| Bloomberg  -- How London Paid a Record Price to Dodge a Blackout ................................ 
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 Bloomberg
 
 Opinion
 
 July 25, 2022,
 
 How London Paid a Record Price to Dodge a Blackout
 
 The UK heat wave also saw an unhappy benchmark in the energy crisis.
 
 By Javier Blas
 
 Javier  Blas is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering energy and commodities. A  former reporter for Bloomberg News and commodities editor at the  Financial Times, he is coauthor of “The World for Sale: Money, Power and  the Traders Who Barter the Earth’s Resources.”
 
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 Last  week, unbeknown to many outside the power industry, parts of London  came remarkably close to a blackout --  even as it was recovering from  the hottest day in British history. On July 20, surging electricity  demand collided with a bottleneck in the grid, leaving the eastern part  of the British capital briefly short of power. Only by paying a record  high £9,724.54 (about $11,685) per megawatt hour  more than 5,000%  higher than the typical price  -- did the UK avoid homes and businesses  going dark. That was the nosebleed cost to persuade Belgium to crank up  aging electricity plants to send energy across the English Channel.
 
 The  crisis, which quietly played out within the control room of the British  electricity system, shows the growing vulnerability of energy  transportation networks  -- power grids and gas and oil pipelines  --  across much of the industrialized world after years of low investment  and not-in-my-backyard opposition.
 
 On most days, the bottlenecks  mean distorted costs. Sometimes, it results in sky-high prices where  energy is in short supply when it is needed. At other occasions, prices  can tumble to zero, or go negative, when producers cannot sell their  power into a congested transmission system. Increasingly, it puts the  whole system at risk. Talk to most industry executives and you quickly  get the sense that we are sleepwalking into more blackouts. Discuss the  problems with the engineers who manage the system day-in, day-out, and  that danger appears even closer.
 
 The £9,724.54 price, settled  between noon and 1:00 p.m. on July 20 via the so-called NEMO  interconnector that links the UK with Belgium, was the highest Britain  has ever paid to import electricity, nearly five times higher than the  previous record. The absurdity of that level is apparent when comparing  it with the year-to-date average for UK spot electricity: £178 per  megawatt hour.
 
 “It was an absolute shock,” says Phil Hewitt, who  has been monitoring electricity prices for over two decades and is now  executive director of EnAppSys Ltd, a consultancy. “It was the price to  keep the lights on. The security of supply was at stake.”
 
 The  actual amount of electricity bought at the record price was tiny: enough  to supply just eight houses for a year. More power was bought at  slightly lower prices. The payments, nonetheless, highlight desperation:  buying across the channel was, for 60 minutes or so, the only option to  balance the system. If Belgium had not helped, the grid would had been  forced to “undertake demand control and disconnect homes from  electricity,” says a grid spokesperson.
 
 In a normal situation,  without the traffic jams on the grid, the UK should have been able to  send power to the southeast of England from elsewhere in the country --   even from all the way in Scotland, where offshore wind farms are  producing more than ever. The problem is that the UK, and the rest of  industrialized nations, aren’t investing enough in their grids, leaving  the system exposed.
 
 The world is investing about $300 billion per  year in power grids, an amount that has barely changed since 2015,  according to the International Energy Agency. It isn’t enough, as the  global economy electrifies and deals with a shifting generation map,  with intermittent renewable energy like solar and wind replacing  polluting --  but dependable  -- coal- and gas-fired stations.
 
 Now,  grid bottlenecks create perverse situations. In Spain, for example,  there are times when solar electricity producers in the south have to  switch off their plants while, in the north, gas-fired power stations  are turning on to meet demand. In some corners of the US, electricity  prices often drop below zero, with power plants forced to sell their  energy due to grid constraints. Meanwhile, in other corners of the US,  consumers are facing calls to reduce power demand on peak days and face  record prices.
 
 Aging infrastructure, often 30 or 40 years old,  needs to be replaced. But refurbishment and expansion come up against  local opposition to more pylons and overhead cables. In the UK,  authorities are bypassing popular resistance by moving some parts of the  grid offshore, using undersea cables. “Fish don’t vote,” goes the  industry’s joke. It is, however, an expensive undertaking.
 
 High  metal prices are making building new grids even more costly. Cables are  made of copper or aluminum which, at today’s prices, account for nearly a  third of what will be spent on a new grid, up 10 percentage points from  investments made between 2010 and 2020.
 
 Across the US and  Europe, utilities and grid managers need to invest billions of dollars  into digitalization of the network to allow demand-side load management  that would reduce consumption at peak times, often via hourly prices.  Managing peak demand is going to be even more important when millions of  households shift to electric vehicles, creating a new source of  electricity consumption.
 
 Last year, the UK paid just under £1,600  per megawatt hour on one day to import electricity and avert a short  squeeze. On July 18, it paid just over £2,000, which became the record.  Two days later, the price went to nearly £10,000. The pattern is clear.  At some point, even sky-high prices won’t be enough. Then, a blackout  would belatedly lay bare the consequences of our under-investing ways.
 
 To contact the author of this story : Javier Blas at jblas3@bloomberg.net
 
 © 2022 Bloomberg L.P.
 
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