Obasanjo's Deathwish?
Summary:
A series of recent arrests and allegations signals Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo's continuing campaign against members
of former military governments, particularly the Abacha and
Abubakar regimes. He appears to be playing a complicated political
game in which he is going after potential opponents while at the
same time keeping other political factions off balance. Since there
is no clear faction supporting Obasanjo, he is deftly playing
groups off one another to maintain and perhaps strengthen his
political hand.
Analysis:
President Obasanjo has recently stepped up his campaign against the
corruption of the various military regimes that have ruled Nigeria
during the last 30 years. Most recently, the government announced
Oct. 6 the arrest of Mohammed Abacha, son of late military dictator
Sani Abacha. Obasanjo is apparently also proceeding with his
prosecution of Abacha's former security chief, Major Hamza al-
Mustapha - either oblivious to or unconcerned about possible
ramifications.
This lack of concern could be due to Obasanjo's confidence -
allowing him to attack a diverse group of former military rulers -
or it could betray desperation. The systematic nature of his
campaign, however, does not indicate desperation. In recent months,
Obasanjo has taken legal and economic steps against members of the
most recent military regimes. We do not see any particularly strong
factions capable of supporting Obasanjo against the others, which
raises the question of how he will survive this current bid for
increased power.
First, Obasanjo stepped up his campaign in August, announcing
significant cuts in the military and a clampdown on corrupt oil
concessions [ stratfor.com ].
Since then, there have been a series of arrests culminating in that
of Abacha, Jr. Al-Mustapha was arrested on suspicion of murder
almost immediately after Obasanjo assumed office in June. The al-
Mustapha investigation has come uncomfortably close to the man who
willingly handed power to Obasanjo in May, Gen. Abdulsalami
Abubakar.
The allegations are slowly making their way to the top. Mustapha's
henchmen, Sgt. Barnabas Mcheila, "alias Rogers," has described how
a hit squad known as "Strike Force" worked under the Abacha regime
to do away with political opponents. This squad operated under the
direct control of al-Mustapha and was responsible for dozens of
assassinations and attempted assassinations. Al-Mustapha was also
reportedly involved in the murder of Sani Abacha, who - as the
current conventional wisdom in Nigeria holds - died of poison
rather than a heart attack.
Now the plot thickens. On Sept. 9, Gen. Jerry Useni, former
minister of the federal district under Abacha, was detained in
connection with Abacha's murder. He is the highest-ranking official
to be detained so far, although the allegations likely will
continue to climb. Abubakar admitted last year that Abacha had
planned to retire him and other members of his regime - but
conveniently died the day before.
As of yet, no formal charges have been leveled at Abubakar, though
Obasanjo is sending a clear message that the Abubakar faction is
not exempt from investigation. The first sign that the gloves were
coming off came Oct. 6, as the senate announced Abubakar might be
called to testify before the committee on drugs and narcotics. If
called, he will have to explain why he ordered the removal of the
national law enforcement agency from the ports prior to handing
power to Obasanjo.
In addition to these investigations, Obasanjo is going after the
wealth of former military rulers. In his speech before the U.N.
General Assembly Sept. 23, Obasanjo requested an international
convention or agreement to compel banks to repatriate funds to
countries from which they have been stolen. On Sept. 16, he ordered
24 senior military officers to return lands in Lagos state
illegally appropriated under former military regimes. Finally,
Abacha Jr.'s arrest stemmed from corruption charges alleging that
he and his family embezzled millions as part of a deal with then-
President Abubakar.
The opposition does not appear to be taking these steps lying down.
A new political group representing northern (Hausa-Faulani)
interests, the United Democratic Front, say their concerns are not
being properly addressed because of their constituency's ties with
past military regimes. The group has called on several former
leaders, including former heads of state Alhaji Shagari, Gen.
Mohammed Buhari, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and Abubakar, for support.
Obasanjo seems to be taking notice: Several reports indicate that
security was beefed up at the Presidential Mansion on Oct. 5 -
prompting rumors of a coup attempt - although the government has
made moves to play down this possibility.
While it is clear who is against him, it is not clear who does
support Obasanjo. Popular support is unlikely. While his policies
have achieved much acclaim among the public at large and within the
international community, the president's recent actions have not
been accompanied by mass demonstrations in support of the
government. It is also unclear how international efforts could
protect Obasanjo.
A somewhat more convincing possibility is that Obasanjo is counting
on money from the oil sector to bolster his support. However, while
the oil situation has been improving, its growth is not spectacular
and there is still much to be done. A sudden economic windfall that
could be used to pay off allies is not in sight. Of course, given
the seriousness of current allegations, even cash might not be a
sufficient payoff.
Most interestingly, there could be two factions in the military.
Obasanjo's search for illegal foreign assets has studiously avoided
implicating Gen. Babangida, suggesting he may be behind Obasanjo.
In addition, the Pathfinder Group was founded recently, with the
express purpose of promoting Obasanjo's policies. The group is
headed by the minister of police and former adjutant general of the
army, retired Maj. Gen. David Jemibewon, who has long been
associated with pro-democracy factions within the military.
Obasanjo may be trying to rally military allies behind the scenes
or through the Pathfinder Group, but neither Jemibewon nor
Babangida have the power to protect Obasanjo should it come to out-
and-out confrontation with other factions in the military -
particularly those of Abacha and Abubakar.
None of these possibilities explain how Obasanjo is surviving these
maneuvers. He may in fact be playing a comparatively weak hand to
its fullest. Obasanjo is a seasoned political operator and these
moves have not been made recklessly. He has made it clear, however,
that no one in either the Abacha or Abubakar cliques can consider
themselves to be safe.
The announcement on October 5 that the Oputa Human Rights
Commission was extending its investigations to cover all abuses
from 1966 onwards serves notice to all other military rulers that
they are also subject to scrutiny. Further, Obasanjo can hold out
the possibility that various groups could escape the commission in
return for support against others - or at least non-interference.
This could hold potential enemies at bay.
Obasanjo is going after the Abacha and Abubakar cliques first
because they represent the greatest threat to his regime. Since
they held power most recently, more of their cronies remain in
positions of influence. Their abuses are also the most recent and
foremost in the public's imagination. Unless there is some shadowy
patron with considerable power - and we can find no likely
candidates - Obasanjo is playing a savvy political game designed to
keep his opponents as well as his allies off-balance while he
consolidates his hold on power.
(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
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