Russia Tries to Force Georgia's Cooperation
Summary:
Relations between Russia and Georgia have deteriorated over the
past week since Russia's decision to lift a 1994 border security
arrangement with the breakaway republic of Abkhazia, thus opening
the northward route from separatist Abkhazia. To Georgia's chagrin,
this open border allows for a substantial increase in traffic flow,
including commerce and weapons, between Russia and Abkhazia. This is
Russia's reply to Georgia's failure to guard its northern border
with Chechnya and Georgia will now be made as vulnerable as it has
made Russia.
Analysis:
Russia's decision on Sept. 9, 1999, to lift border
controls on the separatist region of Abkhazia has raised Russia-
Georgia tensions at a time when cooperation is critical. Russia's
sudden maneuver is clearly timed to push Georgia toward a more
cooperative policy on Chechnya. At the height of an air campaign in
Chechnya, Russia has opened the northward route from the separatist
Abkhazia, doing its best to coerce Georgia into cooperation.
Georgia's response to Russia's provocation could mold interstate
relations for the near-term.
Previously, Russia oversaw border policing in Abkhazia's north,
while maintaining a U.N.-backed contingent in Abkhazia's south.
Though Russian peacekeepers will stay on the buffer zone on the
Abkhaz-Georgia border, Russian border police will no longer monitor
the north. Consequently, Abkhazia and Russia share an open border,
allowing Abkhaz separatists to foster trade and military contact in
Russia and the North Caucasus. This could potentially bolster
Abkhazia's defenses against Georgia.
Abkhazia was an autonomous republic administered by Georgia until a
bloody, yearlong war ended on Sept. 27, 1993. More than 3,000
soldiers from the Georgian army were killed, along with 7,000
civilians of Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Abkhaz nationality.
Over 300,000 (60 percent) of Abkhazia's pre-war population, most of
whom were Georgian, fled the region and sought asylum elsewhere.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze portrays this conflict
similarly to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, though lacking
international sympathies. Since 1994, Russian forces have patrolled
the Georgia-Abkhazia border in a peacekeeping capacity under the
U.N. Observers' Mission in Georgia, and maintained a cordon between
Russia and Abkhazia.
Russia decreased its military presence last July and demobilized
the remaining 1,800 forces along Georgia's borders with Chechnya
and Turkey, at the urging of the Georgian government. Barring any
regional conflicts, Georgia's military and police structure could
have adequately protected its own borders.
However, with the onset of war in Chechnya, the situation has
changed. Georgia does not have the military capacity or the
transportation facilities to seal its border with Chechnya per
Russia's request. Georgia's reluctance to cooperate in the war
effort, coupled with President Shevardnadze's amicable relations
with Chechen Aslan President Maskhadov, has polarized Russian-Georgian
interests.
On September 9, Russia unilaterally annulled bilateral resolutions,
in place since 1994, for securing the northern borders of Abkhazia
and Azerbaijan. Georgia's foreign ministry was informed by memo
more than a week later. Caucasus Press judged the memo to be a
thinly veiled threat for noncooperation with Russia along the
Georgia-Chechnya border.
At present, Abkhazia has an open border with Russia. Georgia does
not have the material capability to restore the northern Abkhaz
border or deploy troops along the 80 km border with Chechnya. Nor
does Georgia have the political leverage to compel Russia to
reinstate its border resolution, or maintain economic sanctions on
Abkhazia. By opening its southern border with Abkhazia, Russia is
challenging Georgia's sovereignty and mocking its military self-
sufficiency.
In reply, Georgia has a variety of options. It can fight back
diplomatically and continue its appeals to the OSCE and Council of
Europe to remove four of Russia's last military bases from Georgia.
Georgia could continue to leave its border with Chechnya unguarded,
risking an influx of refugees and rebels. Or Georgia could do the
politically unconscionable and assist Russia in its war effort,
cooperating to capacity with Russian troops and fortifying the
Georgian-Chechen border.
Dagestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia have all thrown the welcome
mat down for Russian forces, making the quarantine of Chechnya
almost complete. Georgia, however, is a sovereign state and a
gaping whole to Chechnya's south. It could be a sieve for rebel
forces either in retreat or gunrunning into Chechnya. If Georgia
continues to balk on military cooperation, President Shevardnadze
might find himself in the same league with Chechen President
Maskhadov as accomplice to the Chechen rebels.
Committees within the Russian Duma and Ministry of Defense are
already bustling with allegations against Georgia for
noncooperation. Though Russia is in no position to impose itself
militarily against Georgia, Georgia is in a position to help Russia
in its fight in Chechnya. If it does not, Russia may pressure
Georgia even further, lifting economic sanctions on Abkhazia
altogether and perhaps interfering in Georgian pipeline projects.
__________________________________________________
SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU)
stratfor.com
or send your name, organization, position, mailing
address, phone number, and e-mail address to
alert@stratfor.com
UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU)
stratfor.com
___________________________________________________
STRATFOR.COM
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________
(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
|
