Subject Bremer wises up
U.S. Sidelines Exiles Who Were to Govern Iraq
Former Opposition Leaders Considered Unrepresentative and
Too Disorganized
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, June 8, 2003; Page A01
BAGHDAD, June 7 -- Former Iraqi opposition leaders, many of
whom were brought back from exile by the U.S. government
with the expectation that they would run the country, have
been largely sidelined by the U.S.-led occupation authority
here, which views them as insufficiently representative and
too disorganized to take charge.
In the six weeks after Baghdad fell to U.S. forces, leaders
of seven political groups that had opposed former president
Saddam Hussein acted with the swagger of a government in
waiting. Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Pentagon-backed Iraqi
National Congress, returned from London and ensconced
himself with the help of his own militia in a private club
in the capital's poshest neighborhood, where he received a
procession of visitors who treated him with the deference
due an incoming president. The chieftains of the two
largest Kurdish parties traveled down to Baghdad from
autonomous northern Iraq to hold court in large hotels
surrounded by dozens of heavily armed guards. Other
political leaders wooed people by touting their parties as
key participants in a new government.
But as a scorching June heat envelops Baghdad, plans to
cede power to the former opposition leaders have
evaporated. Taking advantage of a recently passed U.N.
Security Council resolution that gives the United States
and Britain broad authority to run Iraq, the top U.S. civil
administrator here, L. Paul Bremer III, said he intends to
appoint Iraqis to a council that will advise him on policy
decisions instead of endorsing the formation of a full
interim government, which the former opposition leaders had
hoped to lead. Bremer has promised that the council will
include a spectrum of Iraqis and not be dominated by former
exiles.
In a recent meeting with the seven leaders, Bremer told
them they "don't represent the country," participants said.
U.S. officials said he repeatedly asked the Iraqis to
broaden their coalition to include women, Christians and
tribal chiefs, but they failed to do so.
Rebuffed by Bremer, the former opposition leaders are
quietly regrouping. One of the top two Kurdish leaders,
Jalal Talabani, has left Baghdad. Chalabi's group moved out
of the Mansour Hunting Club and into less prominent
accommodations this week. His militia, the 700-member Free
Iraq Forces, an American-trained contingent of paramilitary
fighters, was disbanded last month on Bremer's order.
Representatives of the seven political organizations now
devote much of their regular "leadership council" meetings
to talking about how to regain political influence with the
United States.
The decision not to hand over power to the former
opposition leaders through a hastily formed transitional
government, which U.S. officials here said was made by the
White House, means the United States will occupy Iraq much
longer than initially planned, acting as the ultimate
authority for governing the country until a new
constitution is authored, national elections held and a new
government installed. One senior U.S. official here
predicted that process could last two years or more.
"The idea that some in Washington had -- that we would come
in here, set up the ministries, turn it all over to the
seven and get out of Dodge in a few months -- was
unrealistic," the official said.
"We gave them a chance," the official said. "We bankrolled
some of them. But they just couldn't get their act
together. It was amateur hour."
The initial backing of the exiles was a contentious issue
within the Bush administration. Chalabi's Iraqi National
Congress was championed by the Pentagon, which provided him
with a liaison officer to the U.S. Central Command. Many in
the State Department and the CIA, however, opposed support
for Chalabi, arguing that he would not emerge as a national
leader.
Some U.S. officials here said the decision to back away
from the exiles was part of a broader restructuring of the
U.S. postwar occupation strategy that included the
deployment of more troops to stem looting and the
replacement of the initial civil administrator, retired Lt.
Gen. Jay M. Garner, with Bremer.
Some of the returning leaders were viewed with suspicion by
Iraqis who never left the country. Signs denouncing
Chalabi, a banker who had been living in London, appeared
on walls almost as quickly as those posted by his
supporters.
In addition, after living for years in the West, many found
it difficult to adjust to the austere conditions in postwar
Iraq. One top leader complained of getting diarrhea from
drinking tap water. Others said they missed family they
left behind in Britain and the United States.
Former opposition leaders argue that U.S. officials
underestimated the difficulty in building support and party
infrastructure in a country where, for 35 years, no
political organization except for Hussein's Baath Party was
allowed. "We all have extensive contacts, but there is a
lot we are doing from scratch," said Entifadh Qanbar, a top
official with the Iraqi National Congress.
Even so, party leaders contend that they have made
significant inroads, signing up thousands of new members
and opening scores of new offices. They also point to
Chalabi's extensive discussions with tribal leaders and
Muslim clerics, and to Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani's
meeting on Thursday with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, one
of the most senior Shiite Muslim clerics in Iraq.
"We share Mr. Bremer's belief in a broad, representative
government," said Hoshyar Zebari, a top aide to Barzani.
Bremer's decision to rely on a council of 25 to 30 members
instead of devolving power to a transitional government has
riled many of the former opposition leaders, who say that
the Bush administration has reneged on commitments to let
them be in charge.
"This is a regression of what the U.S. had promised us,"
Qanbar said.
"We should not be sidelined," he said. "We should not be
looked at as unrepresentative. In any democracy, there is
no government that represents everybody."
In a last-ditch effort to influence the interim
administration, the former opposition leaders have insisted
that the participants be selected through a national
assembly they would organize. Such a forum could give them
a chance to ensure that the council was stacked with their
members and allies.
Bremer, however, has rejected that request, insisting that
it would take too long to convene an assembly and that it
could be prone to manipulation by former Baathists and
radical Islamic clerics. He said he will handpick the
council, although he has promised to engage in broad
consultations with Iraqis.
In response, one of two Shiite parties among the seven, the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
threatened today to boycott the advisory council if members
are selected by Bremer.
"If he's going to appoint an administration, we can't be
part of that," said Hamid Bayati, a top Supreme Council
official. "We will only be part of an administration
selected by the Iraqi people. There are certain lines which
we cannot cross."
Bayati expressed dismay that Bremer would try to
marginalize parties that have pledged to cooperate with the
United States and that serve as a link to important
segments of Iraqi society. The Supreme Council, which had
been based in Iran, is one of the largest parties
representing Iraq's politically influential Shiite
majority.
"If they sideline the former opposition groups, who are
they going to consult with?" he said. "If he doesn't take
the view of the seven groups, what other Iraqi groups can
replace them?"
U.S. officials in the occupation authority say there are
other Iraqis -- who opposed Hussein but did not go into
exile -- who could serve as advisers to the United States
and as possible future political leaders. As a first step
in that direction, Bremer invited 10 more Iraqis to join a
meeting on Friday evening with representatives of the seven
former exile groups. The additional participants, most of
whom stayed in the country during Hussein's rule, included
three women, two tribal chiefs, a newly elected local mayor
and a Muslim religious scholar.
"Before we got here, we had to depend on the exiles," one
U.S. official said. "That's no longer the case."
In an attempt to address some of the participants' concerns
about the council's role, the official said Bremer pledged
to let the members provide advice on policy decisions and
select interim leaders of some ministries. But
representatives from three of the seven parties said today
that those concessions would not assuage them.
The frustration of former exiles extends beyond those
seeking a role in politics. Some Iraqis who have recently
returned under Pentagon sponsorship to serve as technical
advisers to government ministries complained that promises
of significant responsibility have not been kept.
"Our role is very limited," said Isam Khafaji, a professor
who had been living in the Netherlands and was sent to Iraq
last month as part of the Defense Department's Iraq
Reconstruction and Development Council. "We're not allowed
to make any decisions."
The 150-member group had been billed by the Pentagon as a
way to bring exiles with specific technical experience back
to the country to help resuscitate ministries. The
participants were expected to stay for about 90 days and
serve as advisers to ministerial employees and U.S.
officials.
Khafaji, who left Iraq in 1978, said he and several others
were told they would have a chance to play a key role in
reshaping the ministries. Instead, he said, he and other
council members have been relegated to such dull tasks as
translating for Americans and screening ministry employees
for senior Baath Party members.
Some members said they were thinking of quitting if they
were not given more authority and responsibility.
"We've been marginalized and humiliated," one returning
exile said. "We came here to help, to make a difference.
Now it looks like nobody wants us."
© 2003 The Washington Post Company |
