China: Using Masses Against Corruption
Apr 03, 2001
stratfor.biz
Summary
Official Chinese media have been touting the victory of a farmer over a Communist Party member during village-level elections in the suburbs of Beijing. China's central government is attempting to enlist the masses to unite with the central government against the corruption in the middle ranks. Following historical patterns, Beijing hopes to engender a social revolution.
Analysis
Residents of Xiwengzhuang village, a suburb 80 km (49.6 miles) from downtown Beijing, began local elections on March 23. According to reports by Eastday.com, an online branch of the Shanghai Daily, the victor was Hou Dongsheng, a local farmer who is not a member of the Communist Party. Hou beat out Yang Derong, Communist Party member and four-term incumbent village leader, but only after three rounds of balloting.
Xiwengzhuang is the first of the nearly 4,000 villages in the suburbs of Beijing Municipality to hold local elections, with all elections to be completed by the end of July. As such, it has received broad coverage in Chinese media as a shining example of grassroots democracy in the People's Republic of China. Beijing, however, has another reason to emphasize the elections in Xiwengzhuang, which saw the incumbent village leader fall due to irregularities in the initial balloting. Beijing is enlisting the masses of farmers and rural peasants and all working class citizens to unite with the central leadership against the corrupt middle ranks.
China's 900 million rural residents make up more than 75 percent of the nation's population. These same farmers and peasants have yet to see substantial benefits from China's economic reform and opening. Rather, as China heads toward entry into the World Trade Organization, the farmers stand to suffer the most.
China initiated direct village-level elections in 1988 with the Provisional Law on Organization of Villagers' Committees. In 1998, the revised Organic Law of Villagers' Committees was enacted by the National People's Congress. This revised law called for villagers not only to vote for their local leader, but also to nominate the potential candidates, replacing the process of town or township governments appointing village leaders or choosing the candidates running in elections.
Beijing is one of six remaining provinces and municipalities yet to hold direct village-level elections. The elections in Xiwengzhuang were highlighted by official media as the first in the municipality where residents "are considered to be more politically minded than farmers in other parts of China."
In Xiwengzhuang, during the first round of voting on March 26, Party-member Yang won 829 out of 1,657 votes, with official media giving him the victory. A few days later, however, another media report explained that the elections did not end on March 26, but continued two more days, leading to the victory of non-Party member Hou.
Hou had protested the initial results after he learned that relatives of Yang served on the election committee in contravention of the rules. A second round of balloting gave Hou the victory, but not by a wide enough margin, so a third round was held, with Hou finally coming out on top.
The official media's attention to the election results serves several purposes. First, Beijing is interested in internationally promoting its grassroots democracy - even going so far as to show how a Party member was defeated after violating election laws.
China has struggled with expanding its global political and economic reach due to accusations of human rights abuses and an image of stifling democracy. Over the past decade, Beijing has worked intensively on improving China's international image and standing in order to maintain foreign investment and trade, particularly after the 1989 Tienanmen Square incident led to a sharp decline in investments from overseas.
Second, Beijing is seeking to enlist the rural masses in its fight against mid-level government corruption that has undermined the control of the central leadership. While China has seen several high-profile anti-corruption cases recently, corruption and nepotism remain an endemic problem at all levels of bureaucracy. By empowering farmers and peasants to elect their village leaders, Beijing is seeking bottom-up assistance for its current top-down, anti-corruption efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most significant, Beijing seeks to regain the trust and loyalty of the rural masses. Beijing increasingly faces protests and demonstrations by disgruntled farmers and the unemployed, who are angered at the effects of China's economic reforms, official corruption and nepotism. By uniting these masses with the central government against a common foe - in this case the nameless, corrupt middle bureaucrats - Beijing hopes to stir up a popular revolution of sorts.
Already, Beijing is adding incentive to farmers at the expense of the middle levels of government. Beijing is mulling over a modification of the tax and fee burden placed on farmers, according to Chinese media. In essence, farmers would pay slightly higher taxes directly to the central government while Beijing would eliminate other taxes and fees imposed by lower levels of government. For the farmers, this means an overall lower economic burden, for Beijing higher revenues, and for the mid-levels of government a loss of a common source of personal economic enrichment.
If Beijing is successful, it might push foreword with economic reforms with little fear of social unrest directed toward the center. Rather, the masses would be rallied around the incorruptible center and take it upon themselves to enforce anti-corruption measures against regional and local politicians.
Having failed to maintain centralized control over the regional and local governments during China's economic opening, Beijing is turning once again to its old tactics of social revolution. It is questionable, however, if it can win over China's 900 million rural residents. With the days of Mao long gone, the central leadership may instead find itself facing a more politically active and empowered populace who find the center just as culpable for their economic condition as the regional and local officials. |
