Mohan:
Benazir Bhutto dishes out a stinging criticism.
dawn.com
28 July 1999
Wednesday
14 Rabi-us-Saani 1420
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What next in South Asia?
The post-Kargil outlook
Recommendation
What next in South Asia?
By Benazir Bhutto
FOR nearly three months the Kargil conflict threatened South Asia with the prospect of
the first nuclear war since Hiroshima. The Nawaz regime in Pakistan had made it clear
that, if necessary, it would not hesitate to use its recently acquired nuclear power in the
event of an all-out war.
Such a dangerous conflict ended as it began: shrouded in confusion. Whilst the Pakistani
premier announced in Washington that he would ensure the withdrawal of Pakistanis
from across the Line of Control, his official spokesman had another story to tell in the
country's capital. But nothing could conceal the truth: Kargil had been Pakistan's biggest
blunder. The country had lost its eastern wing in 1971 in the face of Indian aggression.
That defeat could be passed onto the Indians. But the regime in Pakistan alone was
responsible for the Kargil blunder.
In the snow-clad mountains, Pakistan-backed men took up positions they had no hope
to keep. Pakistan was made to retreat from the mountaintops in disgrace when it found
itself internationally isolated and blamed for the conflict. Instead of announcing the
withdrawal from Islamabad in an attempt to keep the country's dignity, the prime
minister trotted off to see the American president and "take dictation" from Washington.
The Indian government, which outsmarted, outmanoeuvred and outflanked the Pakistani
leadership at every level, is crowing from the rooftops. The election prospects of the
BJP have received an enormous boost. The Pakistani people, who were told they were
winning the war, are bewildered and humiliated. The Indians are basking in the
accolades the international community is bestowing upon them. They are hoping that "the
maturity and restraint", which earned them world praise, will also mitigate opposition to
their bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
Shock makes it difficult for the Pakistani people to accept that the regime so thoroughly
eroded the credibility of the Kashmiri struggle and Pakistan's backing of it. Pakistan's
vehement denials of involvement, beyond moral support to the Mujahideen, in the Kargil
conflict, has been torn to shreds internationally. There are some who believe that the
Kashmiri cause has been irreparably damaged.
The Pakistan regime has claimed victory. It claims to have established that it values
peace and has won the respect of the international community by having the courage to
finally withdraw. It interprets the Washington agreement as evidence of the
internationalisation of the Kashmir issue. Securing the interest of President Clinton is no
"small thing", maintains Nawaz Sharif.
This interpretation is widely perceived as an attempt to "spin-doctor" a disaster into a
triumph.
However, no matter how monumental the Kargil blunder, the euphoria in India and the
humiliation in Pakistan, the reality of the Kashmiri struggle remains. The hard fact is that
the alienation of the Kashmiri people has triggered three conflicts, including a potential
nuclear conflict. Despite the Washington agreement, the Pakistani withdrawal and the
Indian triumph, the Kashmir dispute poses a threat to peace and stability in South Asia.
The cost for suppressing the Kashmiri people continues to rise for India. Politically, it
damages the country's standing in the international community. Militarily, it calls for
repeated increases in levels of force, to contain the Kashmiri people. After Kargil, the
Indian armed forces' need for permanent deployment of forces along the Line of Control
rises. Financially, the burden increases. Each piece of bread for an Indian soldier costs
between fifty and sixty rupees in the high snow-bound mountains. Deaths from frostbite
and cold exceed those in actual combat by a ratio of five to one. The Indian army will be
strained in guarding the Line of Control, coping with the "insurgency" in Indian occupied
Kashmir and fulfilling its anti-insurgency responsibilities in north-eastern India.
In the current euphoria, the additional resources demanded by the armed forces will be
readily available; the difficulties will come later. Without the cold war largess provided
by the former Soviet Union, the Indian economy will find it increasingly difficult to bear
the cost - as difficult as the Pakistani economy is finding itself in the absence of billion of
dollars from the West when it was an ally of the free world.
No matter how much praise Indian "restraint" may have received, in the ultimate
analysis, violently denying self-determination to the Kashmiri people can backfire. Given
the defiant statements of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference, the Indian armed forces
will continue their policy of burning down entire villages on suspicion that they had
sheltered "militants." Can a world that effectively took stern action against Serb atrocities
in Bosnia and Kosovo remain indifferent to Kashmir? Reality dictates otherwise.
The Indians will say the insurgency is entirely Pakistani inspired and that Kargil has
proved their point. Yet reports in the western press about the fervour of the Kashmiris in
the refugee camps in Azad Kashmir and the frustration of villagers in Indian occupied
Kashmir give a different picture. Some analysts discard the comparisons with Kosovo
because Kashmir is in Asia, not in Europe. Perhaps so. But there can be no diminution
of attention when there is a problem in a newly nuclearized South Asia. When concerns
about global peace and security combine with concerns about gross violations of human
rights, they demand attention.
True progress in South Asia will depend largely on the ability of the two nations to build
a harmonious relationship based on satisfying the sentiments of the All Parties Hurriyet
Conference which represents the Kashmiri people. This may be difficult in the present
circumstances. The Indian people, who warmly greeted their prime minister when he
went on a bus journey to Pakistan extending the olive branch, feel deeply disillusioned.
Their sense of betrayal has been compounded by the long line of coffins returning from
the frontline during the Kargil operation. The policy of the Nawaz regime to make
money through trade with India while preparing a military action against it has hurt
Pakistan's negotiating position. It has also played into the hands of Indian hardliners who
never wanted peace.
But peace is necessary for the Kashmiris, the people of South Asia and for the larger
world community. India and Pakistan will find it difficult to benefit from the many
opportunities offered by the new world of global finance unless the region can promise
stability. That stability and the promise of a better future have, in the short term, been
lost.
But whilst the credibility of the present Pakistani regime has been undermined by its
duplicitous policies, the prospects of sub-continental peace will pick up under a new
leadership. Indian maturity, lauded during the Kargil blunder, will meet its true test in the
quest for a permanent and just peace.
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