between a tax-payer guaranteed and fed-embraced as bad as instant-loss of 1.4 tril over just so many months which really only benefited financial elite overlords the world over, and a few failing states, and some issues with clueless leadership intent on witch hunts, we are set for good show in the second half, and imo, the still-just-starting dire crisis should add new ingredients of failing states (as in california/new york, as opposed to pakistan/mexico).
should all crisis be averted, then money supply should be at 10x pre-crisis level, and velocity at 2x pre-crisis level, allowing us a respite, stock up on more gold at substantially higher average price, in time for the next crisis
in the mean time, watch n brief from stratfor
U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan: Seeking a Trilateral Solution
May 5, 2009 | 2241 GMT
Alex Wong/Getty Images
House Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner and Speaker Nancy Pelosi with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Washington, D.C., on May 5Summary
U.S. President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will meet in Washington on May 6 to forge a common strategy to fight the jihadist insurgency in South Asia. Karzai will look for greater cooperation from Pakistan, while Zardari will look for reassurance and aid from the United States. The Obama administration, meanwhile, is already in the process of downgrading expectations for this war.
Analysis
Related Link
Special Report: U.S.-NATO, Facing the Reality of Risk in Pakistan (With STRATFOR Interactive map)
U.S. President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will attempt to hammer out a common strategy to battle the growing jihadist insurgency in South Asia when they sit down for a meeting at the White House on May 6.
The trilateral meeting comes at a crucial time: Afghan Taliban forces are increasing the tempo of attacks with the help of their al Qaeda allies, and attempts to negotiate with so-called reconcilable Taliban are already falling flat. On the other side of the Durand line, Pakistani military forces are desperately attempting to confine Taliban forces to the northwestern Swat valley, where a peace deal with Taliban militants has all but collapsed.
Karzai’s demands for this meeting are relatively straightforward. The embattled Afghan leader is facing re-election in August, and now has a Tajik former warlord in addition to a Hazara former mujahideen commander by his side as vice-presidential running mates to take advantage of a deeply fractured opposition. After facing a stream of criticism from White House officials for leading a corrupt regime and exaggerating civilian losses caused by U.S. and NATO attacks, Karzai is coming to Washington with the understanding that he still runs a good chance of remaining in the presidential palace after August elections, and that U.S. officials will likely be dealing with him for some time to come. From his Pakistani counterpart, Karzai will demand greater intelligence sharing and cooperation in targeting the jihadist supply line that originates in Pakistan and fuels the insurgency in Afghanistan.
But this is no longer “just” about the war in Afghanistan. The growing Talibanization phenomenon in nuclear-armed Pakistan is now dominating the headlines as fears mount that Pakistan’s leadership will be ineffective in countering the Taliban’s “salami tactics” and preventing the militants from spreading beyond their Pashtun strongholds into Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland. Pakistan traditionally has dealt with the Talibanization threat by alternating between strong-armed tactics and flimsy peace deals in an attempt to box the Pakistani Taliban into the lawless northwest. Such tactics have thus far backfired: With each new military offensive that displaces a local population, more refugee camps are created from which the Pakistani Taliban can pluck fresh recruits.
It is little wonder, then, that the leadership in Islamabad finds itself hamstrung. Even as U.S. officials cheer the Pakistani military on during its “wakeup call” offensive to push the Taliban back in the Buner and Dir districts around Swat, Pakistani commanders on the ground acknowledge that trying to move aggressively into Swat would be suicidal. Taliban forces are already preparing for a major counteroffensive and see the Pakistani military’s moves as playing into their hands. Pakistani troops simply lack the capability and will to handle the backlash.
Obama will attempt to boost Pakistan’s confidence when he meets with Zardari. While Zardari is in town, Obama is expected to push through nearly $1 billion in aid and put the final touches on a new counterinsurgency plan developed by U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus to train two Pakistani battalions at a U.S. base in Kuwait, along with other forms of military and intelligence assistance. While such assistance is critical if Pakistan is to have any hope of regaining the initiative against the Taliban, a number of fundamental problems remain unaddressed.
No matter what assurances the United States gives Islamabad on India’s intentions, the Pakistani military will give priority to its eastern front with India. Some 6,000 troops have been transferred from the eastern border to the Pakistani northwest, but Washington cannot expect Pakistani commanders — who are far more willing to devote resources to conventional warfare than counterinsurgency — to divert much more than that. This severely limits the extent to which force can be brought to bear in the lawless tribal areas. In addition, the Pakistani security apparatus suffers from a lack of cohesion, as the armed forces and intelligence services are heavily penetrated by Islamist sympathizers who work on both sides of the insurgency. Washington has long pressured Islamabad to reform agencies like Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but the Pakistani leadership doubts that the United States will remain committed to the region for the long haul. As a result, many Pakistani leaders do not feel particularly compelled to deal with the domestic backlash from doing things like purging the ISI and bulldozing through Taliban territory when they feel they may later be abandoned.
The Pakistanis have reason for such concerns. The Obama administration is clearly alarmed about the developments in Pakistan, but also is beginning to understand its limits in the region. The Pakistani military is fighting an uphill battle against the Taliban while Taliban forces in Afghanistan are in no mood for reconciliation. Insurgencies have long lives, and this is a region that has seen countless occupiers. Most of the militants that U.S., NATO, Pakistani and Afghan forces are battling today have the motivation and patience to fight to the end.
However, the United States has neither the luxury of time nor patience. There are a host of competing issues that need to be dealt with, and Obama has given a number of subtle — and a few not-so-subtle — hints that he is not about to rest his re-election four years out on the fate of the jihadist war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The focus has now turned to ensuring that, at the very least, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (most of which is believed be concentrated in Punjab) is secure, and that appropriate measures are taken to enhance security of those facilities.
Now is also the time to start downgrading expectations. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a lengthy interview to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria on May 3, in which he unequivocally stated that there were no prospects for political reconciliation with Afghan Taliban right now, and that he has “real reservations about significant further commitments of American military (forces), beyond what the president has already approved.” He compared the situation to the Soviet experience, and said that if the Soviets were there with some 120,000 troops, did not care about civilian casualties, and still could not win, “then there is a lot we (the United States) can learn from that.”
Gates emphasized the need to train Afghan forces to fight the war, but the defense secretary was very clearly sending a message that this administration is not prepared to escalate the U.S. military commitment to a war that is already in deep trouble. Regular readers will understand that this message, which could not have been made without the president’s approval, does not come as a surprise to STRATFOR. Petraeus, who has pushed for a long-haul strategy in the region, likely has a different strategy in mind for fighting this war. It will be interesting to watch this policy debate in Washington as the administration pushes ahead with its own agenda. Meanwhile, Islamabad and Kabul will try to squeeze as much out of the United States as they can while they still have time
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