Strategy Page update on Iraq:
August 15, 2004: The ceasefire with Muqtada al Sadr and his gunmen has broken down. Sadr demanded control of Najaf in return for a ceasefire he would not promise to abide by. Apparently Sadr believes he can hold out in the Imam Ali shrine long enough for popular support for him to force American and government troops out of Najaf. But Sadr has consistently misjudged his popularity (low) and military capability (also low.) While about ten percent of the population wants a religious dictatorship, most of them don't want Sadr running the show.
In Baghdad, 1300 local leaders began meeting to form an interim national assembly, to serve until national elections next year choose one.
August 14, 2004: Muqtada al Sadr and several hundred of his armed followers are surrounded by American and Iraqi troops in the Imam Ali Shrine. For the last 24 hours, the government has maintained a ceasefire with Sadr, to allow for negotiations. The government wants Sadr and his gunmen out of the shrine, and Sadr wants to avoid getting killed. Most Iraqis see Sadr as a young hothead, and a puppet of the Iranians. A minority of Iraqis, perhaps ten percent, agree with Sadr's concept of an Islamic republic (like in Iran), and that's enough people to create his "army" of gunmen. The majority of Iraqis are looking to the government to deal with Sadr. That means destroying Sadr's militia, and preserving the holy places. Killing or imprisoning Sadr won't eliminate the problem of Iranian influence and Iraqis who desire a religious dictatorship. In fact, the elimination of Sadr would make it possible for the Shia conservative faction to develop a more effective leader. Sadr is a devious, ruthless and unpredictable fellow who cannot be trusted. But he's in the shrine and doesn't much care that the people of Najaf hate him for it. |
