We're either too fast or too slow,
New Urgency, New Risks in 'Iraqification'
By Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday, November 14, 2003; Page A01
At least four factors forced the administration to overhaul its military and political strategy in Iraq, despite the danger that a new approach might actually diminish U.S. control over the country's future.
The foremost factor is the security risk -- from an Iraqi opposition that has become more intense, more effective, more sophisticated and more extensive. The other three are the failure of the Iraqi Governing Council to act, the Dec. 15 U.N. deadline for an Iraqi plan of action and the U.S. elections just a year away, according to administration and congressional officials and U.S. analysts.
All four factors produced a new sense of urgency in Washington. "In an atmosphere of heightened violence and instability, Iraq urgently requires a new political formula. The U.S. administration, increasingly alarmed at the turn of events, is considering a range of options. This will be its second chance to get it right; there may not be a third," the International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan watchdog, warned in a report issued yesterday.
The new approach amounts to Iraqification, or the handing over of responsibility for both a deteriorating security situation and a stalled political process to Iraqis. The goal, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told reporters yesterday, "is that we find ways to accelerate the transfer of authority to the Iraqi people."
"They are clamoring for it; they are, we believe, ready for it. And they have very strong ideas about how that might be done," she said.
But Iraqification also poses significant hazards -- risks that emerge from the same security and political considerations that drove the administration's decision to change strategy.
As the administration sorts out a plan in talks with the Governing Council over the weekend, the first test may be in averting the appearance that the United States intends to cut and run. U.S. officials already sound defensive.
"We are not in a rush to leave. We will stay as long as we need to to ensure that Iraq is secure, that the hand-over makes sense and that a moderate Iraqi government emerges. And we're very capable of doing that," Army Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander for Iraq and the Middle East, said at a news conference in Tampa yesterday.
Abizaid used the word "prudent" four times to describe his plans for Iraq.
President Bush said yesterday that the revamping of his policy was a "positive development" because it will get Iraqis "more involved" in the governance of their country.
But others were more skeptical. "If the policy is to more rapidly Iraqify the situation -- as in Vietnamization during the Vietnam War -- then that is another version of cutting and running. One way to cut and run is to simply say we're pulling out. Another is to prematurely turn over security to Iraqi forces and draw down American forces. That's a near-term prescription for disaster," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
"All the political body language coming out of Washington these days seems to show that we are going to cut and run," said Thomas Mahnken, the acting director of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University. "That is precisely the wrong signal to be sending."
For an administration loath to concede it has made mistakes, redirecting U.S. policy is an open admission that the situation has reached a crisis point. Under mounting pressures, the White House had little choice but to effectively jettison the seven-point plan outlined by its own governor in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, just two months ago.
"We so underestimated and underplanned and underthought about a post-Saddam Iraq that we've been woefully unprepared," said Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), a Vietnam War veteran and member of the Foreign Relations Committee who has frequently visited Iraq. "Now we have a security problem. We have a reality problem. And we have a governance problem. . . . And time is not on our side."
Iraqification includes its own challenges. On the security front, experts worry that it will overburden the new and fragile Iraqi military and police units with limited training as they confront other Iraqis, particularly better-trained loyalists from Saddam Hussein's army.
"I'm not optimistic," said Gordon W. Rudd, a peacekeeping expert who earlier this year served on the staff of the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad. "On the one hand, it's the right thing to do. On the other hand, you simply can't rush it." Rudd said he is especially concerned that the faster the training, the more Iraqi police and other officials will simply be inclined to resume their old corrupt, authoritarian ways.
Some experts say, however, that Iraqification could create a more effective anti-guerrilla force because indigenous units understand their own society and can identify opposition forces. "I think it is logical," said Frances West, who participated in an initiative in Vietnam similar to the creation of Iraqi civil defense forces now. "If our soldiers have six months with such small units, they will turn out Iraqi forces superior to the threat as it now appears."
Accelerating the political transition is also risky -- and it could even jeopardize the goal of creating a democratic government. As part of the new strategy, the United States is prepared to endorse some form of elections before a new constitution is written -- reversing the order outlined in Bremer's seven-point plan -- to ensure that a new governing body would have the legitimacy that the current 24-member council, handpicked by the United States, lacks.
"Elections are always chancy. You don't know the outcome, and some of the wrong people may win out. But if we're advocating democracy, we'll have to take that risk," Hagel said.
There are no guarantees, for example, that either the constitutional committee or a reconstituted provisional government would back democratic ideas for a constitution. The most organized political forces in Iraq are the Islamist parties, particularly among the majority Shiite population, and the former Baathists among Sunni Muslims.
The two greatest U.S. fears are that Iraq will end up with a new autocrat or will become a theocracy rather than a democracy. Some U.S. officials fear that a transfer of authority before Iraq gets a new constitution could pose the danger that an interim leader becomes president for life.
Other dangers include handing over power to people who are not fully prepared to take political office or ending up after elections with a fractious constitutional committee or a provisional government unable to agree on the major political challenges ahead. If the United States draws down forces before political stability has been ensured, the differences among Iraqis could deteriorate into conflict.
"If [a new body] lacks strong grass-roots support, then it will be vulnerable to a violent takeover and Iraq could revert to its violent past," said Judith Yaphe, a former CIA analyst now at the National Defense University.
As Abizaid described the U.S. dilemma, however, the key question is not whether Iraqis can take over their own security and governance, but whether the U.S. public has sufficient patience to let that happen.
"The goal of the enemy is to break the will of the United States of America," he said. "It's clear, it's simple, it's straightforward. Break our will, make us leave before Iraq is ready to come out and be a member of the responsible community of nations."
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