The innovative, though risky, element in Mr. Sharon's strategy was to trade his concessions in Gaza and the West Bank not to the Palestinians as part of a negotiated agreement but to the Americans, over outraged Palestinian opposition.
The Palestinians are starting to taste the fruits of three years of spitting in President Bush's eye. Bush is a neocon in this: he believes in noticing whether people behave as allies or enemies, and in altering his own behavior accordingly. He does not believe in remaining "even-handed" between allies and enemies. I think the Palestinian killing of the three US agents in Gaza last fall (recent reports I've seen said that Arafat personally ordered the hit), combined with a refusal to punish the perpetrators, was the last straw for Bush.
For Israel, the risk is that the Palestinians will now reject as imposed on them any peace plan along the lines Mr. Bush laid out, in his White House statement and a letter he gave Mr. Sharon.
Well, of course they will. Goes without saying. But what does this change? It's not like they have a government which could accept a plan, anyway. The Pals have shown that they are a car without a steering wheel; they cannot change course. So, what are they going to do about it? Commit terrorism?
For the United States, the risk is that, with Arabs and Muslims already suspicious of American motives, the Bush administration will be seen as teaming with Israel to void Palestinian rights.
Again, of course they do already. The Arabs saw Clinton this way, for heaven's sake. Any agreement that doesn't include destroying Israel or turning it into Palestine II was always seen this way. So where is the additonal risk?
Well, maybe if conditions ever change for the better the next American President won't have such a high hurdle to climb to look relatively friendly to the Arabs. |
