I have an approach to Sudan that is different than any proposed. Arm the opposition forces. I understand that there is a weak oppo group.
I don’t know enough about the situation, or about the opposition group, to have an opinion on that one. The enemy of our enemy is not always our friend.
If we quietly back the oppo's, and tell the Sudan command that we will provide the type of air cover against attacks that we gave the Northern Alliance it Sudan allows their Arab groups in the area to attack, it should result in a stalemate.
Providing air support is not terribly consistent with quiet backing. We’d need base facilities, AWACS cover, and a substantial ground deployment for support, and force protection. The Sudanese air force uses MIG 29s, allegedly flown and serviced by Russian mercenaries. Certainly no match for US forces, but if we got sloppy or didn’t take them seriously they could do damage.
I’m not sure a stalemate would be better, from a humanitarian perspective, than the current situation. It could be worse, especially if the rebels turn out to be just as far off the beam as the Janjaweed, which is by no means impossible. We might arm the rebels only to discover that they are less interested in fighting government forces, which might shoot back, than in raiding villages on the other side of the fence. |
