It is difficult to blame Kofi Anan for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A large part of the blame must be placed on the U.S.
www2.gwu.edu
As the killing intensified, the international community deserted Rwanda. Western nations landed troops in Rwanda or Burundi in the first week to evacuate their citizens, did so, and left. The UN mission (UNAMIR), created in October 1993 to keep the peace and assist the governmental transition in Rwanda, sought to intervene between the killers and civilians. It also tried to mediate between the RPF and the Rwandan army after the RPF struck from Rwanda to protect Tutsi and rescue their battalion encamped in Kigali as part of the Accord. On April 21, 1994, the United Nations Security Council, at the behest of the United States—which had no troops in Rwanda—Belgium, and others, voted to withdraw all but a remnant of UNAMIR. The Security Council took this vote and others concerning Rwanda even as the representative of the genocidal regime sat amongst them as a non-permanent member. After human rights, media, and diplomatic reports of the carnage mounted, the UN met and debated and finally arrived at a compromise response on May 16. UNAMIR II, as it was to be known, would be a more robust force of 5,500 troops. Again, however, the world failed to deliver, as the full complement of troops and materiel would not arrive in Rwanda until months after the genocide ended.
See also Document 4 www2.gwu.edu
US Department of State, cable number 099440, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal”, April 15, 1994. Confidential.
Source: Freedom of Information Act release by Department of State
This telegram forwards Department of State guidance to the US Mission to the UN in New York instructing US diplomats there that “the international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.” Advising that this withdrawal does not require a UN Security Council resolution—which would have likely focused international criticism—the Department instructs the mission “that we will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda.” April 15 was the first of two days of UN Security Council debate on next steps in Rwanda—for which the Rwandan ambassador was present and about which he reported back to the interim government in Rwanda. Over that same weekend, aware the UN Security Council was in retreat, the interim Council of Ministers, the genocide’s architects, met in Kigali and decided to take the program of extermination to the rest of the country. |
