The West Loses Its Grip On Georgia
Summary
The Russian and Georgian interior ministers announced Jan. 22 the
launching of joint border patrols to police the Chechen-Georgian
border, reported Russian Radio. If true, this marks a collapse in
Georgian government policy and establishes a new Russian military
presence in Georgia. The West must react quickly, or Russian
policies will further erode Georgian independence.
Analysis
Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo and his Georgian
counterpart Kakha Targamadze announced Jan. 22 the beginning of
joint border operations - codenamed Undercover - to police the
Chechen-Georgian border, reported Russian Radio. If true, this
marks a significant policy shift for the Georgian government and
establishes a new Russian military presence in Georgia. The West
must react quickly or face losing Georgia as an ally in the
Caucasus.
At the beginning of the Chechen war, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze steadfastly refused any Russian presence on the border
stating that Georgia was capable of monitoring it. This view has
incrementally changed over the past five months. A few weeks into
the Chechen campaign, in early November 1999, Georgia insisted that
in addition to monitoring the border, it would seal it. But
instead, in December, Russia dropped paratroopers at the most
accessible connection between Chechnya and Georgia, at the top of
the Argun Valley, and sealed it themselves. Georgia responded by
welcoming an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
monitoring group, hinting that Russians could join this effort.
Now, with a contentious CIS summit
[http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/012100.ASP] as a backdrop,
Georgia has agreed to participate in the joint operation.
The Russian component, the composition of which has yet to be
determined, must be flown into Georgia, because Russia does not
have land access to the border from the north. It is likely the
force will be based somewhere in Georgia. The logical headquarters
for the operation is the Russian base near the Georgian city of
Vaziani - the same base the Georgian government has doggedly tried
to wrest from Russian control for several years. Shevardnadze's
original position of refusing Russia access to its borders has
collapsed.
Georgia's agreement to participate in what is likely a Russian-
dominated operation on Georgian territory serves two purposes for
Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin. First, sealing the
Georgian border will finally prevent the Chechens from resupplying
their forces. This signals the beginning of the end of the Chechen
War.
Second, Georgia's decision informs Putin that the West will not
significantly intervene in his efforts to manipulate the states of
the South Caucasus into assisting him in eliminating the Chechen
rebels. For the last five months, Shevardnadze has sought Western
support to maintain Tbilisi's independent line vis-a-vis Moscow.
Having realized that Washington will not support him, he has
changed Georgian policy to placate Russia. The only way Georgia can
be prevented from falling back into Russia's orbit is if Turkey
establishes a military presence in Georgia - something that becomes
less likely with every passing day.
Other CIS states have noticed that the West has abandoned Georgia.
Normally independent-minded Uzbek President Islam Karimov recently
stated that if Islamic militants threatened his country, then
"Russia is a country we can rely on." Turkmenistan is also sounding
conciliatory toward Russia. It is now looking to Russia as a
petroleum export route after Azerbaijan rebuffed it in a pipeline
deal. Azerbaijan, too, is speaking of diversifying its oil export
routes to include additional Russian pipelines. This is a far cry
from its "Baku-Ceyhan or bust" rhetoric of the past several years.
The shift from a willingness to "observe the border" without
Russians to "secure the border" with Russians marks a
transformation in the Georgian government's perception of
geopolitical realities. Russia is economically and diplomatically,
and in the case of Georgia, militarily, reasserting its influence
in the states of the former Soviet south.
[http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special13.htm] The lack
of Western support and Putin's more aggressive strategy in Chechnya
[http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c0001190220.htm] have forced
Shevardnadze to seek a "normalizing of relations" with Russia -
code for establishing relations on Russia's terms - at the CIS
summit. Unless the West begins to invest the resources required to
maintain Georgia's independent line - and quickly - Georgia will be
only the first former Soviet state to capitulate to Russian
demands.
(c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. stratfor.com
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