A Committee on the Present Danger Policy Paper:
IRAN -- A NEW APPROACH
# Senator Jon Kyl
Honorary Co-Chairman
# Senator Joseph Lieberman
Honorary Co-Chairman
# The Hon. George P. Shultz
Co-Chairman
# The Hon. R. James Woolsey
Co-Chairman
fightingterror.org
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei of Iran presents a fundamental threat to peace, for all
signs point to his determination to develop nuclear weapons. Iran’s people, on the other
hand, are our allies. They want to free themselves from Khamenei’s oppression and
they want Iran to join the community of prosperous, peaceful democracies.
The recent agreement Iran made with France, Germany and Britain to temporarily halt
uranium enrichment, while it may slow down its overall program, will do so only briefly.
What is needed is a permanent cessation of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities (unless
it can be proven the program is for peaceful purposes only), including inspection of
recently-revealed secret nuclear facilities, along with those sites already agreed upon.
If there were in place an international clearing house and monitoring system for using
existing enriched uranium for peaceful purposes only, countries seeking it for such
purposes would not have to develop their own enrichment capacity. In the absence of
such a system, it must be made clear to Iran that the alternative to a permanent
agreement to suspend its enrichment activities will be stiff economic sanctions--
something Iran does not want. A number of strategies can be put in place quickly to
build pressure to both reduce the threat and to promote democratic change in Iran.
Threat and Opportunity
The centrality of the threat posed by Iran is clear. In addition to its peace-threatening
nuclear program, Iran under Khamenei, continues to be the world’s foremost state
supporter of terrorism, offering financial and logistical support to both Shi'a and Sunni
terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Elements of al-Qaida and Ansar al-Islam transit through Iran and find safe haven there.
Through these groups Khamenei destabilizes the region, prevents the emergence of an
independent and democratic Lebanon and tries to stymie any movement toward
peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Khamenei supports Moqtada al-
Sadr and others in Iraq who want it to become another theocratic dictatorship under
Iranian tutelage. He is seeking regional hegemony, both ideologically and militarily. His
growing oil wealth increases his capacity for wreaking havoc on his own people and the
region.
The opportunity is equally clear. The votes of the Iranian people in the elections of
1997 and 2001, and in repeated public demonstrations from 1999 to the present, have
been widely interpreted as strong expressions of support for democracy and change.
Numerous leading religious and reformist figures have spoken against Khamenei’s rule
and his unwillingness to establish normal relations with the United States. The
repression, failed economic policies and corruption of the Khamenei regime have led to
deep alienation.
The geostrategic situation increasingly favors the forces of democracy around and
inside Iran. Should progress continue toward a stable, democratic Afghanistan and
Iraq, and with reform moving ahead elsewhere in the region, Khamenei’s dictatorship
becomes an increasingly isolated and dangerous anachronism. A new and democratic
government in Iran would be a major contribution toward transformation of the region
from its present backwardness and strife to a one of growing peace, prosperity and
freedom.
Given the scale of the threat and the promise of the opportunity, Iran must move to the
top of America’s foreign policy agenda for the next four years. We need a fresh
approach that appeals to, encourages and empowers the Iranian people. We need to
rally our allies around a strategy that takes into account their commitment to traditional
diplomacy, while putting all of us together on the offensive vis-à-vis Khamenei. We
need to relearn the lessons of what has worked, not just in negotiating with the Soviet
Union through a position of strength (while simultaneously opening up eastern and
central Europe and supporting the forces of democracy), but also in the transition from
dictatorship to democracy in countries from Chile to Indonesia.
Opening up dictatorships is key to helping the forces of change. We were on the ground
with an embassy and support programs for Solidarity in Poland, which played a central
role in the nonviolent transition to democracy. Nonviolent movements based on
alliances between students, workers and intellectuals, leading to massive
demonstrations and general strikes, have worked in dozens of countries in the past
three decades; they worked in Iran itself. The reawakening of Iran’s tradition of student
activism, a predominant force in the 1978-79 overthrow of the Shah, is not lost on
Khamenei and should not be lost on us.
Elements of a new American policy:
The administration should announce clearly a new approach to U.S. policy and be
prepared to pursue it in a sustained manner. The highest profile announcement would
be a speech by the President. The stated purpose of the announcement would be a
pledge by the United States to reconnect with the Iranian people, to help the vast
majority of Iranians who want democracy to achieve it and thereby join the community
of democratic nations, to assure their security in return for not acquiring nuclear
weapons and to help develop their economy. Recognizing that the major barrier to
Iranians seizing their freedom is their current mood of pessimism and isolation, the
President’s announcement would be voicing our confidence in their ability to succeed
and our determination to assist them.
We should announce our willingness to reopen our embassy in Tehran. At the same
time, one of our highest-ranking officials should be designated as the key person in our
new policy toward Iran. An example of such a person is the State Department’s
Counselor. The Counselor must be prepared to assert regularly his or her strong
human rights advocacy and commitment to democracy for Iran. While it is unlikely that
Khamenei would move ahead rapidly (it is well to remember that his predecessor closed
our embassy 25 years ago because of his fear of the “Great Satan’s” influence on
Iranians, and Khamenei continues to limit contact with the United States), we will have
demonstrated that we are exhausting all remedies. The Counselor would be the point
person for our new policy and Iran warrants the nearly-full-time attention of such a
senior official.
There is an extensive agenda with or without the early opening of an embassy. The
Counselor can work to generate support from our allies, speak frequently with the
Iranian people via radio/tv/internet and meet directly with Iranians wherever possible.
He or she should concentrate on direct outreach to the Iranian people rather than solely
engaging with Iranian government officials. The Counselor should understand that
engagement with officials without engagement with ordinary Iranians will be interpreted
by the Iranian people as abandonment of democracy. Discussion with Iranian officials
should be limited to those with sufficient power to make decisions--such as those in the
Office of the Supreme Leader--rather than with ordinary diplomats in the Foreign
Ministry.
Nuclear Weapons. President Bush has voiced skepticism about Iran’s suspension of its
nuclear enrichment program (a program which could lead to the creation of weapons).
He has emphasized the need for third-party verification of all related sites in Iran. While
we should work carefully and multilaterally in this regard, any verification failure should
lead immediately to taking the matter to the United Nation Security Council for the
imposition of sanctions. Khamenei should also understand that if he does not comply
with legitimate international requirements to keep his nuclear weapons development
program suspended, we and others reserve the right to take out or cripple his nuclear
capabilities.
The case of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi is instructive. Through an interplay of allied
strength and diplomacy he became persuaded to give up his stealth program to produce
weapons of mass destruction. The lesson here is that dictators who feel sufficiently
threatened can be persuaded to give up their WMD ambitions. We can accept no less in
the case of an even more dangerous Khamenei. The window of opportunity will not
remain open indefinitely. Some say it is already too late to stop Khamenei’s nuclear
ambition and that we will just have to live with it. We must make clear that we will not
accept Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon, and we must be willing to reinforce that
position.
Supporting Iranian Democrats and Dissidents. Ultimately, it is Iranians themselves who
will make the breakthrough to democracy and remove Khamenei from power. We need
to make clear that they are our partners in a new dialogue and that even as we meet
with representatives of the Khamenei regime, we consider these to be illegitimate.
There are many time-tested ways in which we can help, particularly with younger
Iranians and women as the major agents of change. Cultural, academic, and
professional exchanges and programs must form an integral part of our efforts to assist
Iranians in the democratization of their country. Visiting scholars--even tourists--have
considerable freedom of movement and association. Young activists from democratic
countries could also enter Iran as tourists to meet with their Iranian counterparts and to
join in demonstrations. We should authorize American NGOs to operate within Iran. We
should also tie U.S. visas for Iranians to those that Iran grants to Americans. For
example, if Iran refuses to allow, say, American student groups or scholars to visit their
country, then we should bar a number of Iranian officials, their family members and
business partners from ours.
It is also important to get young Iranian activists abroad for short seminars with
counterparts who have been successful in organizing civic campaigns in Serbia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Chile and elsewhere. (These activists should be chosen by U.S.
officials, not by Iranian institutions.) Embassies of the democracies can give support in
many ways: attendance at trials, joint petitions for release of political prisoners, financial
assistance to prisoners’ families and democratic groups, training, witnessing and even
participating in demonstrations. Iran should receive the highest priority in funding from
our public and private democracy/human rights organizations. Congress should
consider an Iran Freedom Act to generate adequate resources for relevant NGOs.
Undermining pillars of support. To remain in power, Khamenei relies upon his security
services. In 1978-79 the Shah’s largely peasant-based army disintegrated in the face of
massive street demonstrations. The Shah’s hated secret police, SAVAK, was
overwhelmed.
Faced with demonstrations in 2002, Khamenei was unsure the army would obey his
orders and resorted to using hired paramilitary thugs. The United States has
opportunities to develop relations with the military and various services in Iran and
should seek to do so. Our forces in the region, the CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency
and others have issues to work on, ranging from cross-border threats to terrorism to
drugs. One objective in these relationships should be to make clear that those there
who cooperate in the transition to democracy can thrive on the other side (as many
others in former dictatorships have done), but those who persist in committing crimes
against the Iranian people or others will be prosecuted. We should specifically call for
the eradication of the Islamic Guard Corps and the Basij, for reform or elimination of the
Ministry of Information and an investigation into the government’s support for vigilante
groups such as Ansar al-Hizballah.
Smart sanctions. As Khamenei and his regime are the problem and the Iranian people
our natural allies, we should develop sanctions that target the Supreme Leader and his
close circle of support, so that the sanctions are not seen by the people as harmful to
them.
In April 1997 a German court implicated Iran’s leaders in the assassination of their
opponents in Berlin. This ruling had an impact on Iranian opinion, contributing to the big
vote for Khatami that year, perceived as a reformer. Deftly making it known that a case
is being marshaled against Khamenei would create good leverage. U.S. Government
agencies, working closely with human rights organizations, could begin gathering
evidence. Then, we could seek the cooperation of like-minded governments, leading
toward creation of an international tribunal to try Khamenei.
Crimes for which evidence could be gathered include financing and facilitating terrorists,
corruption, the torture and murder of Khamenei’s opponents at home and abroad and
development of weapons of mass destruction in violation of the Non-proliferation Treaty
and other accords. We have precedent for a special tribunal gathering evidence against
and eventually indicting a leader still in office in the case of Liberia’s President Charles
Taylor and the UN-approved Sierra Leone tribunal. In Taylor’s case, having an Interpol
arrest warrant out against him has had a significant impact in delegitimizing and
undermining him.
Other “smart” sanctions also can be developed. Iran’s Revolutionary Foundations
(bunyads) control 35 percent of Iran’s import-export business and are directly controlled
by Khamenei. The Iranian people are well aware that despite protestations of moral
leadership, Khamenei and certain mullahs and their supporters have grown rich and
corrupt. The United States and other nations are becoming more expert at identifying
the economic crimes and assets of dictators and their supporters. We should undertake
a major effort to identify those companies and accounts associated with Khamenei and
his entourage and develop sanctions targeting them. We should use our existing
sanctions as rewards for progress on specific agenda items of concern to us, such as
human rights, terrorism, nuclear weapons and regional peace.
Television, radio and internet. The U.S. Government’s Farsi-language Radio Farda
(“Tomorrow”) and several hours weekly of VOA television are a beginning, but not
enough if we are going to effectively communicate directly with the Iranian people. A
number of private U.S.-based Iranian satellite television stations exist, but they are
underfunded and thus unable to achieve their real potential. A budget equal to that of
Radio Farda and VOA television should be made available to them. At least $10 million
annually should be appropriated to assist independent television, radio and internet
communications with the Iranian people.
Dialogue with Khamenei about his return to the mosque. Dictators are acutely
conscious of their vulnerability, even their mortality. A dialogue with them about a way to
exit peacefully from political power, combined with credible indications of the
alternatives (jail or hanging), can play an important role. Who could conduct such a
dialogue with Khamenei?
President Khatami has the legal right to hold such a dialogue, but he has been weak to
date. Iranians and their democratic friends should be looking for such a person or
group. Shi'a clerics with high religious standing in both Iran and Iraq argue that mullahs
do damage to their own influence and prestige when they try to run the everyday
secular affairs of the state. We should encourage the Houzeh (the traditional Shi’a
religious establishment) to reinforce the position that, short of the return of the Hidden
Imam, clerical rule is by nature corrupt and detrimental to the status of religion in
society. Perhaps they could join together to approach Khamenei--initially in private--to
urge that he cede secular power to those elected by the people, and to make clear that
they will go public with this demand if he resists.
Dialogue with the Iranian government. We should state our willingness to meet with
Iranian officials to discuss issues of concern to us, such as human rights, terrorism,
nuclear weapons, regional stability. We should also reiterate that trade and investment
relations can move forward (and sanctions removed) as progress is made in these
areas.
Conclusion
For far too long an academic debate over engagement vs. containment, dialogue vs.
regime change has dominated and weakened America’s approach to Iran. Some argue
that “Iran is not on the verge of another revolution” and we should just engage in a
dialogue. Others argue that a dialogue will strengthen and perpetuate the regime, and
we should try to bring it down through isolation, arming a resistance inside the country
and maybe eventually carrying out another Iraq-style invasion. The Committee on the
Present Danger believes that we need a new approach, one based on a sober
recognition of the threat Khamenei presents, but also an appreciation of our new
strengths and the opportunity before us. We recommend a peaceful but forceful strategy
to engage with the Iranian people to remove the threat and establish the strong
relationship which is in both nations’ and the region’s interests.
###
Committee on the Present Danger
P.O. Box 65196
Washington, D.C. 20035
tel. 202/778-1032
fax 202/659-7923
email: info@fightingterror.org
December 20, 2004 |
