Every unhappy nation is unique
THOMAS BARNETT
ARTICLE: "What Makes A Monk Mad," by Seth Mydans, New York Times, 30 September 2007, p. WK1.
NEWS ANALYSIS: "More Than Just a Fighting Force, Myanmar's Military Is the Nation's Driving Force," by Seth Mydans, New York Times, 7 October 2007, p. A9.
EDITORIAL: "The saffron revolution: If the world acts in concert, the violence should be the last spasm of a vicious regime in its death throes," The Economist, 29 September 2007, p. 13.
ARTICLE: "On the brink: How Myanmar's people rose up against its regime--and the regime rose up against its people," The Economist, 29 September 2007, p. 29.
ARTICLE: "Destructive engagement: The outside world shares responsibility for the unfolding tragedy in Myanmar," The Economist, 29 September 2007, p. 31.
"Myanmar has as many clerics as soldiers," so notes Mydans. Moral force versus pure force. One connects with the people naturally, the other controls the people rather harshly.
Why the military, which is equally an economic force as a security function, will eventually lose is that regime legitimacy in Myanmar isn't based on economic performance but human rights, says Ingrid Jordt, a UW-Milwaukee prof and country expert.
But the military, which dominates the economy rather thoroughly, is, at 400k strong, "one of the largest and most battle-tested armies in Southeast Asia," so getting it to withdraw from a political scene it has dominated for 45 years won't be easy.
When even the Nobel-winning opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi admits the military has to be part of any migration toward democracy, clearly we're talking about a very long-term solution set that must involve committed mentorship from the outside, especially since this junta rules through the Musharraf-like armistices with the numerous "armed insurgencies lining its borders."
How very Gap.
China is the clear mentor candidate. As the Economist notes, it is highly incentivized to dominate the situation: Myanmar has energy and coastal military facilities that give Beijing an extended presence into the Bay of Bengal. China, just like in the case of the DPRK, wants stability most of all on its own borders, so put it all together and there is a great case for encouraging China's mentorship here.
The key here is getting past our usual fears about China's dominance of the region: the so-called "string of pearls" argument that says China--omygod!--wants to build a capacity to extend itself militarily toward the Middle East. Go figure! China's looking at a huge dependency on the region, something the U.S. truly lacks, and we're wondering why China, in its rise, might want to protect that connectivity.
Hell, as we've seen with China many times, they prefer nasty dictators, just like America has long done in the Gulf, so what's the big worry?
But more to the point, if we can help China realize its potential in Myanmar, then what becomes more possible in the Middle East?
But no, China will not get there on its own, and hectoring from afar won't be enough. The North Korean progress, such as it is, is a good step in the direction of bolstering China's confidence in such matters.
Is this admitting to a sphere of influence? Of course it is, if employing that term from another era makes it easier for you to swallow. Does anyone expect economic integration to happen without a dominant regional player encouraging the spread of its preferred rule set? Look at NAFTA or the EU and tell me otherwise.
Most of what it takes to get the Core to work together in shrinking the Gap involves recognizing that there is a growing rule set of cooperation among the world's great powers inside the Core and that that rule set must include the encouragement of each to step up wherever possible in mentoring and facilitating Seam States' integration in regional economic schemes. Why the term "spheres of influence" is all wrong is because the attendant fears concerning political-military domination, which no great powers seem much interested in pursuing anymore (indeed, look at how quickly everyone wants to limit their exposure in such things and--in the case of the Americans--leave as soon as possible), simply don't hold in this day and age. In fact, it's the very lack of such willingness to match economic integration with political-military domination that gives rise to the issues of failed states and the very existence of the rule-deficient Gap.
Moreover, the whole concept of spheres presupposes the bumping up of "empires" and underlies the "clash" thesis. Those hold even less water in this world, where the notion of creating mini-world economies is dead and buried with the Soviet empire. Only the truly fantasy-dominated dreams of our enemies in the Long War hold those crazy notions anymore.
So yeah, if you're going to hold up cooperation with China on the "string of pearls" fear, then yeah, don't expect much help from Beijing, and the Gap will remain the Gap.
thomaspmbarnett.com |
