The dossier is damned again
By Kim Sengupta and Paul Vallely
12 August 2003
Downing Street's Iraq weapons dossier caused
such deep concern among senior intelligence
officers that they formally complained to their
superiors, the Hutton inquiry into the death of
David Kelly heard yesterday.
Hitherto undisclosed official documents produced
at the hearing revealed disquiet within the
intelligence community on a number of claims
made by No 10, including Saddam Hussein's
alleged capacity to launch chemical and biological
attacks within 45 minutes.
Among those who wrote a letter of protest was
one of the most senior and experienced officers
in the field of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
The opening day of the inquiry also heard that Dr
Kelly, described by a No 10 spokesman as a
"Walter Mitty" fantasist, was one of the country's
foremost experts on biological warfare, and
someone who had access to intelligence at the
highest level.
The inquiry, set up to investigate the apparent
suicide of Dr Kelly after he was named as the
main source of a report by the BBC journalist
Andrew Gilligan that No 10 had interfered with the
Iraq dossier, heard evidence from five witnesses,
and trawled through dozens of pieces of
documentation yesterday.
Senior Ministry of Defence officials admitted
under questioning that Dr Kelly was regularly
used by the Government to put forward its
position on weapons of mass destruction to the
media, and had been praised for his previous
efforts.
The first witness to appear before Lord Hutton at
the High Court totally contradicted the
Government's assertion that Dr Kelly was nothing
more than a middle-ranking technical official.
Terence Taylor, a former Army colonel, described
the late scientist as someone with a "very high
quality reputation" who had played a key role in
uncovering Iraq's chemical and biological
weapons programme.
Mr Taylor, now president of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in the United States,
also pointed out the highly important work Dr Kelly
had done in investigations into banned weapons
programmes in the former Soviet Union.
There was, however, some relief for the
Government over the damaging claim that Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's
chief of communications, had the "45 minutes" threat inserted into the September
dossier, and that this had been done despite Downing Street knowing the claim to
be false.
Senior Whitehall officials, including Martin Howard, the deputy director of Defence
Intelligence, and Julian Miller, chief of the assessment staff in the Cabinet Office,
insisted that these allegations were untrue.
However, as James Dingemans, counsel for the inquiry, produced internal
documents showing disquiet within the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), Mr Howard
also had to concede that his staff had contacted their line managers about the
dossier published in September last year.
One letter said: "As possibly the most senior and experienced officer on the field of
Iraqi WMD, I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessment
for which I had some responsibility was being presented in the dossier of 24
September 2002 that I was moved to write formally to Tony Cragg recording and
expressing my reservations". Mr Cragg was Mr Howard's predecessor at Defence
Intelligence.
Mr Dingemans read from another official document noting that intelligence officers
had expressed concerns about the way language had been hardened up over the
45 minutes claim. The concern had related to the "level of certainty" about the claim
expressed in the dossier's foreword and the executive summary. "The executive
summary expressed the point differently as a judgement. The personnel concerned
did not share its judgement but it was agreed by the Joint Intelligence Committee,"
the document noted.
The document said some Defence Intelligence officers had disagreed with the claim
in the dossier that intelligence "shows" that Saddam attached great importance to
possessing weapons of mass destruction. "They judged that it only 'indicated' this,"
the document said. "Several reports contributed to the strong judgement, however.
Again it was agreed by the Joint Intelligence Committee." Mr Dingemans also read
from an e-mail written by a DIS member who consulted Dr Kelly over an assertion
that UN weapons inspectors had been unable to account for 20 tons of biological
growth agents.
The DIS officer wrote that he had been told by Dr Kelly: "The existing wording is not
wrong but it has lost [sic] of spin on it". Mr Howard said the individual intended to
type: "It has a lot of spin on it". He said the phrase had been the officer's, not Dr
Kelly's. Mr Howard said the intelligence staff's worries related to the dossier's use
of language - whether it should say intelligence suggests, indicates or shows. |
