Actually thank you Mr. Carter- who f*cked up the 1954 treaty we had with Taiwan by doing a poor job in 1979 of recognizing China without carefully setting out a protection policy for Taiwan.
So the Republican congress- whom you can also thank- passed a bill aimed at correcting what congress perceived as the shortcomings in the Carter agreement with China- and thus affirming our commitment to protect Taiwan.
Objective #1: Taiwan Security
The lack of a policy to address Taiwan's security needs was the most glaring shortcoming of the Carter
Administration's proposal. Given that Taiwan for 25 years had been a partner with the United States to a mutual
defense treaty, this was a shocking omission. The Carter bill did not even mention arms sales or address the U.S.
interest in Taiwan's security. Unable to secure a renunciation of force from Beijing, the Administration seemed to
rely almost entirely on Beijing's understanding that Washington expected peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Congress filled this void with a policy that declared peace in the Taiwan Strait a matter of international concern,
linked diplomatic recognition of Beijing with peaceful treatment of Taiwan, considered any non-peaceful action a
threat to regional peace and security, provided for the sale to Taiwan of arms sufficient for self-defense, and
committed the U.S. to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against
Taiwan.
Broadening the U.S. view of Taiwan's security blunted Beijing's claim that Taiwan's status was solely an internal
matter, but it also made clear to U.S. policymakers what would happen if the United States failed to honor its
commitments to Taiwan. As Senator Robert Dole (R-KA) noted, "If the Taiwanese question is not resolved in
favor of freedom and independence, then...none of the nations who rely on the strength of America and the good
faith of our commitments to dissuade stronger and more aggressive alliances...can hope for freedom of choice in a
secure and stable future." 6
Understanding the importance of protecting Taiwan's security, Congress then turned its attention to deterring acts
of aggression against Taiwan. Diplomatic recognition of Beijing was linked to the expectation that China would
use only peaceful means in dealing with Taiwan. Building on the language of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty,
Congress declared any use of force or coercion against Taiwan, including boycott and embargo, to be a threat to
regional peace and security and of grave concern to the United States.
Beyond these diplomatic deterrents, Congress made clear the that the United States would continue to sell arms
to Taiwan, that these arms would support a sufficient self-defense, and that China would have no veto over such
sales. During committee debate, Representative Robert Lagomarsino (R-CA) made the point crystal clear: "If
President Carter is going to abrogate the defense treaty with Taiwan, the least we can do is sell arms to willing
buyers on Taiwan." 7
"[We] do not mean that we will deliver to [Taiwan] outmoded, outdated, horse-drawn vehicles," emphasized
Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY). "We mean that we will deliver to them appropriate equipment which is
necessary to the defense of Taiwan." 8 Representative Edward Derwinski (R-IL) added during final floor debate
that "This provision is meant to ensure that Taiwan's defense needs are determined by its authorities and those of
the United States without regard to the views of the PRC." 9
The final element of security strategy came in the form of an amendment offered by Representative Dan Quayle
(R-IN). The Quayle amendment made sure that, in addition to assisting Taiwan's self-defense, the United States
would maintain its own capacity to resist any resort to force or other coercion that would jeopardize either
Taiwan's security or its social or economic system. 10 U.S. readiness to resist mainland aggression or coercion
against Taiwan serves the purpose of increasing the cost and complication of any plans by China to threaten
Taiwan's security or economic and social stability. |
