Afghanistan: Same War, Different Players
By Gwynne Dyer
1839, 1878, 1979, 2001: Four foreign invasions of Afghanistan in
less than 200 years. The first two were British, and unashamedly
imperialist. The third was Soviet, and the invaders said they were there to
defend socialism and help Afghanistan become a modern, prosperous state.
The last was American, and the invaders said they were there to bring
democracy and help Afghanistan become a modern, prosperous state. But all
four invasions were doomed to fail (although the last still has some time
to run).
When Britain deployed 3,300 troops to Helmand province early last
month, then Defence Secretary John Reid said: "We hope we will leave
Afghanistan without firing a single shot." But six British soldiers have
been killed in combat since then, and the new Defence Minister, Des Browne,
announced on Monday that the British force is being increased by another
900 soldiers to cope with "unexpected" resistance.
The story is the same across southern Afghanistan. The Canadian
army has lost six soldiers killed in action in Kandahar province since late
April, and may soon face the same choice between reinforcing its troops or
pulling them back, because the American combat troops in the vicinity are
leaving at the end of this month. The US forces are pulling out just in
time.
A country that has been invaded four times in less than two
centuries is bound to know a couple of things about dealing with foreign
conquerors. The first thing Afghans have learned is never to trust them,
no matter how pure they say their intentions are. There are probably no
more xenophobic people in the world than the Afghans, and they have earned
the right to be so. If there was ever a window of opportunity for the
current crop of invaders to convince Afghans that this time is different,
it closed some time ago.
The other thing Afghans know is how to deal with invaders. They
will always be richer and better armed, so let them occupy the country.
Don't try to hold the cities; fade back into the mountains. Take a couple
of years to regroup and set up your supply lies (mostly across the border
from Pakistan, this time), and then start the guerilla war in earnest.
Ambush, harass and bleed the foreigners for as long as it takes.
Eventually they will cut their losses and go home.
It has worked every time, and it is going to work again. Des
Browne remarked plaintively last week that "the very act of (British)
deployment into the south has energised opposition." But the reality is
that the rural areas of Helmand province, like most of the Pashto-speaking
provinces of the south and south-east, have been under the effective
control of the resistance for several years. The arrival of foreign troops
in these areas simply gives the insurgents targets to attack.
The end-game is beginning even in Kabul. Hamid Karzai, the West's
chosen leader for Afghanistan, is now starting to make deals with the
forces that will hold his life in their hands once the foreigners leave:
the warlords and drug barons. In April, he dropped many candidates who had
been approved by the "coalition" powers from a list of new provincial
police chiefs, and substituted the names of known gangsters and criminals
who work for the local warlords. He will also have to talk to the Taleban
before long.
The "Taleban" that Western troops are now fighting in Afghanistan
is more inclusive than the narrow band of fanatics who imposed order on the
country in 1996 after seven years of civil war. The current Afghan
resistance movement includes farmers trying to protect their poppy-fields,
nationalists furious at the foreign presence, young men who just want to
show that they are as brave as previous generations of Afghans -- the usual
grab-bag of motives that fuels any national resistance movement.
Nor is the regime that will eventually emerge in Kabul after the
foreigners have gone home likely to resemble the old Taleban, a
Pakistani-backed and almost entirely Pashto-speaking organisation. The
foreign invasion overthrew the long domination of the Pashto-speakers in
Afghanistan (about 40 percent of the population), and it is most unlikely
that Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen will simply accept that
domination again. Their own warlords will have to have a share of the
power, too, and even Karzai might find a role.
Post-occupation Afghanistan would certainly live under strict
Islamic law, but there is no reason to believe it would export Islamist
revolution of the al-Qaeda brand. Even the old Taleban regime never did
that; it gave hospitality to Osama bin Laden and his gang, but it almost
certainly had no knowledge of his plans for 9/11, and on other issues it
was often open to Western pressure. In 2001, for example, it shut down the
whole heroin industry in Afghanistan, simply by shooting enough
poppy-farmers to frighten the rest into obedience.
Afghanistan will not be left to its own devices until after the
people who ordered the invasion leave office: presumably next year for Tony
Blair, and January, 2009 for George W. Bush. There is time for lots of
killing yet. But Afghanistan stands a reasonable chance of sorting itself
out once the Western armies leave.
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Gwynne Dyer is a London-based independent journalist whose articles
are published in 45 countries.
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