Two, Three, Many?   The New York Times  February 1, 2002
                
                By PAUL KRUGMAN
                   Here's a scary question: How                   many more Enrons are out               there?
                Even now the conventional               wisdom is that Enron was               uniquely crooked. O.K., other               companies have engaged in               "aggressive accounting," the art form formerly known as               fraud. But how likely is it that other major companies will               turn out, behind their imposing facades, to be little more               than pyramid schemes? 
                Alas, it's all too likely. I can't tell you which corporate               icons will turn out to be made of papier-mâché, but I'd be               very surprised if we don't have two, three, even many               Enrons in our future.
                Why do I say this? Like any crime, a pyramid scheme               requires means, motive and opportunity. Lately all three               have been there in abundance. 
                Means: We now know how easily a company that earns a               modest profit, or even loses money, can dress itself up to               create the appearance of high profitability. Just the               simple trick of paying employees not with straight salary,               which counts as an expense, but with stock options,               which don't, can have a startling effect on a company's               reported profits. According to the British economist               Andrew Smithers, in 1998 Cisco reported a profit of $1.35               billion; if it had counted the market value of the stock               options it issued as an expense, it would have reported a               loss of $4.9 billion. And stock options are only one of a               panoply of techniques available to make the bottom line               look artificially good. 
                Motive: The purpose of inflating earnings is, of course, to               drive up the price of the stock. But why do companies               want to do that?
                One answer is that a high stock price helps a company               grow; it makes it easier to raise money, to acquire other               companies, to attract employees and so on. And no doubt               most managers have puffed up their stock out of a               genuine desire to make their companies grow. But as we               watch top executives walk away rich while the companies               they ran collapse (there are cases worse than Enron; the               founder of Global Crossing has apparently walked away               from bankruptcy with $750 million), it's clear that we               should also think about the incentives of the managers               themselves. Ask not what a high stock price can do for               your company; ask what it can do for your personal               bottom line. 
                Not incidentally, a high stock price facilitates the very               accounting tricks that companies use to create phantom               profits, further driving up the stock price. It's Ponzi time!
                But what about opportunity? A confluence of three factors               in the late 1990's opened the door for financial scams on               a scale unseen for generations. 
                First was the rise of the "new economy." New technologies               have, without question, created new opportunities and               shaken up the industrial order. But that creates the kind               of confusion in which scams flourish. How do you know               whether a company has really found a highly profitable               new-economy niche or is just faking it? 
                Second was the stock market bubble. As Robert Shiller               pointed out in his book "Irrational Exuberance," a rising               market is like a natural Ponzi scheme, in which each               successive wave of investors generates gains for the last               wave, making everything look great until you run out of               suckers. What he didn't point out, but now seems obvious,               is that in such an environment it's also easy to run               deliberate pyramid schemes. When the public believes in               magic, it's springtime for charlatans.
                And finally, there was (and is) a permissive legal               environment. Once upon a time, the threat of lawsuits               hung over companies and auditors that engaged in sharp               accounting practices. But in 1995 Congress, overriding a               veto by Bill Clinton, passed the Private Securities               Litigation Reform Act, which made such suits far more               difficult. Soon accounting firms, the companies they               audited and the investment banks that sold their stock               got very cozy indeed. 
                And here too one must look not only at the motives of               corporations, but at the personal motives of executives. We               now know that Enron managers gave their investment               bankers - not their investment banks but the individual               bankers - an opportunity to invest in the shell               companies they used to hide debt and siphon off money.               Wanna bet that similar deals didn't take place at many               other firms?
                I hope that Enron turns out to be unique. But I'll be very               surprised.
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