Depletion for the majors -
Many of the majors have some of the earlier monster fields, like East Texas, Spindletop, Ventura anticline, etc.
I think some of these fields have recovery estimates based on the 1950s or 1960. Recovery advancements may not be factored in completely.
At one time California had a property tax on oil in the ground. It kept reserve numbers lower....
Reserve estimates were originally used to secure bank loans, so the methodology tended to be conservative.
Throw in Sarbanes-Oxley and Elliot Spitzer, and I expect new reserve estimates have become even more conservative.
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Going out on a limb a bit, the Super Majors have opportunites to add significant reserves in ultra deep Gulf of Mexico, offshore West Africa, Mackenzie River Delta, etc.
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The Russia exposure is a real risk. Russia can mostly do without external help, especsially with prices this high. They will do better with outside expertise and capital (plus real accouting, etc.)
Venezuela has been cutting deals with the Super Majors - they need the technology and capital to keep production up.
Vz damaged much of the capability of PDVSA, and is now more dependent on the outside. Vz has also pulled capital (excess or needed ?) out of PDVSA.
Vz will need to work with external oil companies, or cut down on social spending.
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So I think depletion may not be as big an issue for the Super Majors - of course Shell has had to reduce reserve estimates twice. ;-) |
