These outposts need B-52's with JADAM's circling overhead 24/7/365. We have the forces. We just don't have the tactics or the will.
CAPTAIN'S JOURNAL: Nine U.S. Soldiers Killed in Kunar, Afghanistan: What Can We Learn?
....................Which raises the question of force protection and combat outposts.
Combat Outposts
The use of combat outposts in Ramadi and elsewhere in the Anbar Province (where they were introduced well before the surge and security plan for Baghdad) involved connectedness to other combat outposts in the case of resupply or reinforcement issues. The combat outposts were not randomly placed throughout Anbar, and neither were they garrisoned before ready for force protection.
The force size in this combat outpost was small: 45 U.S. troops and 25 Afghan troops. The nearest help was air power, which was used with effectiveness, but not before a large number of troops were killed or wounded. With nine U.S. soldiers killed, this is an appalling 20% of U.S. Soldiers lost. With fifteen more wounded, this amounts to approximately half of the U.S. soldiers garrisoned at this outpost counted as casualties. Further, because force protection was not possible at this point, the Taliban were the ones to engage in the chase rather than U.S. troops.
The governor of neighbouring Nuristan province, Hazrat Noor, said: "After the attack the US troops decided to move their base to the district centre of Wanat and they tried to build shelters there in the bazaar overnight. Now the Taleban have attacked again." US strategy in Afghanistan has focused increasingly on the use of smaller and more numerous bases, called combat outposts. They aim to give US forces greater influence in local communities. However, American military commanders have privately admitted that such small bases could prove vulnerable if the Taleban was able to concentrate enough fighters and take the base by surprise, as apparently happened yesterday.
Finally, while the loss was horrible, it is necessary to think about the effectiveness of the battle. Normally U.S. troops inflict a kill ratio of 10:1. Forty insurgents were killed in the battle, dropping the results to a rate of about 4:1. This is not high enough.
Inadequate Forces
As we have been arguing for half a year, more forces are needed in Afghanistan, and not of the kind which cannot engage in kinetic operations (e.g., the Germans) due to political decisions at home. Combat outposts are effective when combined with the proper size force to make almost constant contact with the enemy and population, and engage in the chase of insurgents. None of these things obtained in the battle in Kunar.
Summary
Due to the high losses, this unit is likely combat ineffective and needs replacement (or at least reinforcements) soon. This time around, additional troops need to be committed to the area of operation in recognition of its strategic importance. The Captain's Journal has already recommended the redeployment of the Marines to Afghanistan. |
