China-Russia Power Sharing in Central Asia
Summary:
The conclusion of Turkmen Defense Minister Batyr Sardzhayev's visit
to Beijing has solidified Turkmen-Chinese military relations,
promising to enhance Turkmenistan's regional military and economic
strength. With this, China is bidding for influence in Central Asia
in a way that could temper Russia's traditional role in the region.
China's bilateral relations with Turkmenistan will indicate how
well their "multi-polar" world might proceed.
Analysis:
China's offer of military cooperation with Turkmenistan will
demonstrate Russia's and China's faculties to share power in Central
Asia. Russia will have to accommodate its new partner as China
assumes an uncharacteristic role in the region. Because of the
potential benefit of economic and military relations with
Turkmenistan, both China and Russia may discover the destructive
role of self-interest in their attempted "multi-polar" world.
During his seven-day visit to China, Turkmen Defense Minister Batyr
Sardzhayev met with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, Defense Minister
Col. Gen. Chi Haotian, and PLA Chief of General Staff Fu Quanyou.
This was the first such visit to China by the Turkmen defense
minister since the two nations established diplomatic ties seven
years ago. Chi declared his recent meeting with the Turkmen
defense minister the "most important event in the history of
military relations between China and Turkmenistan."
Military leaders from both sides discussed the potential for
cooperation in personnel training and in the use and repair of
military equipment. Sardzhayev was given a tour of Chinese military
garrisons, an academy and an aviation division. The visit concludes
a long and involved courtship between China and Turkmenistan,
confirming their will to cooperate militarily.
Turkmenistan is the most neutral of the Central Asian states.
Unlike the other "-stans" it has no binding relations with either
the U.S. or Russia. From Turkmen President Niyazov's point of view,
his country's neutrality is a product of Russian neglect and
American discomfort with the poor human rights record. In a recent
meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Niyazov
protested that his country's "doors are open," though it was
"Russia that has so far not been coming here."
In fact, Russia is in the process of downsizing its military
presence in Turkmenistan. It agreed in July to withdraw its border
patrol forces from Turkmenistan by November 19, 1999. This marks
the end of an agreement made December 23, 1993, permitting Russia
to maintain a border patrol force within Turkmen territory. The
initial force presence of 1,900 has over the years dwindled to 200,
and in May the Turkmen foreign ministry appealed for their removal.
Though Russia is cutting back its active personnel in Central Asia,
the frequency of recent military-diplomatic efforts in the region
indicates that Russia has no intention of losing any military
dependents in the region. Russian supply of training, advising and
hardware is on the rise in Central Asia, culminating with the
Kyrgyzstan hostage crisis. On August 27, Russian air force
commander-in-chief General Anatoli Kornukov announced that Moscow
would provide anti-aircraft systems and fighters to CIS countries
on a "long-term lease" basis. Negotiations are said to be underway
with Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Russia will
continue to cultivate Turkmenistan as a strategic partner,
irrespective of China's recent maneuvers.
Russia has historically held influence over Central Asian states by
maintaining a stable military presence in each country. This
approach is being gradually phased out. Russian diplomacy is now
more even-handed in the region, allowing smaller militaries to
maintain their own defenses with less Russian supplements.
Konstantin Totskiy, director of Russia's Federal Border Service,
has negotiated with Central Asian countries more unilaterally for
the past six months on issues of border patrol demobilization.
Demobilizing Russian forces abroad - while offering "technical
support" country to country - puts teeth in Russia's flimsy
Collective Security Treaty and lets Russia become a partner in
military support rather than a regional hegemon.
Turkmenistan's recent lean toward China may be Niyazov's initial
step away from his characteristic neutrality. Over the past year,
China has done more to fill in the bilateral void left by Russia
and the U.S. on the economic front. It appears now that China will
attempt the same on the military front.
Traditional Russian and growing Chinese inroads into this area are
competing with the stable influence of the U.S. in Central Asia
under the Partnership for Peace program. Military exchanges and
training exercises between the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan are common, without becoming a diplomatic affront to
Russia. But China's involvement with Turkmenistan is an incipient
move to check U.S. influence in the long term, not Russia's. China's
military cooperation with Turkmenistan does not portend a decline of
Russian influence over Central Asia.
The impact of China's cooperation with Turkmenistan is more
immediate in terms of Russia-China relations. If the countries'
shared influence over Turkmenistan proves difficult to manage, then
shared influence over the rest of Central Asia may prove equally
problematic in the future. Cooperation in Turkmenistan will
challenge the resolve of Russia and China to accomplish the "multi-
polar" world they envision. Military cooperation with Turkmenistan
is political and flexible, and suggests no transparent victor.
Turkmenistan's bilateral military cooperation with Russia and China
is less likely to threaten the countries' mutual influence in
Central Asia. Oil and gas, on the other hand, is a market
indicating a clear victor.
China's aggressive cultivation of Turkmenistan's oil market, and
Russia's inability to sanction it, may be a hitch in Russian-China
relations. Over the past year, China's National Petroleum Company
has helped rebuild over 100 wells in Turkmenistan, accounting for
the steady increase in the country's export production.
Turkmenistan is also on China's ten-year schedule for gas
importation. If reserve estimates are correct, Turkmenistan will
soon be the third largest gas exporter in the world behind Russia
and Iran. China is essentially liberating Turkmenistan from the
rigid monopoly of Russia's state-owned Gazprom, which has forbidden
the westward transport of Turkmen gas and oil.
Turkmenistan is a rare and critical case study of the new diplomacy
between Russia and China in Central Asia. Both nations' lobby for
military cooperation with Turkmenistan will gauge the compatibility
of Russia and China, illustrating how the "multi-polar" world might
operate. Should Russia revise its policy on the export of Turkmen
gas, and challenge the economic partnership between China and
Turkmenistan, the aspirations toward a "multi-polar" world will
stumble.
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