Goldsnow-the-strategist,
How about bringing this Kosovo upheaval back into the larger Mediterranean picture? Here's a good analysis:
oneworld.org
Extract:
Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process
Richard Gillespie
Professor of Iberian and Latin American Studies. Leader of the Mediterranian Research Group. University of Portsmouth.
Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, No. 37, 1997
[...]
It is important at the outset to acknowledge that it is not easy to discuss the northern European states en bloc. They have differing levels of interest, and different interests, in the Mediterranean and by no means always do they agree on what should be done there. France, which in the present context must be considered both northern and southern European, has had the most extensive involvement in the area in recent history, but British involvement has been substantial, too. Although a certain deference to France has existed in the formulation of EC Mediterranean policy (at least until the present decade), French policy towards Algeria has been the subject of a restrained controversy in northern just as in southern Europe. Virtually no other country expressed solidarity with the hardline policy advocated by the former interior minister Charles Pasqua, which sought a military triumph over the Islamist insurgents. France subsequently criticised Germany, Britain, and the USA for being excessively ‘liberal' in their treatment of ‘fundamentalist' refugees (Spencer, 1996a: 137-8; The Times, 27 January 1995). It is also true to say, notwithstanding traditional Anglo-French regional rivalry, that historically the northern European countries have shown interest generally in different parts of the Mediterranean, and that the broad tendencies in the present century are for France to be preoccupied with the Maghreb, Britain much more with the Middle East, and Germany (in peacetime) with Turkey and the Balkans.
Of course, one also needs to differentiate when discussing southern European perspectives on the Mediterranean (Gillespie, 1996: 204-5). Nonetheless, so long as the appropriate qualifications are made, it is legitimate to focus on northern (or southern) European countries collectively when considering the prospects of the Barcelona process, for in the past (at least) there has been a clear north-south difference with regard to EU member-state preferences vis-à-vis European support for North Africa. As one newspaper succinctly put it, ‘In the case of North Africa, south Europeans tend to stress the need for financial support, knowing this would come mainly from northern Europe, while north Europeans stress the importance of market access, knowing that it is south European farmers who would suffer most from north African competition' (‘South of Europe', Financial Times, 27 November 1995) (1). These differences were visible even during the gestation of the Euro-Mediterranean Global Partnership, when during internal EU discussions about the guidelines for negotiating the new association agreement with Morocco the northern European states wanted to give commercial concessions to certain Moroccan food products while the southern Europeans maintained that aid should be used to help Morocco become self-sufficient in food: in other words, Morocco should be encouraged to meet domestic requirements rather than export more to Europe (Marquina Barrio, 1995: 49). While this kind of divergence has been much reduced and the discussion now hinges more on an aid/trade ‘balance' than on stark alternatives, the claim that the aid versus trade dilemma has been resolved through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is surely something of an exaggeration. Although a compromise was reached and approved at Barcelona, lingering northern and southern preferences remain as a backdrop to future decisions on disbursements under the MEDA programme and to the overall development of the partnership project. It is possible also that as the Barcelona process unfolds, northern/southern European divergence may become a feature of other discussions, including possibly the ‘postponed' debate about political change in North Africa.
[...]
The North's approximation to the Mediterranean
Before expanding on some of these points, it is worth considering how and why northern European countries have become more interested in the Mediterranean in the 1990s. For although it is true that there is still something of a ‘tendency in northern Europe to see Mediterranean co-operation as an unnecessary luxury' (Hooper, 1995), this tendency has been in decline in the 1990s, as the EU's demonstration of unity at the Barcelona Conference indicated. Certainly, northern European countries were responsible for reducing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership funding package –from the original Ecu 5.5 billion sought by commissioner Manuel Marín to Ecu 4,685 million– by arguing in favour of trade concessions and emphasizing the role of the private sector in providing investment funds (Spencer, 1996b: 9). However, in agreeing to this package they were making an increased commitment of resources to the Mediterranean; in effect, they started to contemplate Europe's relations with its southern neighbours on a much more long-term, open-ended basis than ever before.
What brought about this change in northern attitudes was essentially a combination of events and trends in the southern Mediterranean and political lobbying by southern Europeans. The northern Europeans' recognition of instability in the area is not new: conflicts in the Middle East formed the backcloth against which new uncertainties arose as a result of the end of the Cold War. The main catalyst of European attention in the early 1990s was the outbreak of violence on a huge scale in Algeria following the suspension of the electoral process in 1992. The Islamist challenge in Algeria and signs of unrest in other Arab countries led some northern Europeans to give expression to phobias about ‘Islamic fundamentalism', best exemplified by former secretary-general of NATO Willy Claes's controversial statement about the phenomenon being ‘at least as dangerous' as the former Soviet threat. However, many northern Europeans have shown the same healthy scepticism as Mediterranean states have in rejecting Huntington's thesis about a “clash of civilisations”. The predominant response has been that the Islamists may threaten certain Mediterranean regimes but do not constitute a direct threat to Europe (2).
Nonetheless, there has been a growing awareness in northern Europe that the conditions that have fuelled the radical Islamist movements are not part of some distant overseas malaise, rather that these conditions affect the European Union as a whole. From initial perceptions that the problems of North Africa affected only certain EU member states (mainly those bordering on the Mediterranean) there has been a gradual realisation that the Maghreb, in particular, is of importance to the entire European Union (Mortimer, 1994: 120; House of Lords, 1995). Various European countries, north and south, have experienced the problems of North Africa indirectly through, for example, receiving immigrants and refugees, the appearance of Islamist terrorist groups or support networks and the arrival of new drug-trafficking cartels (Spencer, 1996b: 6). It is worth noting in this context that, during the EU association agreement talks with Morocco, both the Germans and the Dutch voiced complaints about the number of illegal Maghrebi immigrants (Hooper, 1995).
[end of extract]
According to the above excerpt, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia could be interpreted as a successful attempt by Germany to secure a geopolitical access to the Mediterranean.... As Derek put it: we're back in the Bismarckian Age!
Anyway, Algeria might be NATO's next bete noire.... at last!
Regards,
Gustave. |
