That has got to be the most self-serving and totally inaccurate accounts of those events that I have ever read, and I have read many. You should stop trusting panegyric biographies; there is little honest information to be gleaned from them. If the rest of D'Souza's book is on that level, it must be a farce indeed.
For a more accurate rendition, try Raymond Bonner's Waltzing With a Dictator.
I was right in the middle of the events in question, and have taken a particular interest in digging into what happened behind the scenes (I already know what happened on the street, much of which did not go in the news). I don't think you want to challenge me on this one.
Specific inaccuracies:
Reagan sent Nevada Senator Paul Laxalt as his envoy to inform Marcos that he should hold an election to demonstrate whether he had a mandate to rule the country.
The discussions revolved around ways in which an "election" could be held to create an appearance of legitimacy. The solution - reached with full approval of both parties - was to announce the election a mere two months before it was to be held. This was intended to leave the opposition insufficient time to agree on a candidate, let alone mount a campaign. Nobody thought the opposition could win. They weren't supposed to win.
Marcos procrastinated, then finally scheduled the election for January 1986.
February, actually.
Marcos prevailed, but the election was characterized by widespread voter fraud and intimidation.
Marcos did not prevail. The count was rigged, and rigged so badly that the computer operators running the tally walked out in protest. Reagan distinguished himself in this period by publicly suggesting that there had been fraud "on both sides".
Reagan had sent a delegation under Senator Richard Lugar to monitor irregularities; Lugar concluded that Marcos had stolen the election.
This is accurate, but not complete: Lugar came under intense pressure from the White House to declare that the election, though flawed, constituted a legitimate mandate. He refused to do it.
Two of Marcos's senior generals, his defense minister and acting chief of staff, resigned from the government and joined Aquino.
These events happened several weeks after the election. During that time Reagan urged Aquino to abide by the results of the election. Don't you wonder why D'Souza didn't mention that?
He sent a private message to Marcos that the United States would not tolerate his using force to stay in office.
The message was public. It said that the US would not offer asylum or support if force was used. Marcos ordered the use of force, including air strikes, but the units in question defected. Other units did fire on civilians, but asylum was offered anyway.
The account of the meeting at which Reagan was finally convinced to abandon Marcos is similarly flawed. Independent reports say that it took a combined team from State, CIA, and Defense to wear down his total refusal to drop Marcos, and that only their joint conviction that leaving Marcos in power would result in a communist victory, which was true, finally convinced him.
We should have dropped him in '83, if not before.
By the time Reagan actually gave in and talked to Marcos on the phone, it no longer mattered. The question at issue by then was not whether to preserve his regime, but whether or not to rescue him. By that time he had no forces left to fight with, and his palace was surrounded by an angry mob. The only question was whether he was going to leave by helicopter or in a box, or more likely lots of little boxes. |
