Good commentary as usual:
The Region: The jury is out
By BARRY RUBIN
Nothing shows the complexity of international affairs decisions than does the Iraq war. Most analysis tries to "prove" the war was an outstanding success or terrible failure. But what would be a balanced assessment?
Any serious look at the issue must begin by understanding that US leaders acted in accord with what they perceived to be the best interests of the United States. This does not necessarily mean they were right but does mean they are not the imperialist buffoons which are caricatured in much of the Arab world, Europe, and American "intellectual" circles.
So what were their motives?
A new assessment. Crises continually flowed from the Middle East. U.S. attempts at appeasement, ignoring, and peace-making had failed. Seeking a new approach, they concluded that the real roadblock were the Arab world's dictatorial regimes using extremist ideologies to retain power. The September 11 events made strong action necessary to prevent it from happening again.
A new assumption. Arguing that Arabs and Muslims were like other people, they thought that challenging the dictatorships while offering democracy, higher living standards, and human/civil rights would appeal to them. They hoped this strategy would cut the roots of anti-Americanism, extremism, and terrorism. This is all classical liberal doctrine.
(Now, here s an irony which no one has ever noticed. Don't these concepts hold a striking familiarity to those motivating the Oslo agreements?) If the Bush administration had been Democratic and liberal, these ideas would have been hailed as tremendously progressive and beneficial.
Having this policy, it should be noted, did not necessitate attacking Iraq. That came about because of several Iraq-specific ideas in addition to this general assessment:
A new prescription. Just voicing such policies, they believed, would have little practical effect. Regimes would merely use force and demagoguery to retain power. In Iraq, at least, then, the regime must be removed in order to unleash moderation and democracy.
The threat assessment. As long as Saddam Hussein stayed in power, he would become a bigger danger to everyone, especially by developing weapons of mass destruction.
Timing. The administration mistakenly believed that Saddam was on the verge of getting WMD. Based on this assessment, the thought it would lose credibility if it did not go to war, and argued that immediate action was necessary.
Pessimism about allies. Precisely because the US government doubted the will of its allies, it assumed that sanctions on Iraq would steadily dwindle and Saddam would soon be free to do as he liked. Here is where the Europeans who opposed the war had a big responsibility in making it happen.
Thus, the war had multiple causes: to transform the Middle East, reduce the threat to the region and America, and defeat terrorism and anti-Americanism at its roots.
WHAT WAS wrong with this assessment? As I wrote in my study of US-Iran relations 25 years ago, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The administration ignored serious problems in its analysis.
The level of opposition in America and Europe was so high that this in itself became a factor.
While the Arab world will eventually be ready for democracy, the difficulty and time span for such a development was seriously underestimated.
Equally underestimated was the power of nationalism, Islamism, and ethnic conflict to shape reactions in Iraq and the region. The war s supporters were too quick to adapt the idea that Middle Eastern politicians would be rational actors and the masses would follow their material interests.
Intelligence failures about WMD.
Poor planning after the fighting, especially dismantling the Iraqi army, slowness in sending relief supplies, and constant changes of strategy.
So was the war a mistake or a triumph? That question can only be answered for Bush and his colleagues by the US election, and for the situation as a whole in a year or two when Iraq's future course becomes clearer.
On the positive side, radical states were intimidated, Saddam is gone, and Iraqis are freed from horrible repression. On the negative side, terrorist forces have been revitalized by a new cause, violence continues in Iraq, and there is a deep split in US-Europe relations.
Either side can argue just these and other points showing the war was good or bad but the result is quite mixed.
Some critical issues remain open. Will Iraq be better off for the war's having happened or will it dissolve into violence and even civil war?
Will Iraq be the kind of state inspiring others to struggle for democracy or one more proof that this road leads to chaos, justifying the status quo in the Arab world?
Will Bush's general approach be vindicated or so totally delegitimized as to lead to new Western policies that repeat all the older mistakes?
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