You're not being nosy at all Bosco.
Since I have had a long-standing interest in such affairs I enjoy the interplay. But I'm sure others find it rather boring or off-topic, which I can understand.
But this espionage case is relevant to Asia due to massive political tug o' war we're seeing being played out between the WashDC and Bejing. And the bombing of the embassy, Taiwan, and Chinese espionage OR a currency devaluation of the Yuan, are the bullets with which they are fighting the battle.
It pays to examine the quality of the ammunition possessed by either side.
Your parole officer analogy was interesting, but a more appropriate one is that of a "internal affairs" officer not taking the necessary steps to prevent corruption within the ranks of a law enforcement agency.
Because essentially that is the role of a CI investigator/security officer. He is the internal affairs officer who's duty is to make sure that those civilian scientists, who normally loath any security measure that obstructs the free flow of thought or information, don't engage in activities that could compromise all of that classified work the gov't is paying these scientists to undertake.
Vrooman apparently actively encouraged the FBI to pursue its investigation there at Los Alamos, yet now claims that all of the claims had no merit. That's what particularly smacks to me of trying to whitewash his negligence in not having the appropriate security measures in place.
I did some web searches in order to provide some info on some of the claims (since I hate having to retype them in my own words.
From Time magazine:
pathfinder.com
""The FBI's prime suspect is Taiwanese-born American scientist Wen Ho Lee, 59, who first began working in Los Alamos in the 1970s. A well-placed government source tells TIME that Lee traveled to a 1988 seminar in Hong Kong and, with Chinese officials present, allegedly divulged sensitive information on the miniaturization involved in the design of America's most modern warhead, the W-88. In 1995 the CIA obtained a secret Chinese-government document that discussed details of the W-88. The document was dated 1988--the year the warhead went into production and a year in which Lee also visited Beijing. When intelligence analysts studied the data from nine Chinese nuclear tests from 1990 to 1995, they were chagrined to discover that the blasts involved a miniaturized warhead that was a near replica of the W-88.""
""..Richardson ordered Energy to polygraph Lee again--and the scientist failed. On Saturday, March 6, the New York Times broke an extensive story on the scandal, and the FBI swept in. They started questioning Lee gently on Saturday then turned up the heat. By 10 p.m. on Sunday, a U.S. official informs TIME, Lee announced, "I'm not going to tell you anything, and I'm ready to go to jail."""
Ron's note: I hate polygraphs and I'll be the first to admit that they can be notoriously unreliable causing innocent people to appear guilty of deception. Much of depends on the talent of polygrapher. (I know someone related to the polygrapher who tested Linda Tripp and Monica Lewinsky).
""On Monday, Lee finally lost his job for allegedly breaking security rules: failing to report contacts with people from "sensitive" countries, failing to "safeguard" classified material and giving deceptive answers. So far, no criminal charges have been brought against him for his suspected offense.
freerepublic.com
In particular, the FBI is understood to have discovered that Mr Lee and his wife visited Hong Kong without telling Los Alamos, as his security clearance required. He is then believed to have secretly flown to Shanghai, and has also spoken at a number of scientific conferences in China.
His failure to disclose contacts with China's government was a factor in his dismissal. Other offences were described by a Los Alamos spokesman as "the sort of thing that might include taking in a clock-radio that had a tape recorder built in or leaving a classified document on your desk while going to the bathroom".
Ron's Notes: Now the question is whether or not there was an active briefing/debriefing program in place (which is Vrooman's responsibility) for scientists traveling to "threat nations". But if this program did not exist, the blame rests directly on the counter intelligence officer (Vrooman) as he now has created the circumstances where scientists could be placed in situations where they face compromise or recruitment, as well as failing to take advantage of a VALUABLE intelligence collection resource (debriefing scientists AFTER their trip to glean their perspective on what they say).
Wen Ho Lee created the circumstances where he came under suspicion. You just don't fly to communist China without disclosing that trip. It's stupid... it's suspicious... and it's places one in a position of losing their position of trust.
I hated working in a classified environment. It's a real hassle on one's personal life. It intrudes into personal and financial privacy, but it is the sacrifice that must be paid in order to make sure that secrets worth billions of dollars, or places our nation at risk, don't fall into the hands of those who aren't exactly friendly towards us.
Everyone who has worked in a classified environment knows what they should or shouldn't do. They know the repercussions from violating those rules. And they are rebriefed each and every year to make sure they understand those rules.
So that's why I don't have a lot of sympathy for Wo Hen Lee, or Peter Lee, or anyone else working in such a highly classified environment.
Their job is not a right. It's a priviledge that remains only as long as they meet the requirements for that "Q" (or TS/SBI..etc) clearance.
Just my opinion... Don't feel oblige to respond unless you wish to.. This is just the kind of discussion that gets my ol' noggin thinking.
I apologize if I have put everyone to sleep... :0)
Regards,
Ron |
