The New York Times on Iraq, 1993-2005
AMERICAN FUTURE
Marc Schulman
Baghdad forfeits the protection of the U.N. cease-fire
resolution every time it violates the cease-fire terms.
[January 21, 1993 editorial]
This page remains persuaded of the vital need to disarm
Iraq. But it is a process that should go through the
United Nations.
[March 17, 2003 editorial]
A war can be lost because public opinion turns against its continued prosecution. The New York Times – the self-described “newspaper of record” – is among the world’s most influential opinion leaders. As shown by the cited quotations, the newspaper’s stance on Iraq underwent a complete transformation during the decade separating 1993 and 2003. While its editors never lost their fear of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their prescription for countering the threat posed by the weapons was altered beyond recognition. In 1993, by arguing that cease-fire violations nullified U.N. protection, the Times affirmed the right of a victorious party to resume hostilities at its sole discretion if the party it defeated did not abide by the terms of the agreement to which it affixed its signature. Ten years later, the Times reversed its stance, asserting that the United States should not go to war without the approval of the United Nations. In so doing, the Times implicitly argued that going to war with the approval of a multilateral institution took precedence over the use of military force to expeditiously eliminate the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD.
This post, which covers the eight years of the Clinton administration, is the first of three that employ the Times’ editorials to trace and analyze the evolution of the newspaper’s position on Iraq. The second will cover the pre-invasion Bush administration, while the third will deal with the period from the fall of Baghdad to the present.
This initial installment is organized into four sections: editorials on inspections, sanctions, and WMD; editorials on the use of force; editorials on the U.N. Security Council and its members; and editorials on Clinton administration policies.
The Clinton Administration
Except for a brief period during 1994, The Times’ editorial position was distinctly hawkish during the Clinton presidency. At no time did the Times express any doubts regarding the credibility of intelligence information pertaining to WMD. Throughout this period, the paper’s editors insisted on an aggressive UN-directed inspection regime, which was their preferred means to disarm Saddam’s Iraq. They frequently made note of Saddam’s efforts to thwart the inspectors, and insisted that Iraq must fully cooperate before the sanctions implemented at the end of the Gulf War should be lifted. The Times’ objective was the elimination of Iraq’s WMD, not regime change. Bringing democracy to Iraq was not a topic in its editorials.
Notwithstanding their preference for inspections, the editors did not shy away from advocating the use of air strikes – including unilateral American air strikes – if the obstacles constructed by Saddam made it impossible for the U.N.’s inspectors to fulfill their missions. The Times endorsed every U.S. military operation ordered by Clinton. None of the editorials insisted that the U.S. must obtain Security Council approval before undertaking a military action, nor did they require that military operations – unilateral or multilateral – be authorized by new Security Council resolutions.
When the editors criticized the Clinton administration, it was for being too dovish, not too hawkish. They leveled similar criticisms at the U.N. Security Council. China, Russia and especially France were taken to task for giving priority to their commercial interests over coming to grips with the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD.
The single exception to the Times’ hawkish stance stemmed from Iraq’s November 1993 decision to cooperate with the UN arms inspectors. In an editorial dated August 1, 1994, it was stated that Iraq was “now close to meeting the Security Council’s requirement that it destroy its stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and accept long-term international monitoring.” For France, Russia, and China, this was sufficient for lifting the oil sanctions. The U.S. and Britain “opposed any acknowledgement of progress,” and the Clinton administration, “which insists on retaining sanctions as long as Mr. Hussein remains in power, has been reduced to strained reinterpretations of the cease-fire’s resolution’s clear language . . . “ The editors sided with France, Russia, and China. It wouldn’t be long, however, before the Times would be disabused of the notion that Saddam had changed his colors.
1. Editorials on Inspections, Sanctions, and WMD
Saddam’s apparent cooperation with the U.N. inspectors prompted the Times to recommend lifting sanctions:
<<<
(2/15/93) The inspectors found and destroyed much, though not all, of Iraq’s nuclear program. But the technicians that put it together remain, and so does Iraq’s will to acquire the technology.
(8/1/94) Last November, after years of obstructionism, Baghdad abruptly began cooperating with U.N. arms inspectors. It is now close to meeting the Security Council’s requirement that it destroy its stocks of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and accept long-term international monitoring . . . Washington’s most realistic policy toward Iraq under these circumstances is containment. The best instrument for that is U.N. arms monitoring, not endlessly prolonging sanctions that have nearly done their work and will soon lose their meaning.
>>>
But his deployment of troops at the Kuwaiti borders causes the Times to change its mind:
<<<
(10/11/94) [Written the day after Iraq’s announcement that it would withdraw its troops from Kuwait’s northern border] U.N. inspectors reported that Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons components and longer-range missiles had been fully located and destroyed. A thorough system for long-term monitoring is ready to go into operation in the coming weeks — assuming Iraq continues its recent pattern of cooperation with the U.N. . . . the U.S. and Britain, oppose any relief at this time, or perhaps at any time while Saddam Hussein remains in power. They argue that he cannot be trusted to continue his cooperation on arms once sanctions have been eased. That objection now carries added weight.
>>>
With the withdrawal of Iraq’s troops from the Kuwait’s border, The Times reverted to its previous position on eliminating sanctions:
<<<
(11/28/94) Washington refuses to acknowledge Iraq’s progress on arms control . . . Iraq is surely an aggressor state; but it can respond rationally to diplomatic incentives. For two years it has cooperated with U.N. arms inspectors, and its motive for this cooperation is clear. The resolution ending the Persian Gulf war stated that by complying with arms control requirements alone, even if it ignored other United Nations resolutions, Iraq could reclaim the right to sell oil on the world market. U.N. inspectors are now satisfied that Iraq’s most dangerous weapons have been located and destroyed. They are ready to begin an aggressive long-term monitoring program to assure that Iraq builds no more such weapons. A majority of the Security Council’s permanent members, eager to do business with Iraq, are prepared to lift oil sanctions after six months of successful monitoring. The U.S., supported only by Britain, will not agree. Washington, though it never says so directly, has made it plain that it will not consider relief so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. That is no way to encourage Iraqi cooperation on arms control, or to encourage allies to maintain sanctions.
>>>
By early 1995, there were signs that Iraq had stopped cooperating with the U.N. inspectors, and the editors had another change of heart:
<<<
(1/14/95) The United Nations Security Council was right not to ease economic sanctions against Iraq this week. France and Russia pushed for relaxation and the United States and Britain resisted. A new report by the U.N. inspectors shows that Baghdad has yet to come clean. Iraq has impeded monitoring of biological arms-making by failing to identify all sites, material and equipment used for that purpose. Information provided on how it obtained equipment and materials to manufacture weapons is inaccurate and incomplete.
(2/21/95) Baghdad continues to provide incomplete and inaccurate disclosures on its biological weapons program and supplier networks. The embargo is still needed to compel full Iraqi compliance.
(4/18/95) The embargo should not be lifted now because Iraq has yet to comply fully with the requirements on disarming and international monitoring . . . The U.N. inspectors cannot account for 17 metric tons of material that could be used to breed germ warfare agents like anthrax . . . Concern about the continuing Iraqi concealment of its nuclear program was recently aroused by the disappearance of one of Iraq’s nuclear experts, who reportedly fled to Greece with documents showing that Iraq was still engaged in weapons design and nuclear research.
>>>
In mid-1995, Iraq finally acknowledged that it stockpiled large quantities of germ warfare agents in the late 1980’s. For the Times, admission to past stockpiles was not sufficient and the U.S. position on sanctions was justified.
<<<
(7/7/95) The U.N. now rightly demands a detailed report on how the biological agents were produced and which countries supplied what raw materials. It also needs to know how far Iraq got in turning these agents into weapons and exactly what happened to them after Baghdad ostensibly abandoned its germ warfare program in 1990 . . . The United States has been right to insist on full compliance before approving any sanction relief.
>>>
Following the defection of General Hussein Kamel to Jordan in early August 1995, Iraq provided the U.N. with previously-concealed information about its germ warfare program. The new documents showed that Iraq had bombs and Scud missiles armed with biological agents during the Gulf War.
<<<
(8/24/95) The long concealment of this information and the Machiavellian reasons behind its present disclosure invite troubling new questions about what else Baghdad may be hiding. Is this at last the whole truth, or another self-serving selective glimpse? . . . it is now clear that compliance with the arms control provisions of the cease-fire resolution must be proved beyond any doubt before sanctions are removed. Iraq has forfeited so much credibility with its deceptions that the U.N. commission charged with monitoring compliance now has no choice but to verify everything independently.
(10/19/95) . . . there are compelling reasons to keep the economic sanctions intact. Not the least of them is a United Nations report that Baghdad may be embarked on secret new efforts to build prohibited weapons, including long-range missiles equipped with chemical and perhaps biological warheads . . . now it is abundantly clear there has been less Iraqi compliance and far more deception than U.N. inspectors realized [six months ago]. Iraq has shown little interest in reporting truthfully.
>>>
After nearly a two-year hiatus, the editors returned to the subject of Iraq’s WMD.
<<<
(6/30/97) Six years after the Persian Gulf war, Saddam
Hussein remains determined to manufacture chemical and
biological weapons and the means to deliver them.
(10/29/97) For months, Iraq has actively misled United
Nations inspectors about its continuing germ warfare
program and blocked entry to military bases where
prohibited materials may be stored.
(11/7/97) Iraq has been disabling surveillance cameras
and moving suspicious materials and equipment out of the
inspectors’ view. This new interference could mask an
effort to produce biological weapons on the sly and will
undermine the long-term credibility of the arms
monitoring effort.
>>>
Following the departure of the UN inspectors from Iraq, the Times voiced its concerns.
<<<
(11/16/97) There have been no inspections of Iraq’s germ-warfare programs since Oct. 29. Its fermenters can prepare anthrax for weapons use in a matter of days. Given the right conditions, an airborne release of anthrax over a city could kill as many as 100,000 people. Friday’s departure of the inspection force means the system of arms control imposed after the gulf war has lapsed, leaving Iraq’s neighbors and the global community in a situation of intolerable vulnerability.
(11/21/97) Before the Security Council can consider ending sanctions, the inspection commission must be able to certify that Iraq’s biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs have been completely shut down and their stocks destroyed, along with all missiles capable of flying farther than 95 miles. It must also establish and maintain a reliable system of long-term monitoring to assure that these weapons programs are not resumed in the future.
>>>
Two days after these words were written, the Times published a key editorial entitled “No Time to Ease Up on Iraq.”
<<<
(11/23/97) All [Security] Council members . . . have an
urgent interest in halting Saddam Hussein’s determined
effort to arm himself with deliverable biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons. That effort appears already
well advanced and largely moving forward in locations
that U.N. investigators have been denied access to for
many months . . . More than 2,200 gallons of anthrax
remain untracked . . . Fifty-seven tons of ingredients
for VX nerve gas are still loose, along with enough
surviving and newly built missiles to deliver germ or
chemical weapons well beyond Iraq’s borders . . . The
inspectors also need to see the manuals, supply invoices
and physical evidence that will tell them what new
weapons programs Iraq has developed since the war. That
will require unrestricted access to the 250 buildings the
U.N. arms commission has identified as likely weapon
storage sites. At scores of them, Iraq has either denied
the inspectors entry or delayed long enough for any
incriminating evidence to be removed. Inspectors also
need access to the presidential palaces and secret
police, intelligence and Republican Guard headquarters in
which the commission believes documentation for weapons
programs is kept. On Thursday, Iraq’s U.N. ambassador
declared that these sites would remain off-limits.
Inspectors must also physically examine underground
locations where missiles may be buried out of sight of U-2
or satellite cameras.
>>>
The editors took note of Saddam’s fetish for palaces.
<<<
(11/29/97) The boom in palace construction has accompanied the rebuilding of weapons factories, and Washington and U.N. officials believe the palaces may house documentation of the weapons programs, the weapons themselves or even laboratories creating lethal germs.
(12/3/97) Saddam Hussein has poured government funds into building biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and constructing opulent palaces for himself and his family . . . the White House should be under no illusion that it can pretend it has solved the problem of Iraq’s effort to produce deadly biological and chemical weapons.
>>>
They also recalled his massacre of the Kurds.
<<<
(12/3/97) Hussein used chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988 and is quite capable of using them again, or employing germ weapons.
>>>
The editors’ worries continued into 1998.
<<<
(1/27/98) . . . it seems increasingly clear that what Mr.
Hussein really wants is not relief for Iraq but an
operational germ warfare program.
(2/3/98) The inspectors must be free to visit any site where they suspect weapons of mass destruction are stored or manufactured, including not only all palaces but the buildings in and around presidential compounds. The inspection team believes that many of those buildings may house biological and chemical weapons or records of their production.
(6/18/98) Iraq must reveal what has happened to the anthrax and botulinum toxin it is known to have imported before the Persian Gulf war and may since have multiplied. It must also account for the deadly VX nerve gas it is known to have manufactured and the medium-range missiles it has tried to build secretly from imported designs. United Nations experts believe that documentation for these programs may be stored on computers in buildings that weapons inspectors have been barred from in the past. This documentation must be handed over, any illegal weapons must be destroyed and a long-term monitoring system put in place to detect future production of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. Only then should the Security Council consider a timetable for lifting sanctions.
>>>
When Saddam kicked out the U.N. inspectors, the Times responded with a series of editorials.
<<<
(8/7/98) Prematurely ending the inspections would make it
easier for Mr. Hussein to rebuild an arsenal of mass-
destruction weapons, a prospect too dangerous to his
neighbors and American interests to permit.
(8/12/98) Iraq has resisted inspection at every turn,
leaving inspectors convinced it retains the ambition and
means to develop biological and chemical weapons. Mr.
Hussein has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to
attack his neighbors, even his countrymen. Allowing him
to replenish his stockpile of biological and chemical
weapons would threaten the Persian Gulf region and its
oilfields, as well as Israel. Few developments would so
directly endanger American security interests.
(8/14/98) The two international inspectors who know the
most about Iraq’s efforts to create new weapons of mass
destruction have raised an alarm that President Clinton
and other world leaders must not ignore. Richard Butler,
the chief United Nations weapons inspector, and Mohammed
el-Baradei, the director general of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, informed the Security Council this
week that they no longer had the means to monitor and
prevent Iraqi programs to develop nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons. The warning from the two men means
that international efforts to keep Iraq from rearming
have deteriorated swiftly since Saddam Hussein ended
cooperation with inspectors last week. If aggressive
inspections are not quickly resumed, Iraq may soon
replenish its supply of chemical and biological weapons
and take steps to rebuild a nuclear weapons program that
was far advanced before the Persian Gulf war.
(8/24/98) Now that Saddam Hussein has disabled the
international inspection system designed to prevent him
from building biological, chemical and nuclear weapons,
he may quickly be able to produce enough germ agents to
menace his neighbors . . . Mr. Hussein’s real grievance
against the U.N. inspectors is that they threaten his
goal of secretly preserving elements of his germ warfare,
nerve gas and nearly completed nuclear weapons programs.
That is why he repeatedly obstructs their work. The
closer the inspectors come to Mr. Hussein’s most
sensitive secrets — documents describing stocks of deadly
anthrax and botulinum toxin, physical evidence that VX
nerve gas was loaded onto missiles — the more inventive
he becomes in devising reasons to hold them at bay. If
Iraq now gets away with vitiating the U.N. inspection
system, its concealed weapons programs will give it a big
head start on rebuilding its arsenal of terror.
(8/28/98) His willingness to live with sanctions is a
measure of the importance he places on acquiring weapons
of mass destruction.
>>>
Several weeks after Scott Ritter, a top American inspector on the U.N. team, resigned, the editors reacted.
(10/4/98) Mr. Ritter . . . has correctly warned that
the world has largely lost its ability to hunt down Iraqi
weapons projects . . . Every day that passes without spot
inspections gives Iraq more time to rearm . . . Though
cameras and sensors continue to operate at suspected
weapons sites, nearly all spot inspections have been
banned by the Iraqis. Baghdad’s scientists and engineers
are essentially free to concoct biological and chemical
toxins at unmonitored sites and install them in bombs and
missiles.
Following threatened U.S. air strikes against Iraq, the editors demanded “full cooperation and compliance” and specified an inspection agenda.
<<<
(11/16/98) Thousands of chemical weapons and tons of deadly germ-warfare agents remain unaccounted for. The only way to bring the inspections process to a timely conclusion and prepare for an eventual end of the international economic sanctions is to give the inspectors the access they require to laboratories, factories, desert hiding places and computer records. The process will go considerably faster if Iraq not only refrains from interfering, but freely provides information about what has been done with the deadly ingredients it purchased before the Persian Gulf war . . . Mr. Hussein must be made to understand that no further toying with the inspections process will be tolerated.
(11/17/98) . . . an even bigger problem has been Iraq’s withholding or falsification of information about the biological and chemical ingredients it has assembled over the years. Iraqi authorities must be asked directly about some 2,000 gallons of deadly anthrax bacteria and nearly 5,000 gallons of botulinum toxin that have never been adequately accounted for. They need to explain what has become of this material and back up their assertions. Baghdad has also failed to produce records for its production of VX nerve gas for part of 1989 and all of 1990, a period in which it is known to have been running production lines in preparation for and after the invasion of Kuwait. Those records must now be handed over. Iraq must also account for some 200 tons of missile propellant it bought from the Soviet Union that can be used only to power the kind of long-range missiles Baghdad is no longer allowed to possess.
(11/24/98) Iraq is implausibly contending that it does not have most of the weapons documents the inspectors have asked to see and is withholding those it has.
>>>
In December, the U.S. launched air strikes against Iraq.
<<<
(12/21/98) It may take Iraq as long as a year to restore its ability to deliver biological and chemical weapons against potential targets in the Middle East.
>>>
In mid-1999, the editors returned to Iraq’s WMD.
<<<
(6/18/99) The stalemate over Iraq’s illegal biological and chemical weapons programs grows increasingly dangerous. United Nations inspectors have been barred since last December, leaving Baghdad free to rebuild its stocks of deadly toxins, germs and nerve gas in secret.
(8/15/99) With no international arms inspectors present, he has been free to rebuild his purchasing networks and resume production of toxic and nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them.
(12/25/99) Saddam Hussein would clearly prefer to have no U.N. arms inspectors snooping around as he tries to rebuild his biological and chemical arsenals and continues his pursuit of nuclear weapons. He has already had more than 13 months to work on these programs unobserved.
>>>
2. Editorials on the Use of Force
In this editorial, the Times recognized that a state’s failure to abide by cease-fire terms to which it had agreed provided an “implicit license” for a renewal of hostilities. And the Times did not say that renewal required the passage of an additional resolution by the Security Council.
(1/7/93) Iraq has refused to comply in almost every
particular. That gives the coalition allies explicit
license to continue the economic embargo and an implicit
license to continue military actions closely linked to
enforcement of the cease-fire terms.
Saddam’s flouting of U.N.cease-fire terms, ignoring of Security Council ultimatums and playing cheat-and-retreat with his coalition adversaries justified military action.
<<< (1/14/93) Yesterday’s carefully targeted air strike by
more than 100 allied warplanes seems the right penalty...
(1/21/93) Baghdad forfeits the protection of the U.N.
cease-fire resolution every time it violates the cease-
fire terms.
>>>
The editors endorsed unilateral U.S. military action justifiable, but were wary of the possible consequences.
<<<
(10/15/94) American interests in the region are strong enough to justify unilateral U.S. military action in certain circumstances. But the Clinton Administration should be extremely cautious about driving new wedges into an already divided coalition or setting precedents for unilateral action that others might exploit — for example, Russia in the case of former Soviet Republics. But any new U.S. attempt to go beyond a Security Council consensus on enforcement risks doing more harm than good. It would move the U.S. military closer to the unenviable role of global police force, even as it weakened the long-term containment of Iraq.
>>>
They responded to Saddam’s attack on the Kurds.
<<<
(9/4/96) The American cruise-missile attacks on military targets in southern Iraq yesterday were a reasonable, proportionate response to Mr. Hussein’s latest act of aggression, this one directed against thousands of his own countrymen.
(9/12/96) Some retaliation against Iraq was justified after its armored thrust into the internationally guaranteed Kurdish region, and its ground fire at American aircraft overflying northern Iraq yesterday should not go unanswered. >>>
The Times’ reacted to Saddam’s expulsion of inspectors in the fall of 1997.
<<<
(11/16/97) President Clinton has authority under previous
U.N. resolutions to make sure that the terms of the gulf
war cease-fire, including arms inspections, are enforced.
If this last round of diplomacy fails, Mr. Clinton will
be justified in going to the enforcement procedure of
last resort, which is the use of military strikes at
Iraqi ground targets. This could take the form of
retaliatory attacks if the Iraqis fire on the U-2
surveillance flights that could resume as early as today.
Mr. Clinton can clearly get Congressional approval, as he
should, for the heavier blows that will be possible when
Navy and Air Force units are in position in the coming
days. Over time, this page has endorsed such action with
great reluctance. But the risk that Mr. Hussein is mad
enough to unleash biological agents avoided by the
century’s
worst villains is simply too great. The U.N. inspectors
have to get back into Iraq, by force if necessary.
(1/13/98) . . . the issue has not been satisfactorily
resolved and the use of military force cannot be ruled
out. . . . and to Saddam’s efforts to keep U.N.
inspectors away from his biological weapons programs.
(1/27/98) Washington is rightly determined to thwart that
ambition, even if it comes to military force. In the
editors’ view, the threat posed by Iraq’s chemical and
biological weapons was too serious to set aside for
another diplomatic accommodation.
(2/18/98) If required, air strikes may not force full
Iraqi cooperation or destroy Baghdad’s chemical and
biological weapons and the capacity to manufacture them.
But as Mr. Clinton said yesterday, military action will
diminish those dangers and make Mr. Hussein less likely
to threaten his neighbors. To do nothing in the face of
Iraqi defiance will only embolden Mr. Hussein. The last
time he believed the world was indifferent, he invaded
Kuwait.
>>>
The editors were mindful of Saddam’s history.
<<<
(8/7/98) History has taught that Mr. Hussein responds only to the threat or use of force.
(8/28/98) Sanctions and diplomacy cannot work unless backed by the threat of force — if necessary, by the United States alone.
(10/4/98) . . . only the credible threat of force can keep Iraq from resuming its weapons programs.
(11/3/98) . . . experience suggests that resolutions alone will not be enough to make Iraq live up to its obligations. Washington, together with whatever partners it can mobilize, must once again be prepared to enforce the council’s demands with military action . . . The threat of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons is too grave to treat exclusively as a diplomatic matter, as the White House now seems belatedly to recognize. If diplomacy backed by the threat of force does not budge Mr. Hussein, military action itself may be needed.
(11/10/98) . . . getting the inspectors back to work may require a punishing, carefully targeted campaign of air and missile strikes on Iraqi military targets. Diplomacy backed by the threat of force has moved Mr. Hussein before, and may again. If it does not, Washington will have no choice but to launch missile strikes and bombing raids aimed at the pressure points of his dictatorship, including bases of elite security units like the Special Republican Guards. The goal would be to persuade Mr. Hussein to cut his losses by letting the inspectors go back to work.
(11/13/98) . . . if Baghdad remains defiant, President Clinton would be fully justified in ordering an attack . . . any new missile and bombing campaign must be extensive, going far beyond the pinprick Tomahawk missile attacks of the past. That approach failed to produce lasting change. A new air campaign will need to be sustained, with a regrettable risk of civilian casualties. The campaign should be aimed at strictly military targets, including weapons plants and storage facilities that can be hit without dispersing dangerous germs and gases. Washington should also attack bases of the Republican Guard and other forces that Mr. Hussein relies on to maintain his grip on power. The idea is to make the cost to Mr. Hussein so high that he would prefer letting the inspectors back to seeing the attacks continue.
(11/17/98) In the absence of effective inspection, the only way to control Iraq’s weapons development is with a sustained campaign of bombing and missile strikes.
(11/24/98) . . . if Baghdad is back to its familiar game of thwarting the search for biological and chemical weapons and banned missiles, American military action may become unavoidable. if Iraq will not permit the inspectors to do their jobs, Washington will have no choice but to reduce Iraq’s arsenal of deadly germs and chemicals by military force.
>>>
The editors endorsed the December 1998 allied air strike.
<<<
(12/17/98) . . . the decision to launch cruise missiles against Iraq was fully justified. Just weeks after Saddam Hussein had yet again promised to give international inspectors unhindered access, Iraq barred them from sites suspected of housing chemical and biological arms . . . Given the prospect that Baghdad would rebuild its arsenal of toxic weapons while United Nations inspectors were handcuffed, Mr. Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain had no choice but to use military force to destroy portions of Iraq’s arms industry.
(12/21/98) Last week’s air strikes were aimed not just at Iraqi weapons programs but also at weakening Mr. Hussein’s rule. Allied missiles and aircraft attacked presidential palaces, the headquarters of the ruling Baath Party and the barracks of elite security forces like the Republican Guard. These were legitimate targets since they have all been involved in Iraqi attempts to conceal biological and chemical weapons or missile production. But those air strikes were not the end of the story.
(12/27/98) . . . without further outside intervention, Iraq should be able to rebuild weapons and missile plants within a year. If inspectors are unable to resume work, future military attacks may be required to diminish the arsenal again. A purely diplomatic solution would be preferable, but no one has devised a workable plan for dealing with a dictatorial regime in Baghdad bent on terrorizing its neighbors as well as its own citizens. It is hard to negotiate with a tyrant who has no intention of honoring his commitments and who sees nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as his country’s salvation.
(12/4/00) America should be prepared to use air strikes against selected targets if there is hard intelligence that these sites are being used to manufacture new unconventional weapons.
>>>
3. Editorials on the U.N. Security Council and Its Members
What the newly-elected President must do.
<<<
(1/21/93) President Clinton’s first responsibility is to erase any doubts Saddam Hussein might harbor about America’s resolve to see Security Council resolutions enforced.
>>>
Editorials opposing the French, Russian, and Chinese appeasement of Saddam were issued.
<<<
(8/1/94) France, Russia and China . . . are eager to resume trading with Iraq. In the last review sessions, they wanted to acknowledge Baghdad’s constructive behavior, while rightly demanding that Iraq formally acknowledge Kuwait’s sovereignty and borders before they vote to lift oil sanctions.
(1/14/95) The United Nations Security Council was right not to ease economic sanctions against Iraq this week. France and Russia pushed for relaxation and the United States and Britain resisted. A new report by the U.N. inspectors shows that Baghdad has yet to come clean.
(8/24/95) France, Russia and China have long argued that sanctions should be lifted once the U.N. certifies that Iraq is in compliance with the arms control requirements. The United States, citing Baghdad’s long record of untrustworthiness, implies that the arms control requirements cannot be satisfied as long as Mr. Hussein remains in power.
(11/4/97) Closing down Baghdad’s efforts to build weapons of mass destruction requires the continuing pressure of international sanctions until U.N. investigators are completely satisfied that Baghdad is no longer hiding anything from them . . . Iraqi production of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons would threaten the interests of all members of the Security Council, including France, Russia and China, who sometimes seem as eager as Iraq itself to be rid of sanctions and begin profitable oil dealings. The Council’s recent mixed signals on pressuring Iraq have helped precipitate the current crisis. Council members now need to send an unambiguous message that they will tolerate no further interference of any kind with U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq.
>>>
Regarding the conflict within the Security Council.
<<<
(11/16/97) The U.N. Security Council remains divided over endorsing further military action What the Security Council should do.
(11/23/97) The Security Council must back up the inspectors’ efforts to track the unaccounted-for missiles, germ agents and nerve gases that Iraq was known to have at the time of the Persian Gulf war and has not credibly accounted for.
>>>
The editors questioned the commitment of both the Security Council and the Secretary-General.
<<<
(8/12/98) The Security Council is wobbly, with Russia and France eager to ease inspections and sanctions. Mr. Annan’s resolve seems in doubt.
>>>
Another editorial on what the Security Council must do.
<<<
(11/16/98) . . . full cooperation and compliance must now become the principal goal of the Security Council with regard to Iraq. Mr. Hussein must be made to understand that no further toying with the inspections process will be tolerated.
>>>
More editorials on the divisions within the Security Council were issued.
<<<
(12/27/98) The French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, proposes to deal with Saddam Hussein by rewarding his belligerence. Mr. Vedrine would dismantle the present United Nations inspection program and replace it with one more acceptable to Iraq’s friends on the Security Council, then lift the embargo on Iraqi oil sales. Firing Richard Butler, the chief weapons inspector, and allowing Iraq to replenish its treasury with billions of dollars in oil revenue, sounds more like a strategy for winning France new business opportunities in Iraq than for restraining Mr. Hussein. Russia would also like to see the Security Council lighten sanctions. Any approach to Iraq that depends on Security Council unity is destined to be weak. While France seeks trade, Russia hopes to collect money it is owed from arms sales to Baghdad a decade ago. China is indifferent to Iraqi threats. The United States and Britain may soon be left with no choice but to veto a move to reduce or lift sanctions, with the prospect of enforcing an unpopular oil embargo.
(1/15/99) France’s proposal to lift the oil embargo and move to a weakened system of weapons monitoring and anemic safeguards against Iraqi weapons purchases is unacceptable . . . The French proposal includes monitoring of known Iraqi weapons facilities by a less aggressive inspection agency than the one now headed by Richard Butler. That is scarcely adequate. Because of Iraqi obstruction over the years, many weapons research and production sites remain unknown and would not be subjected to monitoring.
(12/25/99) [Saddam’s] ability to resist U.N. directives depends on his success in sustaining divisions within the Security Council.
(1/19/00) [With regard to the Security Council’s stalling,] Russia and France are the chief obstacles . . . Both are putting narrow commercial interests ahead of their broader international responsibilities. Instead of working to ensure that council resolutions are enforced, they are cultivating Baghdad’s good will in the hope that Iraq will reward them with valuable contracts once sanctions are no longer in effect.
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The Times’ negative editorial on Hans Blix.
(1/27/00) The United Nations Security Council’s compromise
choice of Hans Blix as the new chief weapons inspector
for Iraq is a disturbing sign that the international
community lacks the determination to rebuild an effective
arms inspection system in Iraq. Mr. Blix is a man of
unquestioned integrity and tact. But he seems unlikely to
provide the forceful leadership needed to keep Saddam
Hussein from cheating on his arms control obligations and
building fearsome unconventional weapons. The further the
world gets from the gulf war, the more it seems willing
to let Mr. Hussein revive his deadly weapons projects.
Now, after approving a new inspection program that offers
a minimally acceptable level of monitoring, the Security
Council is turning the inspection work over to a man of
uncertain resolve. Mr. Blix compiled a mixed record in
his previous job as head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, including a decade-long failure to detect Iraq’s
secret nuclear weapons program before the gulf war . . .
In 1997 Mr. Blix suggested easing the standard for judging
when Iraq has met its obligations to eliminate all biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver
them. He called for winding up inspections once U.N. investigators
feel they have uncovered all the prohibited weapons they
are likely to find, even if highly dangerous materials
remain unaccounted for. That virtually invites Iraq, which
has not yet agreed to admit new U.N. inspectors, to continue
concealing its illegal programs. We hope Mr. Blix will
reconsider his position now that he will lead the inspection
effort.
4. Editorials on Clinton Administration Policies
The editors favored containment.
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(8/1/94) Washington’s most realistic policy toward Iraq under these circumstances is containment. The best instrument for that is U.N. arms monitoring, not endlessly prolonging sanctions that have nearly done their work and will soon lose their meaning.
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Editorials on U.S. policy regarding the lifting of sanctions.
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(11/28/94) Washington, though it never says so directly, has made it plain that it will not consider relief so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. That is no way to encourage Iraqi cooperation on arms control, or to encourage allies to maintain sanctions.
(7/7/95) The United States has been right to insist on full compliance before approving any sanction relief. But it is wrong to hold out for additional conditions when these arms control targets come within reach. Other grievances like human rights abuses and the return of stolen Kuwaiti property can be addressed by other means (ed.- The NYT is reframing the issue even though these items were clearly part of the cease fire agreement - UN Resolution 687 - along with severing all ties to terrorists).
(8/24/95) The American position [on sanctions] remains unreasonable, and exceeds the terms Washington accepted when the war ended . . .
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Editorials calling on Clinton to clarify his Iraq policy and defining what that policy should be.
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(9/12/96) Though Saddam Hussein started the latest conflict, President Clinton owes Americans a clear explanation of how he means to deal with the complex political and military equation in the Persian Gulf before sending more forces into combat. He has not yet made a convincing case for intensified air strikes against Iraq . . . While we supported Mr. Clinton’s actions last week, he does not have a blank check from Congress or the American people to mount military operations without demonstrating that America’s national security interests are threatened. It is not clear what would justify the ‘’disproportionate'’ response that Defense Secretary William Perry ominously threatened yesterday . . . The vital American interest in the area is oil. Mr. Hussein should be checked when he threatens his neighbors, abuses his countrymen and defies Security Council resolutions. But the American response should be proportionate to the danger and determined by a careful calculation of American interests. Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to draw the United States into a conflict that could strengthen his hold over Iraq and destabilize the region.
(11/4/97) The Clinton Administration should move quickly to exploit Baghdad’s miscalculation [The singling out of American inspectors for special harassment]. The prime goal should be to reinvigorate the Council’s resolve to enforce resolutions designed to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programs (ed. - again ignoring human rights abuses, severing all ties to terrorists & repaying Kuwait per the cease fire agreement).
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Editorials expressing worries that the Clinton administration had gone soft on Iraq.
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(1/13/98) In recent weeks the Clinton Administration mistakenly glossed over the partial resolution of last fall’s crisis involving the expulsion of inspectors, playing down the continuing restrictions on their activities. Mr. Clinton needs to revive the sense of urgency he conveyed immediately after the crisis eased.
(2/10/98) Despite considerable coaxing of Arab allies in recent weeks, the Clinton Administration has failed to reassemble the coalition of nations that fought alongside America in the Persian Gulf war . . . Except for Kuwait, no Arab country publicly endorses the use of military force against Iraq. Privately though, most confess they would be delighted if Washington’s attacks drove Mr. Hussein from power or fatally weakened his rule. It is disappointing that American allies who are among those most at risk from Iraq’s development of germ and nerve gas weapons feel compelled to engage in such a diplomatic charade.
(8/14/98) Just this sort of threat [Saddam’s renewed refusal to cooperate with inspectors] earlier this year quickly drew an emphatic response from Washington, including the reinforcement of American and British forces in the Persian Gulf region and a clear warning from Mr. Clinton that Iraqi defiance would not be tolerated. This time Washington’s response has been strangely muffled, as though the White House no longer cared if Iraq produced chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
(8/24/98) Since the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Washington has been firmly committed to keeping Baghdad from ever again building mass destruction weapons. But with international support for arms inspections and sanctions against Iraq weakening, some Administration officials seem ready to quietly abandon that goal. Instead, they would concentrate American efforts on stopping Baghdad from ever using such terror weapons. Switching from prevention to containment would be a grave error.
(8/28/98) The resignation of Scott Ritter, a top American inspector on the United Nations team charged with penetrating Iraq’s deadly-weapons program, is the latest and most dramatic warning that the Clinton Administration and the U.N. are abandoning a firm approach toward President Saddam Hussein. The United States has blocked aggressive inspections while it tries to build a consensus for firm action in the U.N. Security Council. But prolonged delay is dangerous, giving Iraq precious time to build biological or chemical weapons without being detected . . . The Administration argues that a drop in political support for military intervention, both at home and abroad, has forced it to explore diplomatic options and seek support on the Security Council before considering the use of military threats and force. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has argued that Mr. Hussein is still losing the struggle because the economic sanctions on Iraq will remain . . . The Administration must not let its diplomacy drift into dangerous delay. Even a few more weeks free of inspections might allow Mr. Hussein to revive construction of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. As Washington contemplates an extended war against terrorism, it cannot give in to a man who specializes in the unthinkable.
(10/4/98) In altering its approach to Iraq, the Clinton Administration is blundering into a policy that allows Saddam Hussein to rebuild a deadly arsenal of chemical and biological weapons . . . Washington has now muted that threat [of military force] even as Mr. Hussein has blocked the most critical avenues of inspection . . . The Clinton Administration, in effect, has suspended its effort to keep Iraq from rearming . . . The Clinton Administration maintains that its restraint has allowed the Security Council to deal directly with Iraq, giving members a better appreciation of Mr. Hussein’s defiance.
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The Times states its opposition to regime change.
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(10/19/98) Instead of dreaming about military rebellions [a coup d’etat], Washington should devote its energy and resources to preventing Baghdad from rebuilding an arsenal of biological and chemical weapons. That work has all but ceased in the face of Iraqi resistance and an erosion of international support.
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Further questioning of the administration’s resolve.
(11/3/98) Until early this year Washington consistently
backed the U.N. inspection program with the threat to use
force, the only language that seems to move Mr. Hussein.
But White House resolve weakened last spring and Washington
responded meekly when Iraq halted surprise inspections in
August . . . Whenever Mr. Hussein senses hesitation he moves
to gain advantage, and Washington is now dealing with the
predictable consequence of its desire to avoid another
confrontation with Iraq. The threat of Iraqi chemical and
biological weapons is too grave to treat exclusively as a
diplomatic matter, as the White House now seems belatedly
to recognize.
(11/10/98) [T]he Clinton Administration seems ready to
abandon the seven-year-old United Nations weapons
inspection program there. That would be a premature and
costly decision . . . The new policy Washington is
contemplating, which would seek to restrain Iraq from
ever using toxic weapons rather than preventing their
development, would be far more risky... The Administration
should make at least one more concerted effort to
reimpose the United Nations inspection system, which Iraq
halted by decree late last month. Washington’s first steps
should be diplomatic, building on last week’s Security
Council resolution that unanimously condemned Iraq’s
actions and demanded that Baghdad stop interfering with
the inspectors.
Four more editorials arguing against a regime change strategy.
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(11/13/98) There is an understandable temptation to take on the added goal of politically crippling Mr. Hussein or even driving him from power. Desirable as those results would be, the air and ground campaign required to achieve them would inflict unacceptably high costs on the Iraqi people, Mideast regional stability and American troops.
(11/19/98) Weary of endless confrontations with Iraq, President Clinton, Congress and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain are now rallying around the idea of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. The thought is certainly alluring. The installation of a democratic government in Baghdad would probably eliminate the threat of Iraqi aggression. Unfortunately, the only sure way to reach that goal is for American troops to invade Iraq and capture Baghdad, a risky prospect few Americans would support. The White House and the Pentagon are well aware of all these problems, and were openly skeptical about plotting against Mr. Hussein until Mr. Clinton unexpectedly embraced the idea earlier this week. If Mr. Clinton and members of Congress are serious about trying to overthrow him, they need to level with the American people about the potential financial and human costs. The project will not be cheap or bloodless. Nor is it likely to succeed without an American invasion and occupation of Iraq. Keeping Iraq isolated and controlling its weapons of mass destruction through aggressive inspection is an imperfect policy, but it is more practical than anything else that has been proposed.
(12/21/98) Washington should not delude itself into thinking that [air] attacks will pave the way for a revolt that topples Mr. Hussein. His rule is too well entrenched and opposition forces are too weak and divided for that to be a realistic possibility anytime soon. Diplomatic and economic pressure, backed by the continuing threat of American military force, is the most effective way to manage the Iraqi weapons threat.
(3/3/99) Without ever saying as much, the White House seems to have shifted its military strategy in Iraq to advance the goal of toppling Saddam Hussein. The change has become clear in recent days as Washington escalated its air strikes against Iraq. The bombing raids appear designed to punish the Iraqi military in hopes that disgruntled officers will lead a rebellion against Mr. Hussein rather than suffer further losses of men and equipment. If this is the new American strategy, President Clinton or Defense Secretary William Cohen should let the American people and Congress know . . . Many Americans might support an effort to unseat Mr. Hussein. But the application of American force overseas should never be a matter of mystery and speculation at home or exempt from Congressional consultation. One of these days an American or British pilot may be captured or killed, and the reasons for placing him in danger ought to be explained before that day arrives.
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Another editorial skeptical of the administration’s commitment and stating what the goals of the U.S. should be.
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(12/4/00) For over a year, the Clinton administration has deliberately downplayed problems with Iraq. It hoped to avoid a new military showdown at a time when international unity was frayed and feared that another round of inconclusive air strikes against Iraqi military and industrial targets might have complicated Mr. Gore’s presidential campaign . . . America’s guiding goals should be to keep Iraq from threatening its neighbors and the flow of oil to the West by making clear that any future Iraqi aggression would be unacceptable. To this end, Washington must work with Security Council members to maintain and if necessary tighten sanctions so long as Baghdad refuses to accept inspections.
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