The case for war on Iraq looks weak - Andrew Mack
Thursday, October 10, 2002
VANCOUVER It is true that inspections, however intrusive, can never guarantee that all of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs will be uncovered. Mobile and underground facilities for weapons of mass destruction are almost impossible to detect. And yes, the Iraqi regime is utterly untrustworthy. Any promises to come clean on its weapons programs are never worth the paper they are printed on.
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Regime change is indeed a necessary condition for getting rid of Iraqi weapons programs.
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But does it follow from all this that war is necessary? Much of the Bush administration's case for war is driven by politics rather than logic and evidence. It is often plain wrong, and it reeks of hypocrisy.
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Regime change is necessary to stop the persecution of the Iraqi people? This may well be true, but it is not a driver of the current U.S. campaign to wage war on Iraq. In the 1980s, Saddam was every bit as vicious a ruler as he is today, but Washington supported him because it suited America's realpolitik.
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If preventing violent repression were a reason for military intervention, the United States would have sent forces to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Washington averted its gaze and did nothing.
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War is justified because Iraq seeks nuclear weapons to attack its neighbors? There would be no conceivable reason for a nuclear-armed Iraq to launch unprovoked attacks. This is not because Saddam would have qualms about slaughtering innocent civilians, but because using nuclear weapons would be suicidal. The devastating retaliation that would follow would destroy the regime - and Saddam has always shown a strong instinct for self-preservation.
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The Iraqi leader has done many stupid and irrational things. But since his humiliating defeat in the Gulf War, the omnipresent threat of retaliation has deterred him from any act of military adventurism.
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Nuclear weapons do make sense for Iraq as a deterrent against attack by its enemies. If Baghdad seeks nuclear weapons as a deterrent, this is indeed a matter of grave concern - but not one that justifies waging war and risks destabilizing a whole region.
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What about the nightmare scenario in which Saddam shares his weapons of mass destruction with terrorist organizations? There is no evidence that Iraq has ever attempted to do so. The volatility of Middle East politics is such that Iraq's secular leaders could never be sure that any weapons of mass destruction transferred to Islamic extremists would not at some stage be used against them. The number of people who would necessarily be involved in weapons transfers would make concealment of Iraq's role almost impossible over the long term. Mere revelation of such transfers, let alone actual terrorist use of the weapons, would bring massive U.S. military action against the Iraqi regime.
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Since the Gulf War, the allied doctrine of containment and deterrence has been remarkably successful. The bans on arms imports have prevented Saddam from rebuilding his military capability.
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The undoubted benefits of regime change are not worth the likely costs of achieving it by military means. Estimates of the cost of a military campaign against Iraq range as high as $200 billion. Heavy Iraqi and American death tolls would be likely from the urban warfare campaign.
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And invading Iraq would further inflame an unstable region. It would add fuel to the anti-American rage that feeds terrorism in the Muslim world. Waging an unnecessary war against Saddam risks undermining the global campaign against terrorism.
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If possible use by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction really is Washington's primary concern, then it needs to reflect on the prospect that a Saddam confronting certain military defeat and death or capture would no longer be deterred from using his chemical and biological arsenals.
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Military victory provides no guarantee that a successor regime will be any better than Saddam's, while sustained U.S. commitment to post-Ba'athist institution-building is anything but certain. Building a new order would require the sort of long-term commitment to reform that the allies demonstrated in Germany and Japan after World War II.
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Few believe that America is prepared to make such a commitment. If its performance in Afghanistan is any guide, Washington would begin to lose interest in Iraq the moment its military goals were realized.
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Washington seems to ignore the possibility that any future Iraqi regime, even a "moderate" pro-U.S. one, might seek to pursue a nuclear weapons program as a deterrent against a nuclear-armed Israel and a nuclear wannabee Iran.
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The United States, the world's most powerful state, strongly believes that nuclear weapons are essential for its security. Why should it assume that a much weaker state like Iraq, which has enemies that long predate Saddam and will still be there when he has gone, would feel any differently, regardless of the complexion of its government?
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There may be a compelling case for war, but the Bush administration has yet to make it.
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The writer directs the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. |
