Mr. Buschman:
I have located my copy of Schwarzkopf's 1992 autobiography titled "It Doesn't Take A Hero". On the first page of the last chapter, titled "Afterthoughts", General Schwarzkopf discusses the questions he had been asked the most since the conclusion of the Gulf War. (Bear in mind that this book was published in 1992).
The first question of course, is why didn't we go all the way to Baghdad and "finish the job". It should be clearly understood that the option of going all the way to Baghdad was never considered. Despite all the experts who, with twenty twenty hindsight, are now criticizing that "decision", at the time the war ended there was not a single head of state, diplomat, Middle East expert, or military leader who, as far as I am aware, advocated continuing the war and seizing Baghdad. The United Nations resolutions that provided the legal basis for our military operations in the gulf were clear in their intent: kick the Iraqi military force out of Kuwait. We had authority to take whatever actions necessary to accomplish that mission, including attack into Iraq; but we had no authority to invade Iraq for the purpose of capturing the entire country or its capital.
I wish I was a quick enough typist to reproduce the rest of Schwarzkopf's interesting commentary on this subject, because he gives other reasons for not taking Baghdad as well, but suffice it is to say, Chairman Powell's and General Schwarzkopf's statements in their autobiographies concerning the Gulf War appear to be more consistent with GST's characterization of that event than your characterization of that event. The United Nations resolutions that provided a "legal basis" for U.S. actions are given quite a bit of emphasis.
Best regards,
Huey |
