Part 5 >>(U) Conclusion 13. The report on the former ambassador's trip to Niger, disseminated in
March 2002, did not change any analysts' assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For
most analysts, the information in the report lent more credibility to the original Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal, but State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts believed that the report supported their
assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq.
- 7 3 -
(U) Conclusion 14. The Central Intelligence Agency should have told the Vice President
and other senior policymakers that it had sent someone to Niger to look into the alleged
Iraq-Niger uranium deal and should have briefed the Vice President on the former
ambassador's findings.
(U) Conclusion 15. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate of Operations
should have taken precautions not to discuss the credibility of reporting with a potential
source when it arranged a meeting with the former ambassador and Intelligence
Community analysts.
- 7 4 -
(U) Conclusion 16. The language in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that
"Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" overstated
what the Intelligence Community knew about Iraq's possible procurement attempts.
- 7 5 -
(U) Conclusion 17. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
dissent on the uranium reporting was accidentally included in the aluminum tube section of
the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), due in part to the speed with which the NIE was
drafted and coordinated.
(U) Conclusion 18. When documents regarding the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting became
available to the Intelligence Community in October 2002, Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) analysts and operations officers should have made an effort to obtain copies. As a
result of not obtaining the documents, CIA Iraq nuclear analysts continued to report on
Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from Africa and continued to approve the use of such
language in Administration publications and speeches.
-76-
(U) Conclusion 19. Even after obtaining the forged documents and being alerted by a
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analyst about problems with
them, analysts at both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) did not examine them carefully enough to see the obvious problems with the
documents. Both agencies continued to publish assessments that Iraq may have been
seeking uranium from Africa. In addition, CIA continued to approve the use of similar
language in Administration publications and speeches, including the State of the Union.
- 7 7 -
(U) Conclusion 20. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) comments and assessments
about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent and, at times contradictory.
These inconsistencies were based in part on a misunderstanding of a CIA Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) Iraq analyst's
assessment of the reporting. The CIA should have had a mechanism in place to ensure that
agency assessments and information passed to policymakers were consistent.
(U) Conclusion 21. When coordinating the State of the Union, no Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) analysts or officials told the National Security Council (NSC) to remove the
"16 words" or that there were concerns about the credibility of the Iraq-Niger uranium
reporting. A CIA official's original testimony to the Committee that he told an NSC
official to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech, is incorrect.
- 8 0 -
(U) Conclusion 22. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should have taken the time
to read the State of the Union speech and fact check it himself. Had he done so, he would
have been able to alert the National Security Council (NSC) if he still had concerns about
the use of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in a Presidential speech.
(U) Conclusion 23. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Humint Service
(DHS), or the Navy should have followed up with a West African businessman, mentioned
in a Navy report, who indicated he was willing to provide information about an alleged
uranium transaction between Niger and Iraq in November 2002.
-81 -
(•) Conclusion 24. In responding to a letter from Senator Carl Levin on behalf of the
Intelligence Community in February 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should
not have said that of reporting suggest Iraq had attempted to acquire
uranium from Niger," without indicating that State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) believed the reporting was based on forged documents, or that the CIA
was reviewing the Niger reporting.
(U) Conclusion 25. The Niger reporting was never in any of the drafts of Secretary
Powell's United Nations (UN) speech and the Committee has not uncovered any
information that showed anyone tried to insert the information into the speech.
- 8 2 -
(U) Conclusion 26. To date, the Intelligence Community has not published an assessment
to clarify or correct its position on whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase uranium
from Africa as stated in the National Intelligence Estimate (ME). Likewise, neither the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) nor the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which both
published assessments on possible Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium, have ever published
assessments outside of their agencies which correct their previous positions.
- 8 3 -
. . . .
C. Niger
(U) Although not listed as a reason the IC believed Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
program, the NIE did discuss Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa. The NIE said:
Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at
Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously
trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the
time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.
• A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger
planned to send several tons of "pure uranium" (probably yellowcake) to
Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out
arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of
yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement.
• Reports indicate Iraq has also sought uranium ore from Somalia and
possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or
yellowcake from these sources.
(H^^H) The Committee has examined the Niger uranium issue in depth and reported
the information and findings on the issue in a separate section of this report. The Committee
notes, however, that there were a number of intelligence reports which indicated Iraq was
attempting to procure uranium from several countries in Africa, including Niger, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. At the time the NIE was written the forged foreign
language documents were not available to the IC, but there was intelligence reporting that
indicated Iraq may have approached Niger either to procure uranium or for another unidentified
purpose. The Committee did not find that the information showed Iraq was "vigorously trying to
procure uranium" as indicated in the NIE, but it did indicate that Iraq may have been trying to
acquire uranium. See the Niger section of this report for a detailed explanation of the treatment
of the Niger uranium information by the IC prior to, during, and after the NIE process.
- 125-
D. Explaining Uncertainties
(U) The NIE provided a "tone box" that listed the IC's "confidence levels for selected key
judgements in this estimate." The NIE's key judgements were broken down into three categories
of high, moderate and low confidence. Assessments related to Iraq's nuclear capabilities listed
under the "High Confidence" heading were:
• "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and
missile programs contrary to UN resolutions."
• "We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs."
(U) The only key judgment noted under the "Moderate Confidence" heading related to
Iraq's nuclear capabilities said:
• "Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely to
have a weapon by 2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page 84)"
(U) There were no assessments of Iraq's nuclear capabilities listed under the "Low
Confidence" heading.
E. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis on Reconstitution Prior to Publication of the NIE
(U) The assessment that Iraq had begun reconstituting its nuclear program was a new
Community assessment in 2002, but individual IC agencies began to change their assessments
about the nuclear program more gradually, beginning in 2001, as new intelligence reports began
to come into the IC.
As mentioned previously, the CIA began assessing that the aluminum tubes
"have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program" as early as April 10, 2001 (SEIB -
1-083CHX) - almost immediately after the detailed intelligence reports on Iraq's attempts to
procure 60,000 aluminum tubes started coming to the IC. The April 2001 assessment also
suggested that the tubes, and purchases of other dual use items, such as magnets and specialized
balancing equipment, could revive Iraq's nuclear program. The CIA produced about a dozen
more assessments of the aluminum tubes and their applicability in Iraq's nuclear program over
the course of the next year.
-126-
(U) It is clear from the CIA's finished intelligence that the procurement of aluminum
tubes and other dual use equipment was key to the CIA shifting its position on reconstitution of
Iraq's nuclear program. The CIA wrote in January 2002, that "Procurement activities detected in
the past year are consistent with Iraq attempting to jump-start a clandestine uranium enrichment
program to produce fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon, potentially by late this
decade." (SPWR011102-02) On March 12, 2002, the CIA published a Senior Executive
Memorandum which assessed that "Iraq currently may be trying to reconstitute its gas centrifuge
enrichment program" and on the same day the CIA said "Iraq could develop enough fissile
material for a nuclear weapon by mid-to-late decade." (SPWR031202-07) In August 2002, the
CIA published a paper titled Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat in which
it assessed that "Iraq's procurement of nuclear-related equipment and materials indicates it has
begun reconstituting its uranium enrichment gas centrifuge program to produce fissile material
for a nuclear device, a process that could be completed by late this decade." The same paper
later noted, "Iraq's persistent interest in high-strength aluminum tubes indicates Baghdad has
renewed an indigenous centrifuge uranium enrichment program." The CIA's nuclear analysts
also told Committee staff that the aluminum tube procurement was the principal part of the
agency's assessment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
(U) On April 11, 2001, almost immediately after the reports on Iraq's procurement efforts
came to the IC, the DOE assessed that the aluminum tubes were likely not intended for Iraq's
nuclear program. The DOE noted that "While the gas centrifuge application cannot be ruled out,
we assess that the procurement activity more likely supports a different application, such as
conventional ordnance production." The DOE continued to assess that the tubes were intended
for the Nasser 81 rocket program in numerous assessments throughout the next year.
(U) Despite the DOE's assessment that the tubes were not intended for Iraq's nuclear
program, DOE analysts did note other intelligence in their assessments that led them to believe
Iraq may be reconstituting its nuclear program. On August 17, 2001, in an intelligence paper
(TIN000064) the DOE assessed that "Iraq is engaged in activities, such as establishing a
permanent magnet production capability, that could be preliminary steps intended, at least in part
to support a gas centrifuge program restart. However, we cannot determine from information
now available whether or when Iraq may have begun program reconstitution in earnest or if it
intends to do so in the immediate future." On July 22, 2002, the DOE assessed that Iraq's efforts
to procure magnets, Saddam's meetings with Iraq's nuclear scientists, and possible Iraqi attempts
to acquire uranium from Niger suggest "that Saddam Hussein is seeking to reconstitute Iraq's
nuclear weapons program."
- 127-
(U) The DIA first assessed that the aluminum tubes could be part of Iraq's nuclear
program on August 2, 2001. The background paper outlined the CIA's assessment that the tubes
were suitable for an uranium enrichment program and also explained the DOE's assessment that
the tube's thickness, length, and anodized finish made it more likely they were for other uses.
The paper indicated that "DIA analysts found the CIA presentation to be very compelling." The
DIA wrote little else on the procurements of aluminum tubes or other dual use items until it
published a large defense intelligence assessment on "Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapon
Program" in September 2002. This assessment became the basis for most of the nuclear section
of the October 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.19
The DIA paper used the term "revitalized" rather than "reconstituted" to refer to Iraq's nuclear
efforts saying "Iraq revitalized its nuclear weapon efforts after the departure of UNSCOM and
IAEA inspectors in December 1998."
(U) INR did not publish intelligence papers on Iraq's procurement of aluminum tubes or
papers indicating its position on nuclear reconstitution until after publication of the NIE. A draft
of an in-depth analysis paper on the aluminum tubes issue was provided to the NIC staff prior to
the NIE, so the NIC would be aware of INR's position. The finished paper was published on
October 9, 2002.
E. Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure
(U) On December 17, 2002, CIA analysts produced a review of Iraq's WMD declaration
to the UN titled, U.S. Analysis of Iraq's Declaration, 7 December 2002. On December 30, 2002,
the points from the paper were worked into talking points for the National Intelligence Officer
for Science and Technology titled, Talking Points on US Analysis of Iraq's Declaration. The
two assessments reviewed Iraq's "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure" to the UN
of its WMD programs and made only two points regarding the nuclear program. The
assessments said the declaration, "fails to acknowledge or explain procurement of high
specification aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in a gas centrifuge uranium effort. Fails
to acknowledge efforts to procure uranium from Niger, as noted in the U.K. Dossier." The titles
of both of these assessments said, "U.S. analysis," suggesting that they represented more than
just CIA's position. Yet, known dissenting views from INR and the DOE regarding the purpose
19 The aluminum tube section of the NIE was taken from a September 2002 CIA assessment, Iraq's Hunt for
Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Uranium Enrichment Program.
- 128-
of the aluminum tubes were not included in the assessments. INR's view that the Niger reporting
was "highly dubious" also was not included in the assessments.
(U) Information provided to the Committee indicates that the December 17, 2002
assessment was passed to the President without INR or the DOE having an opportunity to review
or comment on the draft. An INR analyst sent an e-mail to CIA asking, "Do you happen to know
offhand if INR will get to review and clear the draft 'detailed analysis' of the declaration before
it's issued in its capacity as a 'U.S.' position? We were not invited to review or clear on the draft
preliminary 'U.S.' assessment, which subsequently went to POTUS, et al." A CIA analyst
responded to the INR analyst that all agencies had been invited to participate in the analysis. The
INR sent another e-mail noting that INR and DOE analysts had been able to review the
declaration and make comments, but had left CIA prior to the preparation of the talking points
for the NSC. He said INR and DOE analysts did not even know that such points were being
prepared or provided to the NSC, but said the CIA was well aware of their positions and should
have included them in the points. Although the INR analyst's concerns were passed to the CIA
on December 23, 2002, their alternative views also were not included in the December 30, 2002
talking points.
(U) The INR analyst forwarded his e-mail comments to a DOE analyst who responded
that "It is most disturbing that WINPAC is essentially directing foreign policy in this matter.
There are some very strong points to be made in respect to Iraq's arrogant non-compliance with
UN sanctions. However, when individuals attempt to convert those 'strong statements' into the
'knock out' punch, the Administration will ultimately look foolish - i.e. the tubes and Niger!"
web.mit.edu |
