If reasonable disagreement may still be entertained on the question of the bombing of Hiroshima (and I think "reasonable" is being more than concessionary), then it would be altogether out of line to apply such an adjective to the case of Nagasaki.
They were not even given a chance to begin taking charge of the victims and of the dying "survivors" when Nagasaki was blown up. They had only just managed to round up the Supreme Council to continue trying to effectuate a surrender.
Even outright rednecks are unable to rationalize this; most pro-bomb historians (there are still some left) will simply shrug and mumble something about the "stubborn and slow moving Japanese..."
"Thus, it seemed as if only a rude shock could break the spell they were under, as it were. Remember, it took the second bombing to get the Emperor to finally override his Cabinet and insist that they sue for peace........"
No. It is universally agreed except by those repeating simple propaganda, that the bombings did not materially afffect the Japanese position. It was just two more civilian bombings out of 66 cities. The fact was, however, that the Soviet Union could no longer be hoped for as a mediator. The Americans had to act fast as Russia was cutting across Manchuria, and the brutality, treachery, and danger of Stalin was now recognized.
The Americans quickly allowed the Japanese to retain their Emperor, ultimately under the authority of the American Supreme Commander, but clearly to be accorded immunity and denied any special or dishonoutable humiliation. This made the deal as it would have done months before if the goal had been surrender rather than something just a bit more...
What was the huge rush? Were they desperate to avoid the "invasion" which had been unnecessary for many months, and which, in any event, had never been contemplated as something to be engaged before the month of November--3 months away?
After Hiroshima, did they begin to fear that they were losing their grip on air superiority and the ability to bomb at will? Did the blockade seem a hopeless task after Hiroshima was blown up? Did everything look grim for the allies?
No, of course not: because the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki both obtained from the same order dating back to July 25. The first was an Uranium bomb; the second was a plutonium bomb. The tests were succesful.
The wonderful moral argument used by some of the thread members here runs something like: "We had to do something really awful right away; otherwise we were going to do something which was a Hell of a lot worse!"
This is a beautiful moral argument; as it may be used to justify any act in the universe of which one is physically capable.
People who are unwilling to see that there was no miltary necessity for the a-bombs are fooling themselves, and they are ignoring the innumerable voices and records of history which state otherwise.
"The atomic bombs, far from being the 'controlling' factor, caused no significant reorientation of attitudes, no manifest change in point of view."
So if that is the case, then how could these be viewed as military necessities rather than the long planned fulfillment of Grove's personal obsession?
"Stalin's armies were racing across Manchuria; there was no time to lose. Truman asked Byrnes to draft a reply to the Japanese surrender offer. The carefully drafted reply contained the sentence: "From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." This assurance implied the retention of the emperor. Through deliberate ambiguity, Japan's conditional surrender was being accepted; but, at the same time, the fiction of unconditional surrender could be maintained."
"By offering conditional surrender in their note of August 10, Japanese leaders were willing to take the risk of additional atomic bombing as well as of last-ditch resistance. As an old RAND study concluded, "The atomic bombs, far from being the 'controlling' factor, caused no significant reorientation of attitudes, no manifest change in point of view." The main factor triggering the timing of the offer was the Soviet declaration of war because it dispelled the illusion of Soviet mediation. If the bombs had been dropped but the Soviet intervention had not occurred, Japanese leaders would have still pinned their hopes on Soviet intentions.125 The British assessment as well was that "the Russian declaration of war was the decisive factor in bringing Japan to accept the Potsdam declaration."126 The atomic bombs killed one-seventh as many Japanese as the incendiary bombing. "Since Tokyo was not directly affected by the (atomic) bombing", Army Vice-Chief of Staff Torashiro Kawabe later pointed out, "the full force of the shock was not felt." In comparison, the Soviet entry into the war was a much greater shock. Chief of Staff Admiral Toyoda confessed after the war that the Russian attack rather than the atomic bombs hastened the surrender.127
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not a decisive factor even in the sequence of events leading to the surrender. The army refused to discuss surrender at a meeting called soon after the Hiroshima bombing. The atomic bombings had "little or no impact on the Army's position." Had the civilian members of the Supreme War Council tried to surrender at that stage, there might have been a coup led by senior military officers. After the Soviet attack across the Manchurian frontier, however, its representatives participated in the discussions. The atomic bombing had "little or no impact on the army's position."128 The Supreme War Council continued to be evenly divided after the disaster of Hiroshima; the same division persisted after the Nagasaki bombing" |
