And one more since I mentioned Condi earlier:
Condi's Iraq Stumble
April 5, 2006; Page A20
Iraq can use all the gestures of solidarity it can get. And President Bush could boost both American and Iraqi morale by putting his own two boots on the ground there sometime soon. But try as we might, we can't see what good purpose was served by Condoleezza Rice and Jack Straw's lobbying in Baghdad earlier this week. If the American Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary were aiming to be diplomatic, they failed.
That's because with both words and gestures the two publicly took sides in a contentious dispute over forming Iraq's government -- and in favor of a man, former Finance Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who is not even a declared candidate for Prime Minister. Meanwhile, they snubbed Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who beat out Mr. Mahdi to become the Shiite coalition's candidate for the post, and who is also the current holder of the office.
The effect was to suggest to many Shiites -- even those who don't love Mr. Jaafari -- that the U.S. and Britain are not respecting their victory in December's election. As senior Kurdish politician Mahmoud Othman, a usual ally of the U.S., put it, "I think that their interference is bad, and it further complicates issues because this is an Iraqi matter."
It's hard to see any reason for a strong U.S. preference here. Granted that Mr. Jaafari has not proven to be a strong and decisive leader. But he is by everyone's account a good and honest person, and he has more genuine support on the Iraqi street than most other leaders -- though admittedly that's not saying much given the general unpopularity of Iraqi pols. He's also less beholden to Iran than many possible alternatives.
As for Mr. Mahdi, he's clearly the smoother politician of the two. He speaks better English and he seems to have a more modern (free-market) economic philosophy, among other assets. But he also represents a party called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. SCIRI has very strong ties to Iran, and it has been in charge during the interim government of the problematic Interior Ministry, whose police forces are not well trusted and have been credibly accused of abuses against Sunnis.
Mr. Mahdi's name has remained in play in part because President Jalal Talabani and the Kurds appear to have struck a deal with SCIRI to acquiesce in a Kurdish takeover of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in exchange for the Kurds allowing the emergence of a more religious Shiite southern Iraq. Some kind of federalist power sharing is necessary, but too much will also risk a too-weak national government in Baghdad.
Our point isn't to pick one man, or faction, over the other. It is that we can't see a strong rationale for the U.S. taking sides -- certainly not enough to justify Ms. Rice's suggestion that the expenditure of U.S. "treasure" in Iraq justified her barely coded calls for Mr. Jaafari to step aside. A particular danger is that Ms. Rice may be playing into the hands of troublesome cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who dislikes Mr. Mahdi, and who may well be looking for any excuse to foment anti-American sentiment.
Mr. Jaafari may yet fail to form a new government. But it's much better to let him be seen to fail on his own if that's what happens, rather than be pushed aside by the Americans. Iraq has a parliamentary system that allows for no-confidence votes and changes of office if the government isn't working out.
More broadly, the Bush Administration can't afford to forget the most fundamental strategic fact about Iraq: To wit, our project there is entirely dependent on continued Shiite support. The U.S. and its Shiite allies can fight a low-intensity conflict with Sunni Saddamist remnants for a decade or more if need be. What would make the U.S. mission in Iraq untenable would be for Shiites to turn against us in significant numbers.
And Shiite mistrust of the U.S. has been growing. One festering issue remains former U.S. regent Paul Bremer's decision to reverse himself on the de-Baathification policy he declared shortly after the U.S. invasion. De-Baathification gave Shiites the expectation of a process to punish those associated with the former regime and undoubtedly saved a lot of Sunni lives early on. But our about-face emboldened the Baathist insurgents, and Shiite-on-Sunni revenge killings are on the rise now because Shiites believe we can't -- or worse, won't -- protect them.
One especially worrying signal about the Shiite mood has been the reaction to a U.S.-Iraqi raid on elements of Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army about 10 days ago. Many Shiites believe instead that U.S. forces massacred worshippers in cold blood inside a mosque. Ms. Rice's visit is now being cited as evidence of a U.S. "conspiracy" to deprive Shiites of their election victory.
The Secretary of State is surely right that the U.S. sacrifice for Iraqi freedom has earned us the right to speak up. But except where U.S. interests are clearly threatened, pressure is best applied behind closed doors by the seasoned U.S. Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, not the unsubtle endorsement of candidates by overnighting officials. |
