Copyright 1993 Newsday, Inc.
Newsday
December 6, 1993, Monday
Hunting Down Aidid; Why Clinton changed mind
SERIES: Mission in Somalia. A year ago this week, the first U.S. troops President Bush
committed arrived in Somalia. It was to be a humanitarian mission. But policy began to
change in August, when President Bill Clinton sent in a Special Operations force to
capture the warlord Aidid. This report looks at that decision and its consequences.
Second of 4 Parts
By Patrick J. Sloyan.
Washington
The first attempt to grab Gen. Mohamed Farrah Aidid had gone badly.
On Aug. 30 the U.S. Delta Force and members of the 75th Ranger Regiment cascaded from
helicopter ropes into the worsening violence in Mogadishu. Their primary target turned out to
be an empty building. The secondary target included one man who looked like Somalia's
dominant political leader but turned out to be a member of the UN Relief Mission. He was
released four hours later with profuse apologies from a U.S. Army colonel.
At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Les Aspin was upset. "We look like the gang that can't
shoot straight," Aspin said, according to an aide who attended the session with senior military
advisers.
In public there had been no mention of the Special Operations team dispatched by President
Bill Clinton on Aug. 22 with orders to capture the warlord and spirit him offshore to face
murder charges before a panel of African judges. In a meeting with reporters, Pentagon
spokeswoman Kathleen de Laski mentioned only the Rangers, a light infantry force that she
said represented no change of U.S. policy in Somalia.
"This is not an effort to go after one man," she said. "It's an effort to improve the overall
situation in Mogadishu." But in fact the Aug. 30 operation had all the earmarks of the kind of
"snatch" operation perfected by the Delta Force. That first try to grab Aidid was painless
compared to the seventh and final effort five weeks later.
On Oct. 3 the elaborate American effort to capture Somalia's leading politician ended in fierce
battle that left 18 Americans dead and 77 wounded. More than 300 Somalis were killed and
700 wounded. When the gunsmoke cleared, Clinton had suffered a major setback and left
Aidid with a surprising victory.
A Newsday examination of decisions leading up to the battle showed that in private Clinton
was under intense pressure to change his policy after ordering the clandestine mission Aug.
22. In the week before the Oct. 3 firefight, Newsday found, he had moved from a "hang
tough" stance to the verge of halting the hunt for Aidid.
At first - within days of the Special Operations team deployment - Clinton had signaled a new
and tougher line against Aidid. At an Aug. 23 White House meeting it was decided that Aspin
would soon give a major policy address; four days later he pledged that the United States
would stay in Somalia until warlords were disarmed, violence had ceased and a new Somali
police force was established.
But the shift was quickly attacked in Congress, most notably by Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.
Va.), chairman of the appropriations committee. He vowed to cut off U.S. funds for the
expanded mission, claiming it should "either be specifically endorsed by Congress or we
should pack up and go home. My vote is for the latter," he said. Byrd noted he was inspired,
in part, by his failure to vigorously oppose the Vietnam War.
In Mogadishu the hard-line tactics against Aidid rattled U.S. allies. Italy moved its contingent
of troops out of the city to the safer suburbs; the French government criticized the breakdown
in efforts for a political settlement with Aidid.
Meanwhile, U.S. military concerns about locating Aidid in the dusty alleyways of Mogadishu
had become a reality. At least four risky missions ended in failure because of bad intelligence,
according to U.S. commanders in Somalia.
From the outset Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar of Central Command, the military headquarters
responsible for Somalia, had argued that without adequate intelligence, a Special Operations
force would be useless. And military intelligence capability had been reduced as most U.S.
combat troops were withdrawn as ordered by Clinton three months earlier.
"They argued that the Delta Team was worthless unless it had good intelligence," said one
participant in the debate, who, like many officials, spoke on condition of anonymity. "Then it
was decided to send in the CIA. But the CIA said there was no point in going into Mogadishu
unless the snatch team was there. It went on like that."
In late June a CIA team skilled in intercepting communications and other techniques was
dispatched to Somalia. They were able to listen in on satellite telephone and radio
communications with Aidid's associates. "But Aidid never called them," said one U.S. official.
"He went into deep cover."
The CIA high-tech approach was useless in pinpointing Aidid because the warlord
communicated by using dated walkie-talkies too low-powered to be detected by the CIA.
And he used an old, low-power transmitter aboard a truck to make mobile radio broadcasts
to his followers.
In addition, Aidid's forces kept an eye on helicopter operations at Mogadishu airport, where
the Delta Force was based. "It got so we were flying helicopters day and night just to cover
our operations," said one U.S. military commander.
But perhaps the biggest policy flaw was underlined during a long conversation Clinton had
with former President Jimmy Carter on Sept. 12, the night before the signing of the peace
agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Clinton had invited
Carter to spend the night at the White House, and they talked until after 1 a.m., aides said.
Carter had met Aidid while visiting Somalia and had gotten letters from him protesting his
innocence. According to associates of the former president, Carter told Clinton that the key to
success in Somalia was a political settlement. He drove home the point that without Aidid, no
political settlement was possible.
"After Carter's visit the hard line toward Aidid began to weaken," said one Clinton adviser. At
the same time Democratic leaders were having difficulty restraining congressional opposition
to the fighting in Somalia. Eventually the House would vote overwhelmingly to either restrict
U.S. involvement to humanitarian aid or require an American withdrawal.
The lack of success in finding Aidid was also forcing a Clinton reassessment. While top aides
to the Somali leader had been captured by the Delta Force, Aidid remained elusive and
defiant.
"[They] never came close," Aidid said Nov. 29 of the elaborate American effort. Aidid told a
news conference he had hidden himself among his people.
Violent protests on Aidid's behalf had forced a halt to United Nations patrols in Mogadishu.
U.S. Army Cobra helicopter gunships fired 20-mm cannon into a crowd attacking American
and Pakistani soldiers attempting to clear a roadblock Sept. 9. More than 100 Somalis were
killed, including a number of women and children.
"In an ambush there are no sidelines or spectator seats," U.S. Army Maj. David Stockwell
said in defending the gunship attacks.
But the Sept. 9 event evoked memories of Vietnam, where U.S. troops often killed and
wounded women and children. As a young anti-Vietnam activist, Clinton wrote that he
"loathed" the U.S. Army tactics. As a presidential candidate, he promised to avoid such U.S.
involvement by endorsing a multinational approach to world trouble spots.
According to White House officials, that Clinton campaign pledge was the driving force
behind U.S. support for a UN takeover of Somalia - other countries would share the dirty
work. But now, Clinton was commander-in-chief of the most potent force in Somalia, a force
that had become embattled by the hunt for Aidid.
At the time of the Sept. 9 fighting, Hoar was in the city, meeting with his local commander,
Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery. With the withdrawal of most combat forces, the
remaining 1,120 combat soldiers were without armored personnel carriers. To deal with the
increasing threat, Montgomery requested four M-1 Abrams tanks, 14 Bradley Fighting
Vehicles and some heavy artillery.
"Hoar approved the request and sent it up the chain of command," said a U.S. military official.
"Hoar made phone calls to the Pentagon before he sent the formal request."
On Sept. 23 the request, titled "Protection of Forces in Somalia," was rejected by Aspin. "It's
not going to happen," he said. According to his aides, the defense secretary feared the
additional equipment would signal to a reluctant Congress and American voters a deeper U.S.
commitment.
As Aidid's supporters took control of the city, Robert Gosende, the U.S. envoy there, called
for more military muscle. Gosende proposed the dispatch of thousands of new combat troops,
but his Sept. 6 cable triggered a sharp rejoinder by Hoar.
"Hoar said we had lost control in Mogadishu," said a senior Pentagon official. "He argued that
if more troops were necessary, it was time to reassess our entire policy."
By the end of September Congress and the worsening situation in Mogadishu caused Aspin,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Anthony Lake, national security adviser, to
recommend yet another policy shift. "It was a consensus by his advisers that caused the
president to change direction," said a senior adviser.
The new approach: The United States would launch an initiative aimed at a political settlement
in Somalia that could include Aidid, but at the same time, the hunt for Aidid would continue.
Disputes continue among Clinton advisers over this so-called "two-track" policy, which was
revealed in press briefings during the president's Sept. 27 visit to the UN.
And there was no change in orders for the Delta Force team in Mogadishu, according to
Pentagon officials.
Six days after the two-track policy announcement a spy for the CIA reported that Aidid's top
aides were meeting near the Olympic Hotel.
When asked later about the Oct. 3 battle, Clinton implied that UN officials might have
ordered the assault. "Not every tactical decision had to be cleared through General Hoar,"
Clinton told an Oct. 14 news conference. But U.S. military officials offered this version:
It was about 1 p.m. Oct. 3 when Maj. Gen. William Garrison, the Delta Force commander,
got the intelligence.
By satellite phone, Garrison called Hoar in Tampa, Fla. "On these missions Hoar had a list of
requirements that had to be met," a U.S. military official said. "He asked Garrison the
questions, and the replies met Hoar's requirements. Hoar gave the okay."
For the first time the Special Operations team would be moving into Aidid's neighborhood.
"Everyone there had a gun, and everyone was angry," said one planner of the Oct. 3 mission.
But six previous sorties without serious injury had instilled confidence in the troops.
With approval from Hoar, Garrison turned to Lt. Col. Danny McKnight, leader of the 75th
Rangers' Third Battalion. Their last mission in Mogadishu began with a single word.
"Execute," Garrison told McKnight. |
