According to the administration, the only communications 
    intercepted outside the framework of FISA are calls to 
    and from the United States in which the overseas party is 
    suspected of terrorist connections, though the suspicion 
    does not rise to the probable-cause level that would be 
    required for obtaining a FISA warrant. It seems to me 
    vital to our national security to be able to intercept 
    such communications--and more. Suppose a phone number in 
    the United States is discovered on a rolodex in an Al Qaeda
    hideout in Yemen. Wouldn't you want the NSA to intercept 
    all calls, especially international, to or from that U.S. 
    number and scrutinize them for suspicious content? Yet 
    the mere fact that a suspected or even a known terrorist 
    has a U.S. phone number in his possession would not 
    create probable cause to believe the owner of that phone 
    also a terrorist; probably most phone conversations of 
    terrorists are not with other terrorists. The government 
    can't get a FISA warrant just to find out whether someone 
    is a terrorist, though that's what it most needs to know. 
    Nor can it obtain a warrant to intercept communications 
    between two persons both of whom are in the United 
    States, even if they are suspected of being members of a 
    terrorist sleeper cell. These are crippling limitations.