Neocon: I am very concerned with not only the cost, but the situation of a peacekeeping force, but there is little to do except try it, for the time being...
Of course, and this concern lead NATO during all time.
But the situation may be equally difficult for other NATO
partners. Or even worse in view of history. Also some
of your NATO partners have soldiers and command
officers quite untrained for a "real life fighting situation"
in comparison to those who will enter first now (the
British troops), or those marines that the US deploys.
Only ten/twelve years back the idea that weapons be
used in fighting was unthinkable in Germany. Military
was for warGAMES, for frightening off any possible
enemy (the Soviet bloc). To many Germans it seemed
to be totally unneeded.
I am glad that you found the discussion of neo/paleo
interesting!
Seems you were surprised also. I had the feeling I knew
the reasons for neo/paleo, but I was very interested in
your definitions and examples.
I think (I may be wrong) that the Europeans were
urging the States to act, I actually don't know it,
although I listened hard to the media during the end
of Rambouillet and the start of the bombing.
But isn't it strange, the US media here gave me the
same idea, while two weeks later I read in one of our
papers the Greeks didn't like the NATO attack at all
(I don't know whether George P. represents a majority
in Greece, but it may well be), while the Italian were
seeking for a temporary stop of military actions
all the time. Those two countries I had - in my naivity -
suspected to be those challenging the most for action
against Milo.
Do media give us what they should? Do they check
critically enough what they were told from the most
glamouros sources, Clinton's gang, Blair's gang, and,
with long distance, NATO headquarters?
I think our (German) politicians are amateurs and didn't
know what to do in the face of the crisis, also they
were newly in charge of leadership. Also our home
media staff were taken by surprise.
but you are right that the Administration insisted
upon too much operational control...
after consideration of the written-above they shouldn't
have shared it the with the Germans, that's for sure.
When I used the term "proxy", I did not precisely
mean that we were just doing things in their stead,
but in a balance of power situation in Europe, a bloc
would have naturally centered around Germany, and
after the War, that was impossible, so the US had
to take the leading role instead...Obviously, as the
years go on, the situation is beginning to change...
Firstly, I still adhere to the thesis that the US are
primarily working in their own interest in Europe, and for
some strange reasons of US internal politics it must
be sold to the US citizen as something done for
others, in others' interest. Please don't understand
me wrong, I still think that US influence is strongly
beneficient in my zone.
Secondly (what now follows is much too long):
I am not sure whether there is really some change
or not. I have the feeling the behaviour of Germany
to foreign partners is changing without a balanceing
inside development.
It seems that society doesn't keep up with the
changes in foreign politics. Because internal
politics is quite naive in Germany, and even more
outside politics, we cannot make something similar
to a "responsible politics of a democratic nation" .
We do as told by foreign leaders, whose influence
on Germany is greatly enhanced if they are - you
know what word will follow - glamourous.
The seeming lack of competence, mature responsibility
is what I am deeply concerned about, but cannot
come to terms with, for lack of competent discussion
partners, and information.
And it adds to the beauty of all this that German media
tell me 8500 German soldiers will participate in KFOR,
while British media speak of 4500.
To exemplify the delicate question "change or not?":
Schroeder simply tried to follow the example of
Blair and Clinton, useing their widespread
popularity to up his features. For he is a
featureless man, a precise copy of his
predecessor and ballot rival (Kohl). And he had
the idea he must offer them as much as possible
to ensure smiles on both sides (needed for the
summit pictures).
Kohl was still of the older generation, who had own
experience (as a boy, not soldier) from WWII and
NAZI times. I am sure, if he had still been in charge
he would have insisted stronger on an even smaller
participation of Germans, and maybe had his way.
Even it is conceivable that German troops would not
have entered Serbia/Kosovo but stay as
humanitarian aid or helping units in Macedonia.
But I don't know whether this would have been a
big difference as to a possible German role in the
situation that once started the war.
E.g. it was still in Kohls legislature time that the
key terms of Rambouillet ("we all will act together
when Milo blocks") was negotiated inside NATO.
And like all the others, we let Milo have his way
for all those years, there was diplomatic
exchange, perhaps even meetings.
Gustave found a reference upon German
weaponry/instrument delivery and training given
to Albania (from a German TV magazine,
shame over me I didn't notice), also during
Kohl time. (But the new government wouldn't
have done it differently.)
And most probably we can draw similar information
for long time, but those questions will never
occur to the German mind, all we think of (politically)
is joblessness and sometimes "identity problems
arising between citizens of former east and
west germany."
These are the reason, why I often think never give back
authority to German politicians, bind Germany into a
strong EU community and let French, British and other
politicians decide, they seem to be trained better.
Germany can help with money, but not with men -
when they come back they might be too dangerous
for our society.
still concerned, but on the way home, Meinhard. |
