on a stock market.      Not really sure about that. I rather think we’ve a whole sector which  does nothing but that, we call them Venture Capitalists. But the error  in the argument is I think here:     In the simplest version of the capital-reallocation story, payouts  from old, declining industries are, thanks to the magic of the capital  markets, used to fund investment in new, technology-intensive  industries. So the obvious question is, has there in fact been a shift  in investment from the old smokestack industries to the newer high-tech  ones?     And he then goes on to show:     As you can see, the decline in high-tech investment is consistent  across the high-tech sectors. While the exact timing varies, in the  1980s and 1990s all of these sectors saw a rising share of investment;  in the past 15 years, none have. [3] So we can safely say: In the  universe of publicly traded corporations, the sectors we think would  benefit from reallocation of capital were indeed investing heavily in  the decades before 2000; but since then, they have not been. The decline  in investment spending in the pharmaceutical industry — which, again,  includes R&D spending on new drugs — is especially striking.
     Where has investment been growing, then?
     The red lines show broad and narrow investment for oil and gas and  related industries — SICs 101-138, 291-299, and 492. Either way you  measure investment, the increase over the past 15 years has dwarfed that  in any other industry. Note that oil and gas, unlike the high-tech  industries, is less R&D-intensive than the corporate sector as a  whole. Looking only at plant and equipment, fossil fuels account for 40  percent of total corporate investment; by this measure, in some recent  years, investment here has exceeded that of all manufacturing together.     Ah. What I think has been missed here is fracking. That technological  revolution of the past decade or so which has entirely upended the  global oil market, and before that the natural gas market in the US. And  while things like smartphones are great I think I’d probably try to  argue that fracking for tight oil has had greater macroeconomic effect  just recently than anything coming out of Silicon Valley.
   In more detail what has been done is that certain sectors have been  counted as being the sort of high tech stuff where we’d like more  investment to be going and certain others have been marked off as being  not quite the high tech sectors where we’d like the extra investment to  be going.
   But it’s not actually true that we want investment to go into a, the  or some high tech sectors. What we want investment to be going into is  sectors more productive than the ones we’re currently in. And  working out how to get tight oil out of the ground has shown itself to  be a remarkably productive manner of employing capital. Thus we’re just  absolutely delighted that investors have thrown money at it.
   In fact, that the fracking revolution has been able to attract great  gobs of funding from the capital markets is actually the proof that  we’re looking for to show that the capital markets are funding new  technologies. Rather than the disproof of the contention which is the  way that Mason is using it.
   Thus the problem in the argument is the way in which desired or  beneficial investment has been defined. Far from capital flowing into  unconventional oil showing that we’ve not been investing in higher  productivity processes, it’s the evidence we need to show that we have  been.
  forbes.com |