AFGHANISTAN: How To Chase Taliban
Strategy Page
July 21, 2004: Afghan army troops in the central province of Urzgan, cornered a band of Taliban and killed 15 of them. American helicopters, including at least one gunship, were involved. The Taliban have a hard time moving and fighting, as American air reconnaissance gets better, and Afghan government information gathering on the ground (from a growing network of police stations and government offices) grows. Once a group of Taliban, usually traveling in several trucks or SUVs, is spotted, they are in big trouble, especially if they don't know they are being tracked. If the Taliban do realize they are under observation, they can disperse. If the gunmen are from the area, they can try and get back to their own village before getting intercepted. If they have crossed the border from Pakistan, they can still disperse and race for the border, and even abandoning their vehicles and making it across the border in twos and threes on foot. Afghans love their cars, but still know how to hike over the hills.
IRAQ: The Economics of Roadside Bombs
July 21, 2004: American combat deaths reached 900, as roadside bombs continue to cause many casualties. Over a third of the combat deaths have been from roadside bombs, with the rest from ambushes, mortar fire and fire fights. About a third of the deaths are from rifles, pistols and machine-guns. While the some 80 percent of roadside bombs are discovered before they can be detonated, aggressive and frequent American combat patrols, plus supply and support troops moving about, provide hostile Iraqis with plenty of targets. In some parts of Iraq, planting roadside bombs has become a major part of the local economy. The Baath Party, which finances much of the violence against the government and coalition troops, pays for the bombs to be manufactured and, most importantly, placed and detonated.
This is a risky business, as American helicopters and UAVs are constantly patrolling the roads looking for people trying to place a bomb. Many of these bomb teams are captured, many more are killed. So the local Baath Party leader pays hundreds of dollars to place a bomb, and even more if it goes off and kills a foreigner. But the payments for a successful "hit" are so high (often thousands of dollars), that there is no shortage of volunteers willing to risk all to get rich (at least by Iraqi standards, as a private in an elite Iraqi army unit only makes $145 a month.)
The roadside bombs often kill and wound Iraqi civilians as well, which makes the Baath Party less popular. But since most of the bombings take place in Sunni Arab areas, where the Baath Party organization is still largely intact and functioning, getting mad at the party, and trying to do something about it, is not considered a healthy course of action. But in most of the country, the Baath Party is but a memory, the party officials and enforcers having been chased out either in April, 2003, or ten years earlier in the northern Kurdish areas. Where the roadside bombs, and other violence, is rare. If you look at the pattern of attacks, and anti-government violence in general, and you see that what you basically have is a rebellion by the Sunni Arab minority, the group that ran Iraqi for centuries, against the coming democratically elected government. It's a pretty clear cut battle between democracy and tyranny. But since most neighboring Arab governments are run by Sunni Arab kings or dictators, the Arab media tends to depict the situation in Iraq as a battle between Sunni Arabs trying to throw off a foreign occupation. What gets reports, and the way it is presented, depends a lot on who you are, and who you are rooting for.
THE WAY THINGS REALLY WORK: The Surreal Sniper Situation
July 20, 2004: Every war is different in its own way. Naturally, the fighting in Iraq has created some uniquely surreal moments, but one of the more surreal occurred when a young captain ran out of minutes on his cell phone while calling in an air strike. Say what? Let us explain.
In some parts of Iraq, the standard army radios have reliability problems, so satellite phones were issued to get around this. There was one minor draw back. Rather than given unlimited time for the phone, users were given a wallet card containing codes to enter to "fill up" the phone with more air time minutes. The codes were of the scratch off type.
Then, a captain with one of these satellite phones was driving along in bandit country one night and begins to take sniper fire. There were apparently two snipers, but a lot of other civilians wandering around. His units solution for problems like this was to call in an Apache gunship, which could use its superior night vision equipment to spot the bad guys, and help kill them.
There was a problem, as the captain had left on this trip without checking his satellite phone to make sure it was “charged” with minutes. It wasn’t. The card with the refill codes was in his BDU blouse pocket, which, of course, was underneath his protective vest. With the snipers popping away, he shed his bulletproof vest, got out the card, scratched it to get the numbers, entered the numbers to recharge the cell phone, called in for the Apache gunship, got his protective vest back on, made sure where all his troops were, and awaited the gunship. Soon the gunship showed up, found the snipers, and began taking care of them. At this point, a few hummers full of heavily armed troops from a nearby unit showed up and their leader announced; "we heard you were in a fight, can we join in?" The captain immediately thought, "I haven't heard that kind of talk since high school." There were no American casualties.
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