Excellent "Q&A" in the NYT
The New York Times
July 26, 2005
Nicholas D. Kristof and Charles Pritchard
Q. I am a veteran of the U.S. military intelligence who specialized for six years in North Korea. Hasn't it been the policy of the U.S. government for many, many years to engage North Korea only with the regional powers: Russia, China, Japan and most importantly South Korea? This isn't an invention of the current administration. The very sensible reason for this stance is that the North Koreans seek direct talks with the United States for only one reason: to enhance their prestige and power at the expense of Japan and South Korea. Opening direct talks would insult our allies and embolden the North Koreans. Do you not agree? — Adrian Stewart, New York
Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard: The United States negotiated bilaterally with North Korea in 1993-1994 to craft the 1994 Agreed Framework. While there was criticism at the time that our allies were excluded, we continued to seek to engage North Korea bilaterally in the early years of the Bush administration. It was not until January 2003 that the U.S. began to put together a multilateral approach to deal with this most current nuclear crisis. Each of our allies as well as China and Russia have urged the U.S. to negotiate seriously and bilaterally with North Korea as each of them are doing. The insistence on an exclusively multilateral approach has not worked to date. Watch closely during the upcoming round of Six Party Talks and see how much the U.S. has moved away from the exclusive multilateral approach to one that has a serious bilateral component to it.
Nicholas D. Kristof: Adrian, I disagree. In the past there were both bilateral and multilateral talks, while this administration has invented the requirement of only engaging the North Koreans in a multi-party forum. Sure, if we sat down with the North Koreans and froze out others in the region, they would be upset. But they're upset right now at our refusal to deal seriously with North Korea, and they would be delighted if we sat down with the North Koreans for one-on-one talks that actually had hope of resolving the issues. The cost of our saber-rattling approach to North Korea isn't just felt in the North - it has also antagonized South Korea, which increasingly is moving out of the U.S. orbit and into China's. That may be the long-run geopolitical legacy of this administration.
Some readers have complained to me, saying: "You always like multilateralism - and now finally Bush does something multilateral and you have a fit." But talk to people who have participated in the six-party talks and they say that they are simply too big to work. By the time everything is translated and everybody has commented, you can't have meaningful give and take. So the six-party talks would be fine, if they were accompanied by a chance for real negotiation in a smaller setting.
Q. What would ever prompt North Korea to justify the use of its limited cache of WMD, knowing that in retaliation, they would be completely annihilated by U.S.? — Mark Davis, New York
Pritchard: For the moment North Korea views its newly acquired nuclear weapons as a deterrent against military action by the United States. Many assess that North Korea would not use their weapons unless they believed the regime's survival was threatened. Of more concern to the United States is the potential that North Korea, under certain circumstances, might proliferate some portion of their stockpile of fissile material. One of the arguments the United States tries to make to North Korea is that they are LESS secure with WMD than they are without it.
Kristof: Fascinating question, Mark. In 1994, the Clinton administration came pretty close to launching military strikes on the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea, risking a strong North Korean response, possibly a nuclear one. The thinking was that the North Koreans tend to be rational, and they'll accept the loss of one nuclear reactor rather than launch an all-out war that leads to the destruction of their country. Some hawks today think the same way — we could take out their plutonium program, and they wouldn't respond in a major way. I think those hawks may well be right. North Korea's ethos is self-preservation, and Kim Jong Il must know that if he responded even conventionally — and certainly with WMD — we would destroy his regime. But I also think there's a good chance I'm wrong. Rogue regimes don't always make rational calculations — certainly Saddam would have been better off backing down before both the first and second Gulf wars, for example. And North Korea is so imbued with nationalism that I think it might respond strongly to an attack on its nuclear sites. On this trip, I asked a three-star general how the North would respond, and he insisted that the result would be all-out war, and he strongly implied this would include first use of nuclear weapons.
Even if North Korea responded only with a conventional attack, the result would be a devastating new Korean War. And since North Korea would lose, my guess is that it would quickly use everything in its arsenal. That includes a small number of nuclear warheads, but a much larger number of chemical warheads that can reach Seoul. That's probably the form of WMD that would kill the most people. If I were guessing, I'd say that North Korea would not engage in a first use of WMD if we did not launch a strike, but that it might well sell plutonium. And if we launched a surgical strike on its reactors, my guess is that there's a 60 percent chance that it would not respond in a major way (maybe just modest terrorism or skirmishes along the DMZ), but that there's a 40 percent chance of a new Korean war and very likely WMD as well. I don't think that's a bet worth taking.
Q. I am a logistics officer being reassigned to South Korea is September of this year. Beyond all the data that I received and can obtain from the military, what can you recommend that I read to get a full and broad understanding of the Korean peninsula? My goal is not just current affairs, but the history of that portion of world. — Maj. Michael Ridgway, Killeen, Tex.
Pritchard: I recommend you start with Don Oberdorfer's book: "The Two Koreas, A Contemporary History," published by Basic Books, revised edition December 2001.
Kristof: Bruce Cummings has written an excellent history of modern Korea, as well as his better-known work on the origins of the Korean war. I tend to disagree with his approach — he's more sympathetic to the North than I am — but he's a first-rate scholar, a master of the Korean language, and well-worth reading.
Bradley Martin has just published an outstanding book about North Korea, called "In the Shadow of the Fatherly Leader." And Jasper Becker has published "Rogue Regime," which is more polemical but also well worth reading. Finally, one good read is "Aquariums of Pyongyang," which President Bush just read and is recommending to others. It's an autobiographical account of life in a North Korean labor camp. And there are a number of good Internet resources. I get a daily email list-serve called Napsnet, from www.nautilus.org, which summarizes news about Korea. And www.nkzone.org is a good blog on North Korea.
Ambassador Pritchard
Q. 1. Having represented the U.S. in negotiations with North Korea, do you understand what prompted North Korea's apparently renewed, feverish nuclear development since December 2002? Could their resumed activities be a response to Bush's pronouncement in January 2002 of North Korea's place in the Axis of Evil? — Elizabeth Kim, Cambridge, Mass.
While the January 2002 State of Union Address in which the president labeled North Korea part of the Axis of Evil (along with Iraq and Iran) caused Pyongyang a great deal of angst and gave them the domestic justification to declare the United States as having "hostile intent" toward North Korea, it was the Oct. 4, 2002, accusation by the U.S. delegation in Pyongyang that North Korea was involved in a Highly Enriched Uranium program to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework that set off a series of events that led to North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003 and extracting plutonium from reactor fuel rods that had previously been under International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring.
Q. 2. The C.I.A. appears to have almost no human intelligence sources in North Korea. Do the Chinese, Japanese and South Korean intelligence agencies have any substantial North Korean sources? — Noah Z., Los Angeles
North Korea is an extremely closed society that effectively limits human intelligence from operating at the level that would provide meaningful information. Of the countries in the area, the Chinese have the greatest access and thus the greatest ability to gain information. Other available sources are defectors, non-governmental groups operating along the Sino-North Korean border and legal business travelers from a variety of countries. But none of the countries you mention have sufficient resources in North Korea to provide effective intelligence that would give us an adequate indication of what is really happening throughout North Korea.
Q. 3. Have you personally met Kim Jong Il? — Nathaniel Cristopher Gualberto, Quincy, Ill.
When I was senior director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff, I traveled with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in late October 2000 to North Korea. I met Kim Jong Il then as part of Secretary Albright's team.
Q. 4. Who is currently in line to succeed Kim Jong Il? Do we have a lot of information regarding Kim's relationship with his sons? — Roberto Azula, Taipei, Taiwan
Kim Jong Il has three sons. Two are in their early twenties and the eldest is in his 30's. Reporting suggests that the eldest son is no longer seen as the likely successor to his father, leaving many to speculate that, because of the age of the other two sons, Kim has not seriously prepared for a successor.
Q. 5. In your dealings with the North Korean government have you found much diversity of opinion regarding the U.S. among officials? In other words, how tightly do the individuals toe the party line? — Alex Ivey, New York
When you are in meetings with North Koreans, they have a fairly consistent opinion of the U.S., much as we might expect. Over time, as you develop personal relationships, more individual opinions are revealed.
Q. 6. I understand that in order to create an environment for economic and market changes, the North Koreans were using farmers markets as a way to learn about operating their own businesses, and that this type of experience might "trickle up" slowly and help effect a transition to a more market-driven economy. Did you see any evidence of this in North Korea? — Charlie Costello
North Korea has transformed many of the black market farmers activities into regulated markets such as the Tong Il Market in Pyongyang that has just about type of consumer goods (meat, vegetables, clothing, crafts, furniture, electronics, etc.) you could want. Some of the vendors are fronts that sell excess goods from businesses seeking to make a profit once they meet their official quotas vice the family farmer.
Nicholas D. Kristof
Q. 1. Do you think any negotiation with North Korea that does not involve the human rights issue is moral? Would it be moral to come to an agreement that removes the nuclear threat but still allows the gulags to survive? Would that simply be appeasement? — Kevin Neilson, Boulder, Colo.
I certainly think it's moral to negotiate with North Korea about issues other than human rights. In fact, I think it would be immoral to refuse to worry about nuclear issues - after all, a nuclear explosion would violate a lot of people's human rights, like life. But, Kevin, if your point is that we should care about North Korea's people as well as its nukes, I think you're right. Jasper Becker argues, I think rightly, in his new book, "Rogue Regime," that if we negotiate only about nuclear issues, then Kim Jong Il has already won.
Will pressure on human rights make any difference? Yes, I think it might. Kim Jong Il isn't going to stop torturing people because we ask nicely, but he has shown some willingness to accommodate human rights demands. For example, many years ago he opened two churches when foreigners raises questions about religious freedom, and now he's about to open another, an Orthodox church. The U.S. says it will raise human rights concerns at the six-party talks, and I think we're right to do so.
Q. 2. Was it possible to form an impression about the influence China truly holds over North Korea? Is it realistic to believe the Chinese could compel the North to suspend nuclear weapons development and give up its arms? — Jason Lear, Eugene, Ore.
Great question, Jason. A lot of people, including many in the U.S. government, think China has immense influence over North Korea. I disagree. In fact, I think China is in trouble because it has always issued propaganda claiming its relations with North Korea "are as close as lips to teeth," and when the U.S. has asked for help with North Korea its officials have nodded sagely and promised to help. But the reality is that North Korea and China don't like each other, and the North Koreans haven't listened to the Chinese for decades. As far back as the 1960's, Mao was already irritated with Kim Il Sung for thinking that Kimilsungism was more important than Maoism.
It's true that China supplies a lot of energy to North Korea. But if China cut off all trade — which it never will, because that's just not China's style — well, even then North Korea would simply let a couple of million peasants die rather than bow to China's bidding. So China can nudge North Korea this way or that (right now it's nudging it an inch in the direction of markets), but it can't force North Korea to be reasonable.
Q. 3. How can the U.S. expect to have any credibility as a force against the development of nuclear weapons by nations such as North Korea and Iran, when we continue to try and develop them ourselves? Does the world see this as flat-out hypocrisy, or is it viewed more as a kind of realpolitik entitlement of superpowers that the world understands and, perhaps grudgingly, expects? — Philip Golabuk, Gainesville, Fla.
Sure, it's hypocritical. But by and large the world recognizes that the NPT and indeed the entire regime for controlling nuclear weapons is about hypocrisy — big nations are allowed to have them, and little ones aren't — but that hypocrisy is preferable to periodic nuclear wars. So I think that while there is some griping about the hypocrisy, there's also a recognition that it'll be a worse world if Iran has nuclear weapons and if North Korea has more.
The problem is in part one of dominos. Domino theory got a bad rap with Vietnam, but the fact is that if North Korea develops more nuclear weapons, that increases the prospect that Japan and South Korea (and possibly Taiwan) will get them as well. Already there are signs that Japan is inching toward a nuclear capability (meaning the ability to put together a nuclear warhead in 10 minutes if it needs to). And if Iran gets nukes, then Saudi Arabia and Egypt may as well. So in this case, I'm sympathetic to a whiff of hypocrisy.
Q. 4. What did the North Koreans want to know about the U.S.? — Aaron Bolton, St. Louis, Miss.
I confess I didn't have a single ordinary, freewheeling conversation with a North Korean. Everybody I talked to was carefully selected, or else they were on guard. If one had asked me, say, if it's true that Americans all have plenty of food and lots of money, the others present might have reported him. So it's difficult to know what they're curious about.
In China and South Korea, I've had more casual conversations with North Korean refugees. They've expressed curiosity about American baseball, about American salaries, about American television and movies, and so on. The North Korean officials I talked to on this trip did express interest in the American political scene. They wanted to know who will get the Democratic nomination in 2008 and whether Bill Richardson of New Mexico (who has been to North Korea) has any chance. And they wanted to know if Sam Brownback, whom they know of and don't like, might get the Republican nomination. And of course they wanted to know whether Republicans will retain the White House. They were disappointed when I told them I didn't have a clue.
Q. 5. Do the people of North Korea have any idea how much food and fuel oil comes from international donors? If they do know, how is it justified in light of the juche policy of self-reliance? — Timothy Wells, San Francisco
More sophisticated North Koreans know about the reliance on foreigners, and it probably does cause some cognitive dissonance. The official explanation is that they've had bad weather that destroyed crops — every year since the mid-1990's. Obviously, that explanation has worn thin.
But remember that juche — self-reliance — isn't a theory so much as a religion. If a Christian loses a child, that doesn't make a Christian forsake Christianity. Likewise, many North Koreans manage to lose relatives to starvation or political oppression, and yet they still believe in the system. I've seen it in my interviews of Korean refugees abroad, and it seems very bizarre that people still believe in a system that has failed so badly.
Q. 6. What kinds of professional jobs are available for North Koreans? Are students sometimes granted visas to study abroad in China? I'm wondering what caliber of educational facilities are available to North Koreans. — Laura Garrity, Brooklyn, New York
The best jobs are in the ruling party, government and academia, in Pyongyang. Much depends on your family background, your political trustworthiness, and your expertise in ideology. A small number of North Korean students study in China, but very few. Kim Jong Il's own sons studied in Switzerland and speak decent English. One reason there hasn't been more rebellion in North Korea is that typically the seeds of dissent arise from the intelligentsia. And North Korea has been careful to co-opt the intellectuals with perks like good wages, houses and working conditions. In any case, one of the real failures of Confucianism has always been that while the state treats scholars well, it also demands in turn that the scholars support the state — and they generally do.
Q. 7. What observations do you have regarding independent North Korean arts and literature? Do such things exist, and if so — what are they like? Is there any evidence of creative freedom, or are the arts all state-controlled, like the children's performance? — Cat, Chicago
There is zero creative freedom. Zero. But the state puts plenty of emphasis on the arts, and so there is good music, painting and dance. And, as you saw in the children's performance, everything is meticulously practiced. The most amazing show I've ever seen in my life was the opening ceremony for the World Youth Festival in Pyongyang in 1989. The children involved spent a year preparing, and it put any Olympic opening ceremony to shame. It was simply an amazing choreography of dance, flashcards and gymnastics.
Kim Jong Il has been interested in the arts, particularly movies, and has watched large numbers of American films. But North Korean movies still follow the political model, where they must present a larger point about how awful foreigners are and how much the Korean people owe Kim Il Sung.
Q. 8. What factors do you think have to happen for a successful reunification of the Korean Peninsula? What would happen if they reunified tomorrow? — William Phillips, Champaign, Ill.
North Korea will collapse at some point, and then the South will take over. But the South has seen what happened in Germany, so it'll be careful to leave the DMZ in place. Northerners will not be allowed to flood south, and the South won't pay billions to raise the living standards in the North.
One risk is that the North will collapse into civil war, with rival factions fighting it out. Then one faction with nuclear weapons would be quite tempted to use them. South Korea would certainly be drawn in, and perhaps China as well. China is a bit nervous about reunification, partly because South Korea claims that Korean territory in the north includes lands that are now Chinese territory. For example, in Blue House, the presidential residence of South Korea, there's a huge map of the Korean peninsula that includes a good chunk of China. That doesn't matter now, but if the South gained control of the north, it would mean a disputed border with China. I think it would help if South Korea accepted that the present border between North Korea and China is the true frontier. |
