Marriage is not a right, and the state clearly has the ability to regulate it, as when it forbids cousins of a certain propinquity to marry, or limits the number of mates to two, or creates a lower age limit.
Your argument is circular. You assume that homosexuals have the right to marry, and then say that means------ they have the right to marry! Miraculous, but fallacious.
Furthermore, you seem to forget that claims of rights and freedoms are moral issues. If society cannot speak to moral issues, it cannot recognize rights and freedoms and uphold them.
Taking it from the other end:
I have demonstrated not merely that heterosexuality is the statistical norm, but that it must be the rule, while homosexuality must be the exception. That does not necessarily mean that homosexuality is bad, but it does mean that heterosexuality is preferable, supposing we had to make a choice about which should be prevalent. That means that it is better.
Suppose we were to try other qualities, for example, athletic prowess. As it happens, we would be better off if a high degree of athletic prowess prevailed, but, unfortunately, the norm is not very fit. Thus, the mere fact that something is prevalent in Nature is insufficient to establish it as "better", which is why we have to consider the alternatives to know which, if we had power over it, should be the rule rather than the exception.
Now, for your outline of the argument:
Number one is fine.
For number two: It is not that marriage legitimizes the homosexual lifestyle, insofar as their already broad social acceptance of homosexuality. It is that it makes the two things appear to be equal, or makes orientation seem a matter of indifference.
Number three: to clarify, the issue is treating a rational bias in favor of heterosexuality as an unreasoning prejudice, rather than respecting the sense of impropriety that is widely felt about such an equation.
Number four: If we treat this as an unreasoning prejudice, it erodes respect for social teaching with respect of undesirable forms of sexual expression, for example, promiscuity or coition among pubescents.
It it is somewhat like the "Broken Windows" argument put forward by James Q. Wilson. If the police cannot even hold the line at quality of life issues like vandalism, it creates a pervasive sense of disorder, and encourages more crime in the area. This has been borne out in studies. Although addressing vandalism and graffiti may seem like small potatoes, they have a symbolic importance. Similarly, not being able to reserve marriage to heterosexuals will have a symbolic value, I think, putting too far on the defensive those who want to sustain values in respect of sex.
If the symbolic aspect were not important, why not stop at civil union? It is much more than half a loaf.
I think that being blind is an inferior state to sightedness. That does not mean that I think that Ray Charles in inferior to Kenny G, quite the contrary. As a musician, as a human being, as a citizen, the homosexual might be superior, but in his sexuality, he is not.
I do not, in any case, believe in the essential equality of people. I am not even sure it is a meaningful phrase.
There is no Constitutional right to marry that I have seen.
I see nothing wrong with accepting homosexuals as legitimate persons with legitimate orientations. I only see something wrong with denying any reason to make a value distinction about the orientation. I used to be a very liberal guy with respect to homosexuality. Then I became a father, and realized that I did care if my son grew up to be gay or straight, and that I hoped he would be straight, even if it would not make me love him less otherwise. I have never been a hypocrite about it since, and I think that that fundamental reservation, that preference for straightness, ought not to be overridden.
As for compromising the ability to moralize, I will try once again:
The preference for straightness is a value judgment which is rational, even if controversial. This one little distinction is all that is left after going as far as possible to accept homosexual, without giving up a reservation. If we cannot even make the marriage distinction, if we are treated like bigots for harboring this reservation, it further erodes the ability to inculcate values, by putting those who want to make distinctions on the defensive even more than they are.
What has to be shown is that the state is being arbitrary in its discrimination. This is not a high standard. After all, there is no compelling reason to disallow bigamy, but it appears to be a reasonable policy, and that suffices. Similarly, it is reasonable to reserve marriage to heterosexuals. |
