Marcos was enabled, emboldened and indulged by more than one U.S.
administration. The fact that you witnessed the suffering of a nation and people you love (rack up another assumption for The Hyena) at a moment in time when RR was in the White House doesn't, in my opinion, justify dumping the whole mess, or even the biggest part of it, in his lap.
The deterioration reached its critical phase during the Reagan years, and the US response to the deterioration was shaped largely by the personal friendship between Reagan and Marcos, which extended back to Reagan's term as Governor. Reagan was saw it simply as an issue of sticking by a friend, and would simply not listen to criticism of Marcos or his Government. This is opinion, but it is based on considerable research, and extended conversations with some people who were extremely frustrated at the absolute refusal of the White House to see or acknowledge what was going on here. I'm sure that Reagan saw this loyalty as a simple masculine virtue; not too many Filipinos agreed.
The other factor shaping the relationship was, of course, the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, to which many of those who were influential in shaping policy subscribed. These people saw the situation simply in terms of good authoritarians vs. bad Commies, and acknowledged no middle ground. This philosophy made it very easy for nominally anticommunist dictators like Marcos to manipulate the US for their own ends. It was clear to anyone who cared to look that Marcos was creating a climate thoroughly conducive to the growth of the rebellion, and that it was growing like a weed under his rule, but very few cared to look.
So Reagan was behind Marcos all the way, and the operative powers behind him had no inclination to overrule, despite repeated reports from all in the field that the country was going to hell in a handbasket, along rails well lubricated by our unfailing support.
Was it you, the other evening, that expressed distaste for U.S. hegemony? What would you have called a U.S. effort to alter the 'friendly' government of the PI?
A difficult call, since we had already altered the course of Philippine history on so many occasions in the past. Marcos would not, indeed could not, have successfully declared martial law and imposed his dictatorship if he had not been assured of continued US support. Massive aid is a distorting factor, withdrawal of massive aid is a distorting factor. Any move, or none, would have altered the field of play, our only choice was the direction in which we wished to alter it. But the decision to continue acknowledging the Philippine Government's guarantees of private loans, even when all involved knew very well that the government could not cover the loans and the private parties borrowing the money, principally the inner circle of Marcos cronies, were busily salting the money away in offshore accounts, imposed a huge hardship on this country, and accomplished nothing but the deposit of a bit more pork in Ferdinand's barrel.
in the years leading up to the Marcos departure, The U.S. had a
keen interest in good relations with the Marcos government because we wanted a military presence near the Southeast Asian mainland.
Why did this need for a military presence require us to support Marcos? This argument assumes that there was no moderate opposition, that the only alternative to Marcos was the communists. This may have been what Marcos wanted Americans to believe, but that doesn't make it true.
It is perhaps interesting to note that we eventually lost the bases not because of leftist opposition, but because of opposition from social conservatives who could not stomach the blatantly racist statements and behaviour of military personnel and the freakish subculture that grew up around the bases. If we had controlled our people, we might well still be there. The volcano, of course, had something to do with the departure. You would be surprised to know how many Filipinos interpreted the eruption as divine judgment against the bases (Pinatubo is located directly between Clark and Subic; Clark was entirely wiped out and abandoned, Subic badly damaged).
The Philippines is very lucky that the combination of Pinatubo and glasnost made the bases less essential; if they had not it is very likely that the US would have resorted to direct action, probably a coup, to retain the bases. This would have been a disaster.
It is also interesting to note that a civil war was only averted in '86 by a complex, unpredictable, and almost freakish sequence of events. Anyone who claims that it was orchestrated in Washington is full of crap. It was a very lucky accident.
the PI is a beautiful and wonderful and wonderfully complex country, but I don't think it's finished with growing pains yet
This is very true. But it pays to remember that there are turning points in history. One of them - a very minor one for us, a very major one for Filipinos - came when a few Americans in Washington and Manila learned that a two-term President of a client state was about to shut down a flawed but functioning democracy, declare martial law, and reign in perpetuity. They could have advised him in no uncertain terms that any such action would cause immediate cancellation of all US aid; there is little doubt that he would have backed down. Instead, they figured it would be easier to deal with an autocrat, and they sat back and let it happen. When we look at the growing pains, we should consider how many of them date back to that moment. (And yes, I realize that this did not happen under Reagan's watch.)
As for the Soviet Union thing -- he looked them in the eye and said, 'get out your checkbook'. An oversimplification, to be sure, but the Soviets NEVER doubted him.
We could probably discuss this at some length, but this post is too long already. |
