The great nuclear debate
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan
The Pakistan foreign minister has spoken of a policy of 'peace and patience'. This must remain our first and preferred option. But it will succeed better if it is
backed by an unwavering determination to defend Pakistan's core interests.
IN the last three decades or so, there has not been a greater spectacle in Pakistan than to see how the mighty have fallen. The space that our print media is devoting to the consequences of the events of October 12 is the latest illustration of this political version of a blood sport. On its own part, the military government is fortunately more focused on economic and other structural reforms without which the stigma of a failed state cannot be washed away.
Unless Pakistan's economic vulnerability is radically decreased, the task of formulating a sustainable security policy remains elusive and uncertain.
Unfortunately, we live in a virtually anarchic world. The fact that our national priorities are right does not earn us any immunity against external pressures.
The Indian attitude towards Pakistan's participation in the Commonwealth summit, the SAARC summit and the larger question of the much-needed India-Pakistan dialogue is an ample demonstration of the tendency to extract the maximum possible advantage out of our domestic predicament. By the same token, Pakistan should also expect enhanced pressure on the nuclear issue.
It is in the fitness of things that high government representatives have emphasized the need for the emergence of a national consensus on basic issues like the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in this regard.
The tests of May 1998 had lifted the veil of ambiguity and opaqueness for all times to come. Even before these tests, in 1997, the renowned Indian scientist, Raja Ramanna, had publicly acknowledged that the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 was actually a test for an atomic bomb. The publication of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine made it manifestly clear that India intended to maintain its nuclear weapons capability at a high level in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
The Pakistani response at the official and academic levels has reflected a widespread and well-founded desire to maintain a minimum nuclear force deemed sufficient to achieve deterrence well short of being sucked into a
ruinous nuclear arms race with India. The discussion of the term 'minimum deterrence', however, has understandably shown up varying interpretations.
For some, the existence of a few city busters, capable of wreaking havoc in one or two major cities of the enemy, is enough of a deterrent. The others visualize more varied scenarios, including those involving open nuclear war.
In these columns, I have argued that though the Pakistani deterrent did not have to seek any fixed ratio to the Indian nuclear weapons, it required a self-assured autonomous existence in which dynamic reappraisals determined the size. The low level that we aim at is thus not a static but a dynamic concept, which presupposes continued freedom to preserve deterrent stability through increments, improvements. and diversification of warheads and delivery vehicles.
International and regional developments that have taken place since May 1998 point to a new global crisis in regard to nuclear proliferation. Sadly, these developments warrant that our concept of minimum nuclear deterrence be stretched towards sufficiency, or towards what is now occasionally referred to, largely because of the new thinking in China, as " limited deterrent".
India has firmly and irrevocably situated itself in a global framework of nuclear challenge and response. Its ,future policies would depend largely on progress towards global nuclear disarmament and on its perception of the nuclear capability of China. Secondly, it will pursue conventional military power in as unrestrained a manner as during the last three decades and keep it basically Pakistan-oriented. Third, so far as nuclear weapons and missile systems are concerned, it would play the big league on the global stage.? Notwithstanding the initial assertions that nuclear weapons capability would not be allowed to become the currency of international influence and prestige, more and more Indian strategic thinkers are convinced that their country is well on its way to becoming a permanent member of the Security Council.
The new nuclear crisis has many dimensions. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has run into deep trouble because of the failure of the major nuclear powers, especially the United States, to ratify it. Washington, Moscow and Beijing seem to be sequentially linked when it comes to ratification.
In Russia's case, there are now fundamental difficulties. NATO's eastward expansion has been viewed with deep concern. There is an apprehension that Russia's conventional forces are not adequate to deter possible western moves to incorporate the Baltic states and even Ukraine in the western political, economic and security systems. There is, therefore, a renewed reliance on nuclear weapons. The Russian Duma has not significantly moved towards ratification of START II. The imaginative manoueuvre to skirt around this obstacle by engaging in START III negotiations has not advanced beyond the preliminaries. What has complicated matters for both Russian and China is the
United States' approach to the ABM Treaty and the development of Theatre Missile Defence systems, including sites in the Pacific basin. Following consultations between Russia and China in Moscow on April 14, 1999, the two sides jointly voiced their grave concern at the US plans to prepare a national defence system for deployment in the United States and abroad.
The joint press communique issued by Russia and China contained an implicit threat of the resumption of an arms race that would inevitably include an expansion and vertical upgradation of the nuclear capability of the two countries. This will doubtless be seized by India as enough of justification for a relentless implementation of the quantitative and qualitative goals inherent in its own nuclear doctrine. Pakistan is no part of the global calculus of nuclear weapons but would find it difficult to ignore major increments in the Indian capability, justified by India as a legitimate response to developments outside South Asia.
The present trend is for a new generation of missiles capable of penetrating national anti-missile systems to deliver increasingly lethal payloads. The Russian SS-26 is believed to represent a major advance in the technology for the penetration of theatre missile defence systems. Their SS -27 TOPOL-M (already deployed) would have the same ability in a range extending to 10,500 kilometers. Russia is also developing a version for its submarines.
China maintained a policy of restraint for a long time and preferred to concentrate on rapid economic development marked by growth rates of 7% plus for years. But now it may be compelled to rethink the size and quality of
its nuclear capability. It is also focusing on penetration aids to overcome the US threat of creating a new missile defence environment around it. China might have already expanded its arsenal of ICBMs. It has made noticeable progress in developing re-entry vehicles (RVs) and multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs.). Its DF-6, and the future DF-31 solid fuel ICBMs and the eventual DF-41 would certainly have the advanced technology for greater penetration of missile defence environment. India will doubtless seek to match this capability.
The international situation militates against India responding positively to Pakistani proposals for restraint regimes both in the conventional field and in the realms of nuclear weapons and missiles. Since it has global ambitions, it will resist being tied to any bilateral restraint regimes with Pakistan, and bilateral diplomacy may remain restricted to rudimentary CBMs for quite some time.
India's GDP in 1998 stood at Rs 19 trillion - that is $ 469 billion compared to Pakistan's Rs 2.8 trillion or $ 61 billion. In 1999 India increased its defence budget again to Rs 457 billion ($10.7 billion). There is a noticeable increase in the budget provision for atomic energy and space with a deep nexus between civil and military projects. In the absence of any significant progress towards the resolution of bilateral disputes, the threat to Pakistan's security will keep increasing as India adds to its force structures and invests them with high -tech features. The increasing gap would make Pakistan even more dependent on nuclear deterrence.
The minimalists in Pakistan are right insofar as it is a question of an unbridled arms race with India. But the challenge of reconciling minimum with credible
deterrence should not be underestimated. It will have to be faced squarely as pressures to cut off fissile materials mount. India has sufficient weapons-grade plutonium in its stockpile. Pakistan's stockpile is probably well short of the minimum number of warheads that the Indian arsenal would dictate.
There are elements in Pakistani nuclear deterrence that need to be resolutely defended if it is to remain credible. Pakistan cannot undertake premature
obligations under the Fissile Material Treaty. Its readiness to participate fully in negotiating it is all that can be asked for, and conceded, at this stage. Several international experts have been sceptical about the veracity of the claims made by India and Pakistan for the yield of the 1998 tests. Until and unless the entry into force clause of the CTBT is triggered, Pakistan must not surrender its right to further testing if the situation so warrants, irrespective of when it signs it.
The proliferation of missiles in the region, especially India's continued pursuit of both the Prithvi and Agni series, requires a clear, if also carefully calibrated and controlled, augmentation of Pakistan's conventional and nuclear-capable missiles. Given the grave imbalance of conventional forces and the absence of
a result-oriented process for the settlement of outstanding issues, Pakistan cannot commit itself to non-first-use of nuclear weapons either. Deterrent stability may turn out to be the most reliable policy for avoidance of conflict.
Since Pakistan has no basic quarrel with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and has been forced into their production by India, it has to
undertake proactive diplomacy to persuade the international community as to what kind of just settlement between India and Pakistan will reverse the present escalation in the nuclear field. By proposing a restraint regime, Pakistan is offering the cornerstone for the building of architecture of peace and security in South Asia. This should more appropriately be the focus of the international efforts and not discriminatory pressure to force Pakistan to give up or dilute its nuclear deterrent against a threat, which is all too real. The Pakistan foreign minister has spoken of a policy of 'peace and patience'. This must remain our first and preferred option. But it will succeed better if it is backed by an unwavering determination to defend Pakistan's core interests. |
