Re the American-led PSI that helped Gaddafi "cooperate"... Lots of links, but here's a couple of interest...
globalsecurity.org
Info on the Proliferation Security Initiative
John Bolton on the Proliferation Security Initiative
ceip.org
From the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The following is taken from Under Secretary of State John Bolton's remarks to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Conference in Washington, D.C. on December 2, 2003. His speech is available by clicking here.
To roll back the proliferation activities of rogue states and to ensure that their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups or their state sponsors, the United States employs a variety of diplomatic and other methods. President Bush announced our newest and most promising effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), on May 31 in Krakow, Poland. The United States and ten other close allies and friends have worked to develop this initiative, which seeks to combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land. Our goal is to create a more robust approach to preventing WMD, missiles, and related technologies flowing to and from would-be proliferators.
The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. On September 4, we published the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" and shared it with countries around the world. More than 50 countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts.
To date, PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises. Four have already taken place, and the remaining exercises will occur in the coming months. Australia conducted the first exercise in October in the Coral Sea, involving both military and law enforcement assets. The United Kingdom then hosted the first PSI air interception training session, a table-top exercise to explore operational issues arising from intercepting proliferation traffick in the air. In mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. Finally, France recently hosted a third maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdictions in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking.
The eleven original PSI participants are now involving additional countries in PSI activities. Last month, the Japanese Government hosted a meeting to inform Asian governments about PSI and encourage their cooperation in interdiction efforts. There was broad support among the governments that further efforts needed to be undertaken to stop proliferation and that they would study the PSI as a new tool for addressing nonproliferation.
Later this month, the United States will host the fifth PSI operational experts meeting, which will bring together military and law enforcement experts from the original eleven participating countries, as well as Norway, Denmark, Singapore, and Canada. Since PSI is an "activity" rather than an "organization," the meeting will develop military and law enforcement capabilities and preparations for interdictions.
As the PSI moves forward, we expect other countries will join in training exercises to enhance global capabilities to respond quickly when governments receive intelligence on proliferation shipments. President Bush has made clear that our long-term objective is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. As the President said, "We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies."
Our PSI interdiction efforts rest on existing domestic and international authorities. The national legal authorities of each participant will allow us to act together in a flexible manner, ensuring actions are taken by participants with the most robust authorities in any given case. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction. At the December operational meeting, legal experts will analyze their authorities against real world scenarios and examine any gaps in authorities that can be filled either through national legislation or policy or international action. Experts also will work to enhance our ability to share information with law enforcement and military operators in a timely and effective manner, in order to allow operators to increase the number of actual interdictions. Properly planned and executed, the interception of critical technologies can prevent hostile states and terrorists from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase their cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.
Our initiatives move us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to impede the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist groups they sponsor do not acquire a shortcut to their deadly designs against us. As President Bush said recently, "After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. The danger hasn't passed....America must not forget the lessons of September 11th." Indeed, danger is present in a growing number of places, and we must be vigilant in recognizing -- and then confronting -- these emerging threats against our common security. |
