Mary, this is the text to which I was referring. Perhaps it might be of some use (both Zhao and Briggs are cited by Varian):
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Although some California appellate courts previously held that the statute only protected acts closely related to "behavior protected by the Petition Clause" (Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124 (1996)), the California Supreme Court recently rejected this view. In Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity 9 Cal.4th 1106 (January 21, 1999), the Court held that:
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that plaintiffs accurately have characterized ECHO's activities as constituting neither self-interested nor general political speech, we cannot conclude such activities thereby necessarily fall outside the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Contrary to plaintiffs' implied suggestion, the statute does not require that a defendant moving to strike under section 425.16 demonstrate that its protected statements or writings were made on its own behalf (rather than, for example, on behalf of its clients or the general public). We agree, moreover, with the court in Braun v. Chronicle that "Zhao is incorrect in its assertion that the only activities qualifying for statutory protection are those which meet the lofty standard of pertaining to the heart of self-government."
(Braun v. Chronicle, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046-1047.)
In short, where 1) defendants have any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, each cause of action concerning those communications must be stricken unless 2) the Court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
webnode.com (see section IIB)
- Jeff |
