last ot -- US caught in Iran policy squeeze
By M K Bhadrakumar
Jun 7, 2006
atimes.com
An extensive interview given by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the Russian media, the full transcript of which has been seen by Asia Times Online, throws much light on the state of play in the Iran nuclear issue.
His remarks illuminate the paucity of options that the United States has left itself in dealing with the issue. Washington's May 31 offer to engage in direct talks with Tehran is in fact its only real option - in Lavrov's words, "a victory of common sense".
At the same time, Lavrov exposes as grandstanding many of the statements emanating from the administration of US President George W Bush about the talks offer. Moscow, it emerges, was not consulted on the matter, and is not party to any tacit agreement on imposing sanctions on Iran, despite Washington's spin to this effect. In other words, an increasingly isolated United States finds itself with very little room left to maneuver, let alone impose its will on an increasingly multipolar world.
Lavrov comes in the great tradition of Russia's distinguished diplomats. Especially given his profound experience in multilateral diplomacy, with a distinguished spell of a few decades at the United Nations, there is none among world statsmen who is in a better position to take an overview of the criss-crossing tendencies and shadows falling on the Iran nuclear issue.
Lavrov revealed in his interview last Friday that it was a year ago, after Russia and China had joined the ongoing talks between the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) and Iran, that the US of its own accord expressed its readiness to be "helpful" with the talks.
Thereafter, the EU countries and Russia tried to persuade the Americans to "abandon their detached-observer status" and to play a more direct role.
Washington's decision last Wednesday to offer direct talks with Iran provided it suspended nuclear activities constitutes, therefore, "a US switch-over from a position on the roadside" to active participation in the talks. But Lavrov implied that the US had made the decision in its wisdom rather than being drawn into it at the behest of Russia or anyone else.
Clearly, the Russian leadership is not to be regarded as party to the Bush administration's May 31 decision - as the deep briefings by unnamed American officials implied in US media reports.
Lavrov reiterated this point by further saying that Russia was as much in the dark as anyone else as to the timing of the Bush administration's decision. "It is hard for me to judge what prompted the decision to announce that precisely now [emphasis added]," Lavrov noted.
Thus what emerges is that Washington did not consult Moscow in the announcement of the May 31 decision. That is to say, Moscow is estimating that the Bush administration has acted entirely on the basis of its own compulsions. And that implies that it is absurd for any claim to be advanced now to the effect that Russia would be expected to reciprocate the US administration's decision.
What Lavrov said in effect contradicts the contentions that have been made by unnamed American officials that the United States' May 31 decision, in turn, made it possible to ensure that Russia (and China) would go along with UN sanctions in the event of Iran refusing the forthcoming European Union package being conveyed to Tehran by the visiting EU foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana.
In a sharp observation, Lavrov described Washington's decision in the above circumstances as "a victory of common sense" born out of a realization that "exclusively unilateral demands do not work" in the Iran nuclear issue.
Lavrov indirectly conveyed Russia's skepticism over the condition that the United States has placed in its May 31 offer to join the "Iran Six" talks (the US, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany). He said, "We welcomed it [the US decision] while noting that, of course, attempts should be avoided to impede the advance to a negotiated result by way of parallel threats or through placing on the talks agenda questions that have no bearing on Iran's nuclear program."
Within the purview of the above remark, we can discern three questions and Russia's position thereon: (a) Is a threat of UN sanctions being held out to Iran unless it agrees to the EU package? (b) What about a military option? (c ) Is the nuclear issue to be linked to extraneous issues, such as Iran's policies or regional and international factors at work?
Lavrov distanced himself from any talk of sanctions against Iran being in the consideration zone. (President Vladimir Putin in a separate interview with Western media chiefs last weekend noted the improbability of any UN sanctions against Iran by quoting a Russian proverb that fancies that "if a grandmother had certain reproductive organs, she would have been a grandfather".)
Lavrov said that guesswork or speculation regarding what would happen if Iran refused the EU package only served to play into the hands of those "who would like to thwart everything". All efforts, therefore, should remain focused on the negotiation process ahead.
Lavrov made an extremely significant point that what was relevant at this stage was not whether Tehran gave a "yes" or "no" answer. The all-important point was that Iran should give a "constructive response". That is, Iran should leave the door to negotiations open.
Lavrov went further by putting the onus as much on the Iran Six: "First of all we [Iran Six] must develop common approaches with our partners, approaches that would be acceptable to our Iranian partners and that would not restrict their possibilities for using modern technology. At the same time, these approaches must completely assuage the international community's concerns about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies that could prove dangerous to international peace."
Lavrov said the EU package did not contain any "ultimatum-like deadline", either. The time limit given to Iran to respond is "several weeks". The Iran Six has agreed that if Iran's response is of a kind that closes the door to negotiations altogether, then the co-drafters of the UN Security Council resolution (Britain and France) may consider themselves free to revive discussions over their draft. At the moment, the draft simply lies on the table since the Iran Six agreed that the "entire work of the UN Security Council is to be frozen" pending the Iranian decision.
But Lavrov drew attention to the fact that even in the draft resolution, "there is no talk in it of sanctions". As for a military option, Russia completely rules it out too. Lavrov said that the Iran Six discussions and accord in Vienna last Thursday were predicated on the firm understanding that there was no question of launching any military attack on Iran. Lavrov said this understanding should hold good for "all contingencies".
When Lavrov's interviewer pointedly asked whether such a categorical understanding would exist among the Iran Six even if Iran were to refuse the forthcoming EU package, Lavrov emphatically replied, "For all contingencies. Interpret that for yourselves. I did not say about the American position, I said about the agreement reached at yesterday's meeting [in Vienna] with the participation of the Americans."
Looking back at last week's developments, Lavrov said he saw the process more as a discussion going on with a view to somehow reducing the respective positions of the Iran Six participants to a "common denominator". The significance of the Vienna meeting, in retrospect, lies in that all six nations have now agreed to negotiate collectively with Iran as a "group of like-minded actors" in search of a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. This meant, in essence, "a qualitative upgrading" of the participation by Russia, China and the US in the negotiation process.
Interestingly, Lavrov confirmed that the question of "security guarantees" figured in the Vienna discussions. He added that "security guarantees" would also form a topic of negotiations with Iran in the period ahead. Iran is known to want some form of guarantee from the US against an attack or covertly trying to subvert it.
In the Russian perception, at this juncture, the EU-3 is the leading player with regard to Iran. Whatever issues specific to Russia there might have been in the past - a guaranteed fuel-supply regime for the Bushehr nuclear power plant that Russia is building in Iran - are a thing of the past now insofar as that matter has been settled.
So there is no "Russian angle" to the Iran nuclear issue as such - except, of course, that the so-called Russian offer regarding setting up a nuclear reprocessing facility for Iran on Russian soil is included in the EU package. But Lavrov somewhat underplayed the remaining potentials of the offer, saying that in his assessment, the offer "cannot radically change".
Germane to the versions appearing in the US media regarding the telephone conversation between Putin and Bush last Wednesday, Lavrov clarified that it touched only on "general matters" connected with the nuclear issue. Lavrov pointed out that by the time the conversation took place, it was already obvious that the differences among the Iran Six had narrowed ("approaches had drawn closer") and that an agreement was likely in the cards.
Putin and Bush thus agreed that the focus at this juncture ought to be on launching the negotiation process.
On the whole, Lavrov's statements dispel the misperceptions and misinterpretations that have gathered during the past few days over the Iran nuclear issue. Clearly, much posturing is going on in Washington, with senior officials of the Bush administration, invariably claiming the cover of anonymity, giving various spins to the US decision to back-track on its policy of not being a direct party to the negotiations over the nuclear issue.
The US compulsions for indulging in such sophistry are evident. Washington's Iran policy finds itself in a cul-de-sac. The United States is manifestly at odds with majority world opinion. From what we see, no matter the US pressure tactics and propaganda, the Russian (and Chinese) position on the Iran nuclear issue has remained firm and consistent. (The Chinese foreign minister couldn't attend the Vienna meet because of scheduling problems.) The mood among the EU countries is also for avoiding any confrontation with Iran - if they can help it.
The US is increasingly left with fewer options. In fact, the options, within Washington's policy framework, have narrowed down to two: one, get used to the possibility that a nuclear Iran might well emerge, or, second, resort to a military strike that might set Iran's nuclear program back for a while.
Actually, both are "non-options". Washington, too, can sense it increasingly.
On the other hand, within the United States there is a growing body of opinion that calls for a US-Iran dialogue. Influential figures have joined the chorus. But such a shift in US policy demands an overall realignment of US strategy toward the entire Middle East.
That, in turn, will profoundly affect Israel's core interests. However, Bush's political standing domestically is uncertain and does not leave much scope to make massive decisions of that nature. The Bush administration simply lacks the political grit to differentiate US interests within this calculus and Israel's interests at this juncture.
That leaves the administration with an extremely narrow corridor to traverse - appearing not to be obdurate over the looming crisis while having to be seen, being a first-rate world power, as doing something about the crisis.
This as opposed to being swept along by the undercurrents, but having to realize at the same time the bitter truth that it is unable to be flexible on the fundamentals of its Iran policy while in an increasingly multipolar world it finds itself unable to change unilaterally the course of events regarding Iran and the Middle East. The result is the grandstanding.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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