AL-SADR: A MATCH IN A TINDER BOX
Much has been written these days about Moqtada al-Sadr, the young Shiite cleric who we had warned against in WWNK 1/19/04. Al-Sadr has brought Shiites into active resistance
against the U.S.-led occupation: his followers are now engaged in battles with coalition troops across Iraq.
Prior to his recent emergence as the leading anti-American Shiite in Iraq, al-Sadr had only a very limited following--probably no more than a few thousand. However, with emotions running high in the Middle East generally, and in Iraq specifically, it is not inconceivable that al-Sadr's belligerent stance against the coalition could help him gain a much larger following.
So, what to do about al-Sadr? The best answer may be "nothing": internal Shiite politics may resolve the problem for us. While al-Sadr has some religious standing in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Hussein al-Sistani is, without doubt, the leading Iraqi Shia cleric. That he has so far turned a blind eye to al-Sadr's uprising is believed by some analysts to be his way of voicing his opposition to the transitional plans of the U.S. government. The theory goes like this:
1.Once Saddam Hussein fell, the U.S. government knew that the key to success in the post-war period would be that the Shiite majority remained quiet and cooperative. The only person able to deliver that guarantee was al-Sistani. In exchange, the U.S. promised prompt and democratic elections-which is to say that the Shiite majority would take power. Power brokers such as Ahmed Chalabi, Chairman of the Iraqi Government Council (an individual we will pay more attention to in a future edition), served as go-betweens with the Iranians, assuring that they would also remain on the sidelines during the transition.
2.The U.S. strategy worked well, up to and until the point that the U.S.--claiming that there was not enough time to allow for direct elections by the June 30, 2004 deadline--changed the plan to a transitional power sharing arrangement that included Sunnis and Kurds. Al-Sistani and his supporters raised strong objections the U.S. has, so far, tried to politely ignore.
3.Along comes al-Sadr, a hotheaded competitor to al-Sistani, the perfect loaded gun to use to get the attention of the U.S. In essence, turning a blind eye to al-Sadr's revolt, or even encouraging it from behind the scenes, could very well be al-Sistani's way of sending a clear and unequivocal message to the U.S. coalition: either allow the Shiites to take power on June 30, 2004, or face a far wider conflict. That would be a disaster for U.S. forces in Iraq, and for the U.S. President's odds of re-election.
As for al-Sadr's longer-term prospects, they are not good. Once his use to al-Sistani is finished, he is strongly at risk of being assassinated by his far stronger Shiite opposition.
Al-Sadr's only hope is for a heavy-handed overreaction against his Shiite followers by the U.S. In that event, he could see his support within Iraq soar. Should that occur, it would be al-Sistani who would have to worry about the assassin's knife.
In the end, the odds of the U.S. riding out over the Iraqi horizon, tipping our white hat to the grateful masses, are infinitesimally small... with the current troubles with al-Sadr making those odds smaller still.
WHAT WE KNOW NOW column at
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