Skullduggery? Here's some on a massive scale:
washingtonpost.com
The Kean Commission seems to be a toothless farce and a profoundly misdirected attempt at covering up the truth about 9/11.
************
The following a Press Release from 9/11 Citizen Watch:
For Immediate Release
May 26, 2003
Contact:
John Judge Kyle F. Hence
202-583-5347 401-935-7715
Washington Post Headline on 9/11 Inquiry May Prove Prophetic Says Watchdog Group:
Witnesses not under oath and conflicting testimony raise doubts about Commission process.
An original Washington Post headline "Lawmakers Urge More Aggressive Sept. 11 Probe," posted online on May 22
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26435-2003May22.html) was changed to "New Panel, Independent of
9/11 Commission, Is Sought" (WP 5/23/03), when the print version was released the following day. The print headline
prompted Lee Hamilton, Vice-Chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, to object at the
opening of the second day of hearings that the actual proceedings and the content of the article didn't match the headline.
The story opens, "Several prominent lawmakers, including two Democratic presidential contenders, yesterday urged an
independent commission to forcefully investigate government shortcomings prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, including an
aviation security system experts described as riddled with holes."
A D.C. based watchdog group monitoring the recent 9/11 hearings says that the misstated headline is ironically and poignantly
apropos, given prior calls by concerned citizens and some 9/11 victims’ family members for a truly independent citizens'
commission on 9/11.
Following two days of confusing, conflicting, and sometimes damning testimony by a range of current and former government
officials, civil servants, experts and whistleblowers, 9/11 CitizensWatch co-founder, Kyle F. Hence noted that, "We may need
just such an independent panel if we are ever to learn the whole story and set the record straight. A citizens' commission would
not be plagued by the apparent conflicts of interest and personal recusals of the official Commissioners, and may be able to
hold the government officials’ feet to the fire."
Despite a forced delay of over a year in starting the probe, military and government officials in positions of responsibility at the
time of the attacks have failed in their testimony to put forward a cohesive timeline. Official timelines from NORAD, the FAA,
and other published accounts conflict with each other on significant details about the events in question. NORAD was already
on alert conducting exercises as part of Operation Vigilant Guardian that day, raising questions about response times and
capabilities.
Former top FAA adminstrator Jane Garvey's testimony failed to provide an accurate accounting of exactly when NORAD was
informed of the first hijacking leading an FAA Public Affairs officer to promise to deliver a formal statement before press
deadlines.
According to the official FAA timeline, the initiation of an inter-agency phone bridge (including the entire FAA network ,
Department of Defense, the Secret Service, and "other government agencies") occured "within minutes after the first aircraft hit
the World Trade Center" shortly after 8:46 a.m. EST. These phone bridges allowed NORAD to have real-time information
"about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being
taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77."
However, the official NORAD timeline released shortly after the attacks reveals that the FAA was in contact with NORAD
reporting real-time events regarding the hijackings prior to the crash of the first plane. The Northeast Air Defense System
(NEADS) put Otis Air National Guard Base on alert at 8:40 a.m. EST and were scrambling planes in response to the
hijackings even before the American Airlines flight crashed into the World Trade Center.
Despite the fact that NORAD had their aircraft and command in battle-ready posture, General Arnold testified that when it
came time to repond to the attacks of the four hijacked planes his command had to depend entirely upon FAA radar and
communications systems to scramble, monitor, and direct any air defense jets at their disposal. "On its face this juxtaposition of
testimony stretches credulity" commented John Judge of CitizensWatch.
There was also some confusion in testimony about exactly what protocol was in place in the event of hijackings prior to, and
on 9/11. This point emerged in Commissioner Jamie Gorelick's questioning of NORAD General McKinley and retired
General Arnold, who maintained that response to hijackings is technically a matter for "law enforcement". This jurisdictional
issue seemed to cloud the issue unnecessarily, because standard operating procedures require that in all air emergencies,
including hijackings, the FAA must immediately notify the Pentagon and NORAD to scramble interceptors.
The confusion over NORAD response, or lack of it, on 9/11 was further compounded by the details surrounding a
'shoot-down' order. Transportation Secretary Minetta testified that he overheard conversations at the White House between
Vice-president Cheney and a staff member indicating that a shoot-down order was in place prior to the attack on the
Pentagon. General Arnold, who was in a plane with his staff in the skies over Washington, D.C. testified that he was not
informed of the shoot-down order until after flight AA77 hit the Pentagon. Arnold did not specify by whom or exactly when the
order was issued, or why so much time elapsed before getting intercept jets airborne to protect the Capitol.
In addition, Arnold made no mention of what type of craft he was flying with his staff over the Capitol or what radar or
communications capabilities it had; Commissioners did not inquire for further details during the questions and answer period.
"This manifest failure is all the more perplexing given the clear warnings contained in briefings given the president by the CIA in
the weeks before 9/11 which referred to a clear threat from Osama bin Laden inside the United States, and a July intelligence
report given to "top Administration officials" that an Al-Qeada attack was ‘imminent,’ would inflict ‘mass casualties’ and that
could involve 'hijackings,'" Kyle Hence noted. Portions of the 800-page joint intelligence committee report, containing these
details, are now being withheld from the Commission and the American people by the Bush Administration and the Department
of Justice. "We have to start 'connecting the dots' and seeing the pattern here. We have to ask ourselves who is covering for
whom in the on-going resistance to accountability and accurate fact-finding," said Hence.
After the close of the hearings outside the chamber, a reporter from the Newark Star-Ledger asked Commission chair Tom
Kean why witness testimony offered the Commission was not being taken under oath. "That's something we gotta talk about as
a Commission. There's some discussion as to whether we need people under oath or whether sometimes people come not
under oath and without lawyers and so on are sometimes freer with their testimony and that's a judgement call we make as a
commission." Kean replied. "This question alone gives rise to a sense that the Commission is not moving aggressively or
forthrightly enough to fulfill their mandate to provide a full and accurate accounting," Hence said in comment.
Taken together, these observations and the record of the hearings thus far raise serious doubts about the veracity of official
accounts and explanations and whether the National Commission's current approach will lead to the truth about what happened
on September 11th. 9/11 CitizensWatch advocates feel these problems make the case for the addition of an independent
advisory group to the Commission or a separate oversight panel, as suggested by the Washington Post headline.
In light of what's transpired in these hearings, it turns out that the Post's misfit headline may actually be prophetic. A truly
independent non-partisan oversight panel, without conflicts of interest, or hints of them, and willing to take sworn statements,
may be exactly what is needed to insure that the Commission drive toward clear answers, accountability, and action so that "no
stone will remain unturned," as Senator Shelby and Governor Kean have insisted and promised.
Thus far the Commission has not called for public testimony of those pilots, unit commanders, communicators and controllers
directly involved in the defense responses on September 11. 9/11 CitizensWatch urges the Commission to do so in order to
pierce the fog of confusion around the timeline and other issues. Certainly, if the Commission does not follow its mandate to
learn the truth at this point, it will give additional momentum to a call by citizens to launch a parallel independent inquiry. "While
the Commissioners continue to insist this is not a ‘blame game’ or ‘witch hunt’, victim family members and members of 9/11
CitizensWatch continue to insist that there must be accountability for failure. Let us also be sure the National Commission
themselves will be held fully accountable to fulfill their mandate to determine exactly what happened on 9/11. Their failure to do
so will require an independent alternative," noted Hence, co-founder of 9/11 Citizen’sWatch.
==========================================================
9/11 CitizensWatch (www.911citizenswatch.org) was formed to monitor and serve as a watchdog over the work of the
National Commission on Terrorist Acts to engage constructively with Commissioners and staff; to be sure the fruits of months
of independent investigative work be placed on the table to support the search for the truth, and that questions posed by family
members and others be answered forthrightly and honestly.
###
==========================================================
Based on recording made May 23, 2003
1) Transcript from Q&A with Gov. Kean, Chairman of the National Commission and members.
2) Transcript of Q&A with Major Don Arias, USAF, Chief Public Affairs, First Air Force, CONR.
3) Questioning of General Arnold (retired) following testimony of Maj. Gen. McKinley.
NOTE: Not a single camera from a singe network was there to tape Kean's impromptu press conference following the
conclusion of the second day of hearings.
1) Here follows a portion of Kean's Q&A with the press:
Braun (Star-Ledger): A number of witnesses said "oh, we don't have that information or it's back at my office." Did that
strike you as unusual that these folks came without log books, without documents? and I want to ask a follow-up: when, if
ever, are you going to put people under oath?
Kean: I don't know when we'll put...that's something we gotta talk about as a Commission. There's some discussion as to
whether we need people under oath or whether sometimes people come not under oath and without lawyers and so on are
sometimes freer with their testimony and that's a judgement call we make as a commission.
At this point everybody who did not come with the information we needed said they would supply that to the commission.
Some of it came in last night. We asked for it right away. Some of it will come in the next couple of days. But I don't think
there was any material gap in testimony that we were not promised that would be supplied to the commission for the record
before we close, before we close the window <<within...24 hours and so on>>(barely audible) I think at that point when we
look at the record I believe it will be complete.
Aircraft Security Report: Could you name or point to the specific pieces of evidence the commission is really investigating?
The commission seems to be very interested with the potential of guns and weapons on some of the aircraft and some
timespans in FAA and NORAD communications, is there any thing else you are concentrating on?
Kean: I think you could tell from the questioning that it was aimed at our mandate. I mean our mandate is two different things
really. One is we are very very interested in answering the questions that are still unresolved around the details of that day itself
...and these timelines are one of the things that's been a lot of questions about so we were trying to get in, and bore in on what
happened when, and what about the conflicts within timelines. And so that's what we were trying to do there. On the other
hand, one of our other mandates is to make reccomendations to make people safer and so a whole other series of questions
from the commission was going out a while and saying what can we do to improve things from this pont and what lessons we
learned are being learned, are those lessons really being digested and what is being done.
Larry Arnold (AP): A lot of time was spent on...and it was very interesting sort of minute by minute accounts of the actual
morning of...can you share some of your impressions as to some of the conflicts were, were people not able to reach people,
communication not already set-up .... this thing we heard about NORAD's cold war focus. Can you tell us what were your
initial impressions about what you heard this morning about that?
Kean: (pause) Well, umm...some of that...some of that... I've got to re-read that testimony...the time it takes to scramble
planes...the distance that some of those places where the planes were from the actual attacks where they were
occurring...um...(pause) those kind...and, and some conflicts and some questions about the timelines are something we've just
got to pursue further...these are concerning. And, but we've got the means within this commission to nail down what we
believe to be the truth and that's our job, our job will be to write hopefully the, the definitive report of that timeline. And that's
a very very important part...it is so important to do our job to get that timeline right and to get those questions answered.
Ron Marsico (Star-Ledger): With the information that Garvey provided to the Committee last night, do you have a better
sense as to whether the FAA provided information to NORAD earlier than was considered yesterday?
Kean: (sigh) That's a question. I mean that's something, that's something we got to determine, I mean that's one of the
follow-ups we gotta do in this area.
Marsico: So it's not clear from what Garvey gave you last night?
Kean: No, I don't think it's totally clear, no.
Al Felzenberg, Director of Communication, concludes the questioning to get Gov. Kean to the train.
======================================================
2) Exchange between John Judge, Kyle F. Hence and Major Don Arias, current Chief, Public Affairs, First Air Force/CONR
Questions not heard...
Major Don Arias:....Only the Guard Units that are apportioned to NORAD; other Guard units have different missions. Units
are assigned by mission. Oh yes.
[Contact details for Arias, Chief, Public Affairs, First Air Force/CONR: 850-283-8657 Fax: 850-283-3376 DSN:
523-8657
email: donald.arias@@tyndall.af.mil]
Judge: Do you about Anacostia Naval Air Station? Guard units there.
Major: No
Judge: They have some guard units there. They do some guard duty in the skies of D.C.
Major: We can task almost any unit. General McKinley as the joint forces air component commander can reach out, even if
they aren't a specified unit, if they are in the right location at the right time now, from any service.
Judge: Then, there was a statement saying that there were 14 ready units or something on that day.
Major: September 10 there were 7 alert sites around the United States. That's no secret. Two aircraft each sitting alert. So
there are 14 aircraft.
Judge: That's nationwide.
Major: That's around the periphery of the Continental U.S.
Judge: How many within NEADS?
Major: Within the Northeast Air Defense Sector at that time? Let me think. ahhh, One, two...you know rather than take a
guess I'd rather not say.
Judge: And when the people were talking about...there were a couple of references to planes coming from Langley and then a
couple of others talking about Norfolk. Is that the same thing?
Major:I think they are talking about the same thing. We had, we had no alert forces at Norfolk.
Hence: I had a question about the timeline that was included in McKinley's statement.
Major: I think the testimony really, you know, has to stand on its own. I really can't comment on it.
Hence: I just want to ask a specific question because I did a little math. It was maintained that at 9:02 at the time of the
second plane hitting the tower. The intercept planes were 71 miles away and it said in parentheses that's 8 minutes flying time.
But if you do the math that would be around or less than 600 mph so...
Major: I don't know the answer to that. And you gotta take into account varying speeds so, well you know, uhh
Hence: varying speeds of?
Major: How fast is eight minutes? You are assuming a constant rate of speed.
Hence: The second tower had just been hit so why wouldn't they be going their top speed of 1500mph or 1800mph?
Major: I can't answer that. The testimony has to stand on its own for now.
Hence: I see. Thank you.
[General Eberhart's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the immediate aftermath was that there were 20
craft on alert status on 9/11. This discrepency raises the suspician that NORAD in their official statements now reduced the
total alert number to 14 to cover for the failure of the missing 6 to respond to the attacks. I would suggest that two of those six
are at Andrews and that another two may have been at Anacostia]
======================================================
3) General Arnold was asked by the Commission about whether or not the planes scrambled from Langley could have been
able to intercept flight 77
General Arnold: It is certainly physically possible that they could have gotten into the area. The speculation is whether we
could have actually intercepted the aircraft by that time because everything we were doing remember was being relayed from
the FAA; we have no visibility on those aircraft couldn't see, no radars, couldn't talk with our pilots. FAA did a marvelous job
during that period of time and doing radio relays and assisting us in being able to...
Commissioner: Now If 93 had not crashed would it have been possible for the F-16s to intercept 93 and do you think they
would have.
Arnold: It was our intent to intercept flight 93. In fact, my own staff, we were orbiting now over Washington, D.C. by this
time, by this time. [was this the C-130 sighted over flight 77] and I was personally anxious to see what flight 93 was going to
do and our intent was to intercept it but we elected to stay over Washington, D.C. because there was not that urgency and
because if there were other airplane coming from another quadrant, another vector, we would have been pulled off station and
we would have not been able to; there might have been an aircraft that popped up from the system closer and been a larger
threat to the area so we elected to remain over D.C. until that aircraft was definitely coming toward us. And as you know the
brave men and women who took over that aircraft prevented us from making the aweful decision which the young men who
were flying the aircraft would have lived with for the rest of their lives.
Commissioner: In a short answer, why with the previous attempt of the light plane to hit the White House, wasn't Andrews
AFB with F-16s and Marine F-18s available part of the alert? Also, I understand and I'd like you to have you comment on
what the role the Secret Service was in scrambling those F-16s.
Arnold: The Andrews airplanes. My understanding. The Secret Service. Obviously they work with the 113th because the
President, Air Force One works out of Andrews AFB so they had personal knowledge of the people out there and the
telephone number. And or, I cannot speculate about whether they knew about what we were were doing or not but in the
urgency to get something done they made a phone call to the 113th, I learned later, I did not know that at the time. And asked
them to get anything they could airborne and I think the quote was: 'to protect the house.'
Unknown: And the 113th is the 113th fighter wing, at Andrews, District of Columbia, Air National Guard, F-16 wing.
Arnold: Not part of NORAD
Commissioner: uhhum. Now you said that the clear delineation was you were looking outward and to do anything inward
you had to get authorization from the law enforcement agency. And that is covered as I understand it by JCS instruction by
3610 on aircraft piracy. In that instruction as I read it, which I believe is still in effect, you don't have any delegated authority to
interdict, in fact there's no mention of interdiction in the, it's purely an escort function. This is still in effect and presumably you
are not following it to the letter and I'd like you to speak to what the chain of authority is now. who has authority to interdict, to
shoot down, and are their published rules of engagement?
Maj Gen. McKinley then explains what systems are in place now with Operation Noble Eagle.
[MORE TO FOLLOW] |
