Yossi Klein Halevi comments on the Bush-Sharon conference, in a piece entitled "Slam Dunk". Excerpt:
In rejecting a return to the 1967 borders and insisting that Palestinian refugees be resettled only in a Palestinian state, the Bush-Sharon agreement reestablishes the two red lines that were once self-evident to most Israelis, even on the left. Until the failed Camp David talks in July 2000, only the radical fringe here spoke of a total withdrawal. One popular leftwing plan committed Israel to ceding 89 percent of the West Bank--without offering the Palestinians any compensating territory within pre-1967 Israel. But even that plan seemed excessive to some observers. In a column he wrote before Camp David, Tom Friedman noted that 75 percent of Israelis would support a withdrawal from 75 percent of the territories. Redividing Jerusalem, he added, was inconceivable.
The reasons for an Israeli refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders seemed obvious then. No country that had resisted attempts on its life would voluntarily return to eight-mile wide borders in one of the world's most volatile regions. And because the legal status of the West Bank was uncertain and no Palestinian state had ever existed, its boundaries could be negotiated. That, in fact, was the reason why U.N. Resolution 242, formulated after the 1967 Six Day War, called on Israel to cede "territories" and not "the territories"--a deliberate ambiguity meant to accommodate adjustments. In rejecting a return to the 1967 borders and legitimizing settlement blocs, Bush has reaffirmed the original intention of Resolution 242.
Among the substantial gains won by Sharon, one of the most significant wasn't even mentioned: removing Jerusalem from the negotiating table. Even many Israelis who in principle accept the redivision of Jerusalem realize that bringing a Palestinian government and militia into the city would destroy it. The delicate process of sharing Jerusalem can only come at the end of a long testing period of reconciliation, not at the end of a terrorist war. By avoiding the issue of Jerusalem, then, Bush has implicitly endorsed Sharon's contention that the conflict can only be managed, not resolved. In that sense, the Palestinians are right to declare this the final death of the ever-dying Oslo process--though it's the Palestinians who made this moment inevitable.
Bush's concessions allow Sharon to present his Gaza pullout plan to the Israeli public as a victory over terror, rather than one more Israeli flight under pressure. Abandoning Gaza settlements, which most Israelis no longer want to defend, will be explained as a tactical move, much like Israel's abandonment of besieged settlements during the 1948 War of Independence. Sharon is cutting his losses in Gaza to gain a bit of strategic depth in the West Bank.
Bush's announcement has strengthened Sharon's credibility among the Likud's rank and file, who will be deciding the fate of the withdrawal plan in a May 2 referendum that's confined to Likud members. According to a poll conducted just after the Sharon-Bush meeting, 57 percent of Likudniks now support Sharon.
In the absence of a negotiated peace, Bush has granted Sharon the option of establishing Israel's de facto borders for the next generation. Those borders are now becoming clear. In Gaza it's the 1967 line, while in the West Bank, it's the route of the fence, including united Jerusalem. When the fence is completed, Israel will probably retain about ten percent of the West Bank--about the same amount suggested by the pre-Camp David Israeli left.
The Bush-Sharon plan confirms a healthy if subtle dynamic in Israeli politics. Invariably, the agenda is set by the left--which first proposed unilateral withdrawal and the fence. The public, though, rightly mistrusts the left's ability to protect Israeli security and turns to the right for implementation. Sharon has proven that the old Likud campaign slogan--"Only the Likud Can"--remains valid.
tnr.com |
